BALKAN UPDATE

Constitutional Court in Kosovo says election of President was illegal, doesn't explain why

2011-03-29T12:04:00.008-05:00

Kosovo's Constitutional Court ruled the other day that the election of President Pacolli by the parliament a month ago was unconstitutional according to Article 86 of the constitution.

For your reference, Article 86 of Kosovo Constitution is listed below:

1. The President of the Republic of Kosovo shall be elected by the Assembly in secret ballot.
2. The election of the President of the Republic of Kosovo shall take place no later than thirty (30) days before the end of the current president’s term of office.
3. Every eligible citizen of the Republic of Kosovo may be nominated as a candidate for President of the Republic of Kosovo, provided he/she presents the signatures of at least thirty (30) deputies of the Assembly of Kosovo. Deputies of the Assembly can only sign for one candidate for the President of the Republic.
4. The President of the Republic of Kosovo shall be elected by a two thirds (2/3) majority of all deputies of the Assembly.
5. If a two thirds (2/3) majority is not reached by any candidate in the first two ballots, a third ballot takes place between the two candidates who received the highest number of votes in the second ballot, and the candidate who receives the majority of all deputies of the Assembly shall be elected as President of the Republic of Kosovo.
6. If none of the candidates is elected as President of the Republic of Kosovo in the third ballot, the Assembly shall dissolve and new elections shall take place within forty five(45) days.

President Pacolli was elected by the parliament in the third round of voting with 62 votes pro, 4 against and 1 invalid vote( out of 120). Opposition boycotted the proceedings and there was no opposing candidate.

Kosovo's Constitutional Court is made of 9 members: Only 4 of which are Albanians, one is a Serb, one is from the Turkish minority and 3 other are "International" Judges.

My opinion about this:

In all frankness,Kosovo's Constitutional Court decision lacks the seriousness and professionalism one would expect of a high court. Those judges who made this decision either haven't read the Constitution, they don't seem to care about it or they just made a political decision instead of judicial one. It's so bad, they haven't actually stated with precision why the Constitution was broken and by whom. Article 86 has 6 section, but they don't care to opine which section was broken.

They allude to the fact that the constitution refers to 2/3 majority needed to have to elect the President on the first two rounds. Guess, what: the President was not elected in the first two rounds. There is nothing in the constitution that says 2/3 of parliament needs to be present in order for the round of voting to be valid.

Some media have talked about the lack of opposing candidate as referred to in section 5 as a possible culprit. Section 5 refers to an opposing candidate, but there is no requirement in there that there be one in order for the voting to be valid. If those who wrote a constitution wanted to have an opposing candidate, they could have said " an opposing candidate is required". It's very clear to anyone who reads the Constitution, Section 5 of Article 83 is designed to be a way out of a stalemate if no candidate gets 2/3 of votes.

Another possible violation has to do with the pause between the 2nd and 3rd rounds of voting. There was a long pause between the 2nd and 3rd rounds & it was used by the coalition to lobby more MP to vote for the President.There is no merit to this whatsoever because there is nothing zero nada in the Constitution that prohibits a pause.This is a procedural matter of Parliament & Constitutional Court does not regulate the procedural matters of parliament. If we use their logic, US Congress here in the US would have to be referred to the Supreme Court in a weekly basis. No court can regulate the internal working of a parliament in a democracy, but Kosovo's Constitutional Court doesn't seem to understand that. They seem to think they have a say in every matter that is brought to their attention.

The final nail in the coffin of this decision is that none of the supposed action the court finds "unconstitutional" were conducted by President Pacolli himself.So, who broke the law and who should be punished for it? The court does not say! You make a decision, but you do not label the violators and the punishment? In any other democratic country, this decision would be laughed at and would not be taken seriously. These judges have a made a laughing stock of this important institution.

It's just sad that the people of Kosovo have to deal with this kind of trivial stuff instead of real issues such as corruption, 50% unemployment, 10%+ inflation, lack of economic development and lack of further recognition for the country.
One cannot but question the impartiality of this court or at the very least it's professionalism.There is nothing in Article 86 to support their decision & there is no other precedent either.Plain and simple wrong!

Decision below: 03/30:
The decision and the dissenting options are here. Two out of three international judges dissented. It's unfortunate the dissenting judges were in the minority because their analyses makes far more logical sense and its far more in line with the constitution. They point out the logic and the decision by the majority, if fully implemented, leads to absurdity because Kosovo may never be able to elect a president because of the requirement that there be two opposing candidates.Given that each candidate must be nominated by 30 MP, we could have a situation where a candidate for President cannot be elected with 91 votes, because there cannot be an opposing candidate because he or she lacks the 30 votes necessary to get elected. This is absurd in addition to being undemocratic.

Below is the well argued dissenting argument by Judge Robert Carolan ( from US State of Dakota) and Judge Almiro Rodrigues ( Portuguese, one of the Judges in the panel that ruled Genocide was committed in Bosnia) :

We respectfully dissent from both the Judgment and the Conclusions of the Majority of the Court in this Referral.

THE FACTS
The Applicants and the Respondent agree as to the facts that follow.
LOn 22 February 2011, the Assembly of Kosovo commenced voting for the election of the President of the Republic of Kosovo.
2.The only candidate nominated was ML Behgjet PacollL
3.When the first ballot was cast, there were 67 Deputies present in the Assembly. Mr.Pacolli received 54 votes.
4.When the second ballot was cast, there were 67 Deputies present. Mr. Pacolli received 58 votes.
5.Before the third ballot was cast there was a break of less than one hour.
6.When the third ballot was cast, there were at least 65 Deputies present. Mr. Pacolli then received 62 votes.

We will consider three main issues: (1) the quorum, (2) number of candidates and
(3)consequences of the Court's Judgment.

(1)
QUORUM
The Majority, at least implicitly, erroneously concludes that the definition of a "quorum" for purposes of electing a President is the same as the minimal number of votes that a successful candidate for President must receive to be elected and that this minimal number of voters must be present when opening the session.

A quorum is different than voting. A quorum is "the minimum number of members of a deliberative assembly necessary to conduct business".l Voting2 by the members of legislative body is part of the business of that legislative body. The rules applicable to each can be, and often are, different.

Pursuant to Paragraph 3 of Article 69 of the Constitution, "The Assembly of
Kosovo has its quorum when more than one half (1/2) of all Assembly deputies are present". That provision is the only one mentioning a quorum. The Rules of Procedure of the Assembly also establish the same quorum for the Assembly, which is more than one-half of all deputies (61 deputies). That quorum is kept unchanged during the session3, regardless of the business of the Assembly even though the minimum number of votes to take a decision may change.

Therefore, pursuant to both the Constitution and the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly, a successful candidate for President, on either the first or the second ballot cast by members of the Assembly, must receive the votes of two-thirds (80 deputies) of the votes of all deputies.

On the third ballot to be elected as President, the successful candidate must receive the vote of more than one-half (61 deputies) of all the deputies.
In this case, on 22 February 2011 there was a quorum of the Assembly because between 67 and 65 deputies were present.

The only candidate nominated did not receive the required two-thirds votes (80 deputies' vote) that he needed to be elected President on either the first or second ballot. However, on the third ballot, the only candidate nominated received 62 votes, more than the minimum number of votes (61) required by both the Constitution and the Rules of Procedure.

The drafters of the Constitution clearly understood the difference between a quorum and voting by allowing the Assembly on the third ballot to elect a President with a different number of minimum votes but never changing the number of members that had to be present to have a quorum.

A rule that would require a quorum of 2/3s would allow a small minority of the members (41 deputies) to prevent the majority of parliamentarians from doing the business and will of the majority by simply refusing to meet and do the work they took an oath of office to do. It would prevent the majority from discharging the duties they were duly elected to do. It effectively would allow the minority to thwart the democratic will of the majority. It would also prevent the Assembly from acting pursuant to Paragraph 4 of Article 86 of the Constitution and elect a President on a simple majority vote of the deputies of the Assembly. Such an interpretation would make Paragraph 4 of Article 86 meaningless. The drafters of the Constitution specifically designed the Constitution in such a way so as to prevent the minority from thwarting the will of the majority.

(2) NUMBER OF CANDIDATES
The Majority erroneously concludes that the Assembly cannot elect a President of the Republic unless there is more than one candidate.
A successful candidate must be nominated by at least 30 deputies of the Assembly.
Therefore, a maximum of four and a minimum of one candidate might exist. However, the Majority erroneously concludes that the Assembly of Kosovo cannot elect a President of Kosovo unless at least 60 deputies nominate two different candidates for President even in a situation where they may all support just one candidate.
As the Majority implicitly concedes, under its interpretation of the Constitution the first President of Kosovo, his Excellency, the late Ibrahim Rugova, could not have been elected President of the Republic by acclamation in 2002 even if that was the will of the entire Assembly. Certainly the drafters of the Constitution never intended such a result.

In fact, the Majority clearly misreads paragraph 5 of Article 86 of the Constitution by inferring that it requires that there be at least two candidates. If two candidates were required, the drafters of paragraph 5 of Article 86 could have and would have stated that there shall be more than one candidate. Indeed, in the following paragraph of the Constitution, paragraph 6, the very same drafters of the Constitution specifically used the word "shall" when they stated what would happen if none of the candidates was elected in the third ballot. Furthermore, the expression "any" under paragraph 5 of Article 86 of the Constitution, in accordance with all dictionaries, means "one or more".

Thus, "any candidate" means "one or more candidate". In addition, the combination of a two thirds (2/3) majority for the two first ballots and the majority for the third ballot also mean that one or more candidates may exist, as the two thirds (2/3) majority is more appropriate for a running off when more than one candidate and majority for only one candidate.

The fact that the drafters of the Constitution chose not to use the same language anywhere in the Constitution with respect to how many candidates must be nominated in order for the Assembly to elect a President but specifically used the term "shall" with respect to the consequences of the Assembly not electing a President by the third ballot clearly means that the drafters never intended that there had to be more than one candidate for President before the Assembly could elect a President.

There is no requirement that there must be more than one candidate for President before the Assembly can elect a President. The only requirement in the Constitution in this regard is that if there are two candidates when the third ballot is cast, the winning candidate must receive a majority of the votes of the deputies (61).

If the Constitution were to be interpreted as requiring at least two or more candidates, it could prevent the election of a candidate that the majority of the elected deputies of the Assembly supported. If such a requirement existed it could easily be met by simply having 30 other deputies sign a document supporting the other candidate but then voting for the popular candidate.

This interpretation would create a sham and mockery of the election system for the highest elected office in Kosovo. The drafters of the Constitution could not have intended such an illogical result. The Constitutional Court does not have the authority to order the Assembly to nominate more than one candidate.
In sum, the foregoing is in accordance with a systematic and teleological interpretation which allows the conclusion that the main purpose of the Constitution is guaranteeing the regular functioning of the political institutions and ensuring the political stability.

Furthermore, we cannot say that, being the President the head of the State and guarantor of the unity of the peoples, the President must necessarily be elected by two thirds (2/3) of the votes of all deputies, as, even when there is more than one candidate, the President can be elected only by majority of the votes.

(3) CONSEQUENCES OF THE COURT'S JUDGMENT

The Majority concludes, and it is undisputed, that, on 22 February 2011, the Assembly had three rounds of balloting for the Office of President of the Republic. At the conclusion of the third round of balloting the President of the Assembly declared that Mr. Behgjet Pacolli had been elected President. This Court cannot change the facts or re-write what happened on February 22. Three ballots were cast for the Office of President of the Republic. The President of the Assembly then declared Mr. Behgjet Pacolli the elected President of the Republic of Kosovo. If that election process violated the Constitution, paragraph 6 of the Constitution is very clear with respect to what the Constitutional remedy is: "If none of the candidates is elected as President of the Republic of Kosovo in the third ballot, the Assembly shall dissolve and new elections shall take place within forty five (45) days". (emphasis added.) The Constitutional Court does not have the authority to order the Assembly to nominate at least two candidates for the office of President or to order the Assembly to revote for a fourth time.

However, at the outset, when the Court determines that there was a violation of the Constitution in the election procedure of the Assembly, the Constitution then mandates that the Assembly shall dissolve and new national elections of the Assembly shall take place within forty five days. By declaring that the election process on 22 February 2011 violated the Constitution, this Court declared that the Assembly had not elected a President after the third round of balloting. The Constitution then mandates the dissolution of the Assembly and new national elections within 45 days. The Court's elToneous decision of today, which cannot be without consequences, forces that result. The Court by simply declaring the election process on 22 February 2011 violated the Constitution implicitly acknowledges that it does not have the authority to order the Assembly to re-vote. Since the Court also does not have the power to declare the election unconstitutional without a remedy, the decision of the Majority forces the dissolution of the Assembly and new national elections. Respectfully

Ferik

Serbian Mercenaries Fighting on Behalf of Gaddafi

2011-02-23T07:18:00.033-06:00

A Serbian newspaper claims it has received information from the military that indicates Serbian mercenaries are fighting to protect Muammar Gaddafi. The source in the Serbian military claims the so called " dogs of war" were the first to arrive in Tripoli and are now helping patrol the city and presumably killing civilians as reported by other agencies. It goes on to say that Gaddafi trusts Serb mercenaries because they are "good"(at killing?) and because Libya has had a long relationship working with Serbs over the past 20 years. Apparently Serbs have done this before in 1990's when Gaddafi hired them to fight the Islamists.

This information is now being collaborated by first hand eyewitness reports from Tripoli. A newspaper in India received the following information from one of its sources: "Serbian mercenary pilots are helping the air force in Mirage bombing runs in cities, including the capital Tripoli". Various other individuals report via twitter and other website the same story.

The Alo newspaper from Serbia(screen shot on the right) goes on to say that these mercenaries, some of whom work in various African countries as hired guns and other live in Serbia, immediately swung in action after being contacted by Libyans. They left their current jobs because Libyans are apparently paying them in 10's of thousands of dollars. According to the newspapers military source these are former members of Serbian Special Forces military group called "Red Berets" who was disbanded in 2003 because too many of them were found to have connections with criminals and with the major massacres in Bosnia and Kosovo. The same people who brought us the Srebrenica and Račak massacres are now back in action again.God have mercy on Libyan civilians!

Now we know why Gaddafi's son Seif al-Islam Gaddafi referenced Yugoslavia a few days ago when he essentially threaten to repeat the bloodshed Yugoslavia saw in 1990's if protesters didn't stop. These mercenaries must have reminded him of Yugoslavia -there is no other reasons why one would compare the conflict in Yugoslavia to the current one in Libya.

It's also worth mentioning that Lybia's relation with Serbia goes much further than these mercenaries.Serbia's Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremić has bragged recently about his countries close relationship with Tripoli and its refusal to recognize the Independence of Kosovo. Not a single word from him or the Serbian government over these atrocities in Libya and these allegations that Serbian citizen are actively taking part in them. The silence is deafening.

Update (02/25/2011 at 9:37):
Ben Wedeman of CNN just reported on Piers Morgan Show that more Serbian as well as Ukrainian mercenaries are pouring in Libya to help prop up Gaddafi.Just confirms what I wrote above.

Second Update (02/28/2011):
Gaddafi gave his first International Interview since the crisis to Serb TV PINK:

How on earth a small TV station such as TV PINK gets such an interview?

I had to post this final update 03/21/2011:

Icing on the cake:A Facebook group in Serbia supporting Gaddafi got over 31,000 supporters just two days after being created. It's titled: Support for Muammar al Gaddafi from the people of Serbia.
I rest my case!

What I wrote a few days ago is being reported by news agencies 3/24:
Libyan opposition accuses Serbs of supporting Gaddafi. Says multiple online support groups from Serbia with 50K + members have been waging a campaign against them and in support of Gaddafi.

From B92:

The movement also noted that "for such a small country as Serbia, with a relatively modest number of internet users", organizing more than 50,000 actively involved Gaddafi’s supporters who jointly act online "represented a grand project that demanded a lot of work, commitment and money".

“We suspect that there are powerful political organizations and political parties behind this pro-Gaddafi movement and we call on the international community to urgently do something about it,” the Libyan opposition movement concluded.

There is no doubt he has strong links with Serbs and Serbia.
Ferik F.

Kosovo: Media lynching Of Behgjet Pacolli

2011-02-20T18:44:00.099-06:00

Behgjet Pacolli may be about to become the President of Kosovo, but he first needs to survive the vicious media lynching he has faced over the past week. Ever since it became clear a week ago that he was on his way to the Presidency, some media in Kosovo and elsewhere have waged a coordinated and disgusting attack against him. He has been called a Russian spy, a Slavic sympathizer (a big no no in Kosovo),a traitor and some have even question whether he is Albanian at all.

The campaign seems to be directed by the Koha Group who publishes Koha Ditore and also owns the Koha TV. Both, the newspaper and the TV, seem to have ditched any sense of professionalism and have gone on an attack mode against the future President. Koha Group is owned by Veton Surroi,whose father, Rexhai Surroi, was a prominent Ambassador of Former Yugoslavia. The irony of these attacks is that Surroi, who harbors Presidential ambitions himself, has been accused over the years of being pro Slavic ( a.k.a pro Serb) on account of his fathers work for Yugoslavia.

Mr. Pacolli initially ignored these attacks, but the other day he was forced to issue a statement denying all allegations against him and essentially saying he feels physically threatened by the propaganda.

Here are some of the things that have appeared on Koha Ditore and other media owned by the Koha Group:

"There are suspicions that Pacolli is Russian Trojan Horse",
" Pacolli unacceptable",
" Pacolli: I want to be the Tito of Kosovo",
" Pacolli: Serbia is a mother to Kosovo",
" Pacolli: Kosovo cannot do without Serbia".

This is just a sample of the things they have said. Other comments on their online website compare Pacolli to the illiterate thug Ramzan Kadyrov, Russia's puppeteer in Chechnya. The implication is clear here: Pacolli is a Russian/Serbian puppeteer and hence he will work against interest of Kosovo. The question is, are there any facts to seriously back these claims? Well, I took a look at the context he made these comments and all of his work over the years and there is nothing to support this slanderous campaign against him.

There is no There There:

The Russian Trojan Horse Allegation:
This allegation is based on the fact that Pacolli and his Mabetex Group have done major construction work in Russia, making him million of dollars. He essentially build and renovated all of the government buildings used by the Kremlin,including the parliament and the White House( see video here: starts at 4:10). This he did in early 1990's, when Boris Yeltsin was President.

So the questions arises: For such a small company ( at the time),how did he get these major contracts? There appears to be a reasonable explanations: In early 1990 he was working on a small project in Yakutia where he befriended Mayor Pavel Borodin who later became head of Presidential Property Management Department. In essence Pacolli knew the right people in the right places. There were allegation that he essentially paid off this person, which is quite possible in Russia of early 1990', but there was an investigation by the Russian prospector which later was dropped out for lack of evidence. In fact, Mr. Pacolli sued the lead Russian prosecutor Yuri Skuratov for libel and won the case and one million dollar in damages.
Again, Pacolli appear to have known the right people at the right places. The fact that he has not won any major contract in Russia in over 10 years, appears to support this theory.Kudos to him for winning this contract and for doing such an incredible job building the Kremlin (and now the new capital of Kazakhstan, Astana). Pacolli does not appear to have any kind of connection whatsoever with the current folks running the Kremlin. Nothing to see here but another possible slanderous lawsuit again the Koha Group.

Pacolli: I want to be the Tito of Kosovo

This, and the other comments where he appears to suggest Serbia was the mother of Kosovo, were made to tabloid Croatian and Serbian tabloid newspapers known for wild sensationalism.When one reads these interviews in context, it's clear he was attempting to use metaphors to describe certain action. The " I want to be the Tito of Kosovo" in fact was a metaphor to say that I want to do good for Kosovo as Tito did for Yugoslavia. In former Yugoslavia most people, at the time,thought that TITO did some good work, rising the standard of living everywhere. The " Serbia is Kosovo's mother" was a poor metaphor in Pacollis' part. He was in effect saying, Kosovo had to split from Serbia just like a child is taken a way from an abusive mother. The tabloid media converted this into: Pacolli said Serbia is Kosovo's mother. No such thing was ever said or implied. The case is closed. In fact there was never a case to begin with.

The case for Pacolli to be the President of Kosovo:

In fact a case can be made that Pacolli is exactly what Kosovo needs right now.First, he is simply the most credible person in the international scene. On his own accord and with his own resources he has in fact done more to promote the Independence of Kosovo than the government itself.He claims that as a result of his direct lobbying 25 countries recognized the independence of Kosovo. Whether 25 is the right number is perhaps a matter of some debate, but there appears to be strong evidence he was more effective in his lobbying effort than the government itself. I would argue the Kosovo government has proved itself to be very weak in this area without any ability to organize initiatives on his own. They have mostly relegated themselves to meeting world ambassadors at UN gatherings with little to show for it.

Second, Pacolli appears to have on his network of connection an incredible number of world leaders outside of Europe. This is what Kosovo needs: a chance to make a case to these countries. The Kosovo government in fact has never made a case to leaders of these countries. I heard Pacolli recently say that most of the leaders of these small countries he convinced to recognize Kosovo told him that they have never received a request from Kosovo for recognition.It's not unheard of for diplomatic cables to get lost, especially those coming from frankly unimportant countries such as Kosovo.

It's very important for Kosovo to have at least 100 countries recognize it over the next two years ( 25 more) so as to prevent Serbia from claiming that most countries do not recognize Kosovo. Right now Serbia FM Vuk Jeremic keeps going around the world asking countries to not recognize Kosovo because " most have not recognized it". Some countries feel comfort in wanting to be with the majority. Serbia should be defeated on this last claim, and I believe Pacolli can be very instrumental in this respect. In normal circumstances I would oppose a billionaire to become a leader of any country, but Pacolli fits the bill for the current needs of Kosovo.He has the wherewithal to present Kosovo's case in Capitals outside of Europe. Kosovo has been recognized by Europe, now the challenge is beyond it in Asia, Middle East, Africa and Latin America. Pacolli, at the very least, will give Vuk Jeremic of Serbia a run for his money....literally!

Rumblings in Europe:

There appears to be some rumblings in Europe about Pacolli becoming the President of Kosovo. Newspapers in Germany and Switzerland have published similar allegation against him as the Koha Group ( why do they care if Kosovo's president is pro Russian anyway?). They appear to think he will take Kosovo's issue beyond their capitals. They are used to other Kosovo leaders kneeling in front of them and they get the sense he won't do that easily. Good news is he appears to have gotten the go ahead from US embassy in Kosovo, a must for any major decision in Kosovo.

Give him a chance

The bottom line here is the allegation against Pacolli are scandalous and without any merit whatsoever. Koha Group, who used to be a credible media company, should be ashamed of itself for peddling Veton Surroi's hate and jealousy. Pacolli has proven himself in being very successful in the business world, something no other leader in Kosovo has done. He is not a man of empty words- he has actually proved that he can use his network of connections around the world to the benefit of Kosovo. Pacolli has what it takes to push Kosovo's agenda to the next level and we should all give him a chance.

Ferik F.

Serbia admits it will use organ trafficking"case" for diplomatic offensive against Kosovo

2010-12-21T06:49:00.003-06:00

Hague Cooperation Council head Rasim Ljajić: Serbia will "enter a diplomatic offensive in all international forums".

Serb President Tadić: " Kosovo will be viewed differently" as a result of the report. "He also expressed hope that such an investigation would shed the light on the creation of the co-called state of Kosovo."

Goes to show Serbia is not interested in Justice, but in scoring political points.What country in the world freely admits that they will try to score political points out of a possible crime? That means the investigation was done in such a way as to produce the needed results. This strategy is well known in the western circles and it doesn't fly.

I would be happy to see anyone involved in such a crime be sent to the slammer for the rest of his life, but let's not kid ourselves- there is not a single shred of evidence to support the claim that organ extraction was done at this house or let alone Thaci was involved in it. This must be one of the most investigated case in the whole of Balkans without a single shred of forensic evidence [ a.k.a bodies on the freezer trucks dumped in the river] which lends credence to the theory that it's done for political purposes.

Serbia, enjoy your political limelight for the next few weeks, but when you are done with that, give it a shot and see if you can find some of the 1500 Albanians who are still missing from the war.I know that's not going to help you score political points, but it might, just might help justice prevail for the families of these people. These are real people with real names, real birthdaysand actual faces, not some phantom creatures once seen living in colored houses.

Ferik F.

Wikileaks cables- Kosovo: Ambassador Dell: Kosovo celebrates second anniversary with success and challenges

2010-12-11T09:38:00.000-06:00

VZCZCXRO5933
PP RUEHIK
DE RUEHPS #0084/01 0481534
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 171534Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY PRISTINA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9735
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1362
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1924
RHFMIUU/AFSOUTH NAPLES IT
RHMFISS/CDR TF FALCON
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEPGEA/CDR650THMIGP SHAPE BE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RUZEJAA/USNIC PRISTINA SR

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 PRISTINA 000084

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

DEPT FOR EUR/SCE, INL, DRL

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KDEM EAID SR KV
SUBJECT: KOSOVO CELEBRATES SECOND ANNIVERSARY WITH SUCCESSES AND
CHALLENGES

PRISTINA 00000084 001.2 OF 005

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY.

1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Kosovo celebrated the second anniversary of its
independence on February 17. These two years have seen political
stability that has allowed the country to create legitimate new
institutions, including the Constitutional Court and the Kosovo
Security Force, and to start fulfilling its Ahtisaari Plan
obligations, such as decentralization. Challenges remain, and
Pristina and the international community must focus on moving the
country towards eventual membership in the Euro-Atlantic
institutions that will act as a guarantor of Kosovo's viability and
security. Progress towards European Union membership and a role
within NATO will require a concerted focus on building institutions,
strengthening the country's system of justice, protecting its
multi-ethnicity, and developing its economy. In each of these
fields, Kosovo has been active in laying foundations for progress.
However, we cannot ignore that work remains. Political parties need
to move beyond their regional bases for support and cooperate better
in pursuit of national goals. The GOK, with more effective support
from EULEX, needs to build on its initial reforms in the justice
sector and intensify its anti-corruption efforts. Pristina, with
the help of the international community, wants to replicate the
success of decentralization in southern Kosovo that empowers Serb
communities and extend the same hope to northern Kosovo, where
Belgrade maintains an illegal stranglehold on municipal governance.
The GOK must use its string of economic reforms and privatizations
as a springboard to motivate private-sector growth. Eventual
membership in the European Union and other Euro-Atlantic
institutions will mitigate the challenge that Kosovo's small size
poses. The largest threats to this agenda come both from Belgrade
and the risk that Brussels will not use its influence there to
compel Belgrade's greater cooperation in allowing Kosovo to develop
and strengthen. END SUMMARY

KOSOVO AT TWO YEARS
-------------------

2. (SBU) The Republic of Kosovo turned two years old on February 17.
It has been two years marked by a number of successes. Most
notably, we have seen peace and government stability. Kosovo has
taken responsibility for ensuring its own democracy with elections
that it ran on its own for the first time since the end of the
conflict. Serbs in southern Kosovo participated in these elections
and are starting to accept that their survival runs through Pristina
rather than Belgrade. More Serbs, in fact, cast ballots in Kosovo's
municipal elections in November 2009 than in the illegitimate
parallel elections for local Serbian institutions that took place
throughout the year. New institutions, like the Constitutional
Court, are standing up and starting to earn respect as legitimate
bodies. Internationally, Kosovo has secured membership in both the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and recognitions of
Kosovo's independence now stand at 65 countries. At the
International Court of Justice, Kosovo (supported by many in the
international community, including the United States) presented a
strong case to challenge Belgrade's contention that the country's
independence fails to accord with international law, and we expect
that even an ambiguous opinion from the Court will open the door for
more states to recognize the country's independence.

3. (SBU) In short, Kosovo has much to celebrate on its independence
day. We must not forget, however, that Kosovo is a nascent state
that still confronts challenges. Its stability is laudable, but
its political scene is fractious as inexperienced political parties
tend to elevate narrow interests above national goals. The legacy
of conflict and socialism has weakened its institutions, and its
economy remains a work in progress. Kosovo continues to look to the
international community for guidance, and it sees in this advice a
path that will lead to eventual membership in the Euro-Atlantic
community of nations, an end-goal that will act as a guarantor of
the country's independence, viability, and stability. In helping
Kosovo ultimately realize both European Union and NATO membership,
we need to focus our efforts in fostering the state's institutions,
developing the rule of law, promoting its multi-ethnicity, and
strengthening its economy.

BUILDING INSTITUTIONS

PRISTINA 00000084 002.2 OF 005

---------------------

4. (SBU) Kosovo's two largest parties -- the Democratic Party of
Kosovo (PDK) and the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) -- have
coexisted in stable government since national elections in November
2007. This stability has allowed the GOK to focus on several
post-independence institution building projects: embarking on
decentralization, standing up the Kosovo Security Force (KSF), and
creating the Constitutional Court, among others. The results have
been positive. We have seen Serbs turnout in large numbers to elect
Serb candidates for mayor and municipal assemblies in the new,
Ahtisaari-mandated, Serb municipalities. The KSF has broken ties
with the legacy of the Kosovo Liberation Army and is showing a
commitment to becoming a multi-ethnic force with its new pan-Kosovo
recruitment campaign. The Constitutional Court has earned
legitimacy as the final arbiter of elections-related disputes.

5. (SBU) The stability allows us to focus on critical economic
projects -- like the New Kosovo Power Plant and the privatization of
the state telecom, Post and Telecom of Kosovo -- with a stable
government partner focused on work rather than campaigning. It also
gives us time to encourage Kosovo politics to move beyond its
post-conflict paradigm, when all parties focused on independence to
the exclusion of other considerations. Left-right policy dimensions
do not yet exist here. The large political parties have not yet
developed policy platforms that extend beyond reaffirming promises
to their core supporters. The LDK still sees itself as the
standard-bearer for late President Ibrahim Rugova. The PDK and the
Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) are outgrowths of the KLA
and continue to appeal to regional support bases. These lingering
identities too often obfuscate priorities and encourage leaders, at
times, to forget that national interests must take precedence.

IMPORTANCE OF THE RULE OF LAW
-----------------------------

6. (SBU) On February 16, President Sejdiu appointed new Supreme
Court judges and prosecutors. This action builds on a years-long,
continuing process of vetting for professional competence judges and
prosecutors. The vetting process involves both Kosovo and
international community arbiters, and the GOK's full acceptance of
the results shows a commitment to developing an independent
judiciary that will start to fill the gaps that exist in Kosovo's
rule-of-law institutions. A similar process of interviews and
testing went into the selection of the Constitutional Court justices
last year, and we have seen this court grow in legitimacy over the
past several months. It has already had its own minor Marbury v.
Madison moment, exercising unchallenged authority over legislation
that controls the funding of the state radio and television
broadcaster. Although the ruling has invited critics and
controversy, none of these critics has questioned the role that the
Court has played. This is a significant step in shoring up the
independence of the country's judicial institutions.

7. (SBU) There remains a need for more progress. In January of this
year one of Kosovo's most widely read newspapers noted in an
editorial that Kosovo's system of justice needs deep reform. The
GOK, too, recognizes that it faces a challenge in developing its
legal institutions, and the Prime Minister has adopted a legislative
strategy for the year that prioritizes the rule of law. It is a
strategy that will modernize and reform the court structure,
invigorate the country's prosecutorial ranks, and create an
institutional foundation where objectivity has an opportunity to
flourish. Concurrent with this legislative strategy, the GOK --
with more active assistance from EULEX -- will need to strengthen
its anti-corruption efforts, a difficult challenge in a country this
small, where businesses often claim a political patron. Despite the
inherent difficulties, our institution-building efforts must
prioritize the rule of law and the fight against corruption. The
public needs to feel confident that laws apply to everyone. EULEX
needs to step up its activity and deliver long-promised arrests of
high-ranking corrupt public officials, or we run a risk that our
rule-of-law reforms will fall flat and leave the public with a
perception that the government is little more than a kleptocracy.

A MULTI-ETHNIC STATE

PRISTINA 00000084 003.2 OF 005

--------------------

8. (SBU) Kosovo has made a strong start in fulfilling its promises
under the Ahtisaari plan to empower Serb communities. Serb mayors,
following municipal elections in November 2009, now hold office in
the new municipalities of Gracanica, Klokot, and Ranilug. In
Strpce, a pre-existing municipality where the Serb majority refused
to participate in the November 2007 elections, a new legitimate Serb
mayor has taken significant steps to undo the influence of the
illegal parallel municipal government that answers to Belgrade. In
Pristina, the central government is devolving more authority to all
municipalities, giving local residents a louder voice in shaping
their communities' future. Most refreshing is that that the GOK
continues to focus on these Serb communities, providing them with
significant new resources in the 2010 budget that will allow them to
strengthen the new municipal structures and develop their
infrastructure.

9. (SBU) In northern Kosovo the challenges surrounding integration
are greater. Belgrade's legitimacy outstrips Pristina's in the
northern municipalities of Leposavic, Zubin Potok, and Zvecan, but
it may not be as unchallenged as Belgrade would like us to think. A
municipal preparation team (MPT) is now working in the planned new
municipality of North Mitrovica, which will hold a special election
later this year to select its inaugural government. This MPT is the
GOK's first step in building on the success of its decentralization
efforts in the South. It has adopted a comprehensive approach to
the North that entails an incremental "hearts and minds" campaign to
win greater support from northern Serbs to work with Kosovo
institutions. The illegal parallel institutions that control the
North are little more than fronts for organized crime, and the
region has become stagnant. The Serbs north of the Ibar River
consistently point to the absence of the rule of law there, and this
could prove to be the tool that begins their acceptance of Pristina
-- if the GOK and EULEX, together, can make meaningful progress in
shutting down the criminal networks that dominate throughout the
North. Pristina can offer hope, but it cannot achieve success on
its own. The Europeans need to contribute. EULEX needs to crack
down on organized crime, and Brussels must use the lure of EU
integration to compel Belgrade to play a helpful role in returning
law and order to northern Kosovo. Pristina cannot return hope to
the North if the international community will not stop Belgrade from
interfering in the region's development.

ECONOMIC REFORMS AND PRIVATE SECTOR GROWTH
------------------------------------------

10. (SBU) At the central level Kosovo has laid a strong foundation
for economic reforms. In recent months the Assembly has adopted a
debt law that sets rational limits on the amount of debt that the
country can incur and should allow Kosovo to pursue a sovereign
credit rating that will permit it to finance its development. The
IMF has provided guidance on a Central Bank law that will both
strengthen the institution and open opportunities for more
development assistance. And, the GOK is demonstrating an ever
improving control of its budgetary process, delivering a
comprehensive and reasonable 2010 budget to the Assembly that
prioritizes critical needs. Amid these steps, privatization
continues. The GOK hosted a pre-bid conference for representatives
from three pre-qualified consortia interested in entering into a
public-private partnership for the Pristina Airport which we expect
will attract a 100 hundred million Euro investment, with a contract
awarded in April. Further cause for optimism is on the near horizon
with the upcoming privatization of the Kosovo Energy Corporation and
development of a new 500MW power plant that will put an end to the
rolling blackouts that still affect the country. When this plant
comes online, industry will find a more inviting environment for
setting up business.

11. (SBU) These important steps do not mask Kosovo's current
economic woes that leave many Kosovars without work. With an
unemployment rate of greater than 40 percent, the economy is
suffering. There is little industry, the private sector is
underdeveloped, and the country's greatest natural resource --
lignite -- is underutilized due to a dilapidated power
infrastructure. At present, the government remains the primary

PRISTINA 00000084 004.2 OF 005

engine that drives the economy, a model that is not sustainable.
Government contracts for road-building projects help to provide
temporary employment, but they do not offer the longer term economic
stability that the country requires. In the coming years, both the
government and the international donor community need to redirect
their efforts towards projects that will spark greater dynamism and
diversity within the private sector. The central reforms that have
occurred -- and will continue throughout the rest of the year --
provide hope that Kosovo will soon feature a strong economic
framework where private sector growth will necessarily follow.

EURO-ATLANTIC INSTITUTIONS
--------------------------

12. (SBU) Kosovo's small size presents a challenge for its survival,
a challenge that the international community can help surmount with
its Euro-Atlantic institutions. The lure of these institutions --
in particular, the European Union and NATO -- are tantalizing
opportunities that focus the attention of the GOK. With a small
population where family and klan ties provide dominant affiliations,
Kosovo is susceptible to corruption that will retard development.
On the security front, Kosovo is currently a NATO protectorate, but
those forces are beginning to withdraw, and Kosovo leaders are
wondering whether or not the small (no more than 2500 active members
according to the Ahtisaari Plan) and lightly armed Kosovo Security
Force (KSF) can fill the void that KFOR will leave. The antidote
for both of these problems is membership within the European Union
and NATO, and this Euro-Atlantic orientation is the primary issue
that unifies the country's dueling political forces around a core
national vision.

13. (SBU) Prime Minister Thaci, daily, expresses his commitment to
readying Kosovo for EU consideration, and he regards the next
European Union Progress Report on Kosovo, due in June, with a mix of
anxiety and optimism. He wants to show the electorate that his
leadership is bringing Kosovo closer to Brussels, and he wants to be
the person who brings EU visa liberalization to Kosovo. Over the
longer term, the country needs EU membership as an outlet for its
young workforce and as a unified market for exports. It also needs
to define its future relationship with NATO. Every Kosovar desires
full membership in an institution second only to the United States
in the hagiography of Kosovo's recent history. The limitations that
the Ahtisaari Plan places on the Kosovo Security Force are going to
prove contentious over time, especially once KFOR withdraws
completely. Without an agreed and viable connection to NATO, we run
the risk that unofficial militias will again develop out of fear
that the country is unable to defend itself from aggression.

COMMENT:
--------

14. (SBU) Kosovo's independence has been a success story. The worst
fears -- large scale population movements and outbreaks of violence
-- following February 17, 2008, never materialized. The political
scene, while fractious, works together on the big issues, like
decentralization and establishing new institutions. The
international community and the Kosovars, themselves, can feel good
about the positive steps that have occurred over the past two years,
but we cannot ignore the challenges that remain. With each passing
day we need to see the GOK take more responsibility for securing the
country's future -- more activity on lobbying for recognitions, more
temperate political debate, greater respect for the rule of law, and
a concerted focus on national interests -- but there remains an ever
present role for the international community. Pristina cannot yet
extend its authority across its entire territory. The International
Steering Group on February 8 gave its blessing to a comprehensive
approach that will bolster Pristina's presence in the North, but
this approach will also require international support. Indeed, each
of the steps towards Kosovo's eventual membership in the European
Union will require international attention, and we need to make sure
that Brussels gives Pristina the same consideration that it pays to
Belgrade. Above all, the progress that Kosovo makes in overcoming
the challenges it confronts should play the determining role in the
country's qualifications for European Union and NATO membership. We
need to keep the GOK's focus squarely on its responsibilities while
reminding our European partners that they too have a role to play.

PRISTINA 00000084 005.2 OF 005

END COMMENT
DELL

Wikileaks cables- Kosovo: Ambassador Dell: Strategy for Northern Kosovo an important step in the right direction

2010-12-11T09:36:00.001-06:00

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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1877

C O N F I D E N T I A L PRISTINA 000048

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY PHIL GORDON FROM THE AMBASSADOR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2019
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL KV
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: STRATEGY FOR NORTHERN KOSOVO AN IMPORTANT
STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION

Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell for Reasons 1.4 (b), (d).

1. (C) Phil - I know that you are seeing Robert Cooper on
Tuesday, February 2, among other things, to discuss Kosovo
and the strategy for northern Kosovo. Integrating Kosovo
Serbs into Kosovo society and preserving the country's
territorial integrity is central to Kosovo's and the region's
long-term stability and has been a core U.S. policy objective
since 1999. In November 2009, we had a breakthrough that
ended ten years of Belgrade-imposed stalemate when thousands
of Serbs in southern Kosovo took part in Kosovo municipal
elections. We want to replicate that success in the north
and end the stalemate that has left Kosovo's future
uncertain. That fundamentally is what the so-called northern
strategy is about. We want to coax the population into
greater cooperation with Pristina, not to impose outcomes on
them.

2. (C) Currently, we have a growing, if still somewhat
fragile, consensus within the international community in
Pristina that the time is right to end the years of drift on
the north and to alter the dynamic of a hardening partition
between the north and the rest of Kosovo. In part, this is
sparked by the new willingness among Kosovo Serbs to engage
with Kosovo institutions. It also stems from Belgrade's
increasingly aggressive actions in the north (e.g., seizure
of the Valac electrical substation; unilateral appointment of
Serb judges to illegal parallel courts) that have underscored
to representatives of the international community on the
ground the risks of continuing to do nothing. For ten years,
we told the Kosovars to trust us -- "let us handle the
situation, and we will protect you" -- and now the government
of independent Kosovo is increasingly asking us when we are
going to make good on that commitment. KFOR is drawing down
(in six months NATO could take a decision to cut its forces
in half). We need to take advantage of a unique opportunity
that has crystallized and act now while we still have a KFOR
presence capable of handling any contingency.

3. (C) Belgrade has reacted vehemently to the northern
strategy. I think this intensity is rooted in the concern
that any positive momentum in the north will undermine
Belgrade's likely post-ICJ strategy: push to reopen status
talks and formalize the emerging de facto partition of
Kosovo. Furthermore, Belgrade has shrewdly judged that
raising the specter of confrontation rattles our EU partners
and is an effective tactic for derailing the strategy
altogether. Cooper will likely reflect this anxiety with
you, but I do not sense that this concern is nearly as strong
within the local Quint (with the exception of Italian
Ambassador Michael Giffoni, who spent ten years on Javier
Solana's staff, where the Brussels bureaucrats have long been
anxious about taking any difficult decision on the north).
With this in mind, I recommend that you stress three points
with Cooper. First, the northern strategy is not radical.
Much of it restates what the international community, in
general, and the EU, in particular, are already committed to
doing. Second, it provides a vehicle for constructively
channeling the GOK's ambitions for the north and takes
advantage of Prime Minister Hashim Thaci's readiness to offer
inducements to northern Serbs who engage with Kosovo
institutions. Third, we now have legitimate Serb partners
(elected by fellow Serbs) who are ready to help us in the
north. These are the elements of a soft approach, which is
the northern strategy's leading edge.

4. (C) We should expect Belgrade to challenge all elements of
the strategy and to misportray the strategy as hard and
confrontational. Serbian Ministry for Kosovo State Secretary
Oliver Ivanovic has already declared that Pristina is
promoting conflict. This is not the case. There is no
interest here in conflict (not among the Quint and the ICO,
nor within the GOK), but the current situation is untenable
and deteriorating. The aim is to stop the rot in the north
and create the positive momentum there that we need to secure
our long-term policy objectives: a secure and stable Kosovo
and a Serbia focused on its EU future, not old ambitions and
grievances. We need to start the process now, and we should
not allow Belgrade to use threats of confrontation as a veto
to block progress.

5. (C) You can tell Cooper that the northern strategy offers
incremental, but fundamental, steps necessary to getting the

north right. We know, however, that there will be difficult
challenges that pose risks. For example, EULEX must get
serious about rolling up organized crime networks in the
north that feed the parallel structures and make the current
situation unsustainable. The northern Serbs are the first
victims of these thugs, and there is a growing body of
reports that they would welcome a change if EULEX can deliver
it. We must, also, deal with the blatant theft of Kosovo
property that has allowed Serbia to, in effect, seize the
northern power grid in Kosovo. Dealing with these issues
will require hard choices and fortitude. Our message to
Cooper should be that we want to coordinate and consult with
Brussels every step of the way. This process, after all,
only works if Brussels makes clear to Belgrade that its EU
future depends on real cooperation on Kosovo. In recent
meetings with Boris Tadic, both Angela Merkel and Nicolas
Sarkozy reportedly emphasized that Serbia's path to Brussels
runs, in part, through constructive relations with Pristina.
This is the perfect message. Brussels needs to repeat it --
regularly. We, of course, are also ready to consult with
Belgrade, as well, and to offer them the opportunity to
engage constructively. Where we part company with some
within the EU, however, is in not being willing to accept
that we must have Belgrade's agreement before taking any
steps.

6. (C) I need to emphasize the importance of this moment.
Failure to act soon means losing northern Kosovo and will
re-open the Pandora's Box of ethnic conflict that defined the
1990s. Fortunately, our European partners increasingly
recognize this. My British colleague here confirms what Stu
has also heard -- that there is a greater degree of
commitment and resolve in member capitals than may be the
case in the Commission and the Council officialdom in
Brussels. Even there, though, initial anxieties over the
strategy appear to be easing as they look more carefully at
the content and less at the rhetoric.
DELL

Wikileaks cables- Kosovo: Ambassador Dell: Success in the North key to a sucessful KFOR drowdown

2010-12-11T09:32:00.001-06:00

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Wednesday, 27 January 2010, 15:44
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PRISTINA 000044
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR (SCE, ACE, RPM)
EO 12958 DECL: 01/27/2020
TAGS PGOV, PINR, PREL, MARR, KV
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: SUCCESS IN THE NORTH KEY TO A SUCCESSFUL
KFOR DRAWDOWN
REF: A. 09 PRISTINA 509 B. 09 USNATO 409 C. BELGRADE 0003
Classified By: AMBASSADOR CHRISTOPHER DELL FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)
1. (C) SUMMARY: While skirmishes and security incidents may be rare from day to day, an impending frozen conflict in Northern Kosovo remains the greatest threat to a safe and secure environment (SASE) in Kosovo in the near and medium terms. Fortunately, a constellation of factors exists that could reverse ten years of rot in Northern Kosovo and avoid letting this region become a frozen conflict. An impressive level of international consensus exists to address Northern Kosovo issues, and international actors and the GOK have agreed on a Northern Strategy to do just that. KFOR, at its current robust “Gate 1” force posture of 10,000, can play an important role, deterring extremists both north and south, as this strategy is implemented. As decisions are made on progress to “Gate 2” (5,000 troops) and beyond, the best way to operationalize the NAC’s central condition for successful drawdown -- maintenance of a safe and secure environment, with a threat level assessed as low -- will be success in this Northern Strategy. Benchmarks for this success include replacement of illegal parallel structures with legitimate Kosovo bodies, the establishment of robust rule of law institutions, the re-establishment of customs controls and revenue collection, and the re-establishment of legal, normalized electrical services and billing under KEK control. END SUMMARY
NORTHERN KOSOVO REMAINS THE BIGGEST THREAT TO SASE
--------------------------------------------- -----
2. (C) We have argued (ref A) that to achieve the conditions-based drawdown of KFOR troops agreed by the North Atlantic Council (ref B), it is crucial both to build local security capacity and address existing security threats now, while KFOR’s force posture remains robust. Northern Kosovo -- home base for illegal Serbian parallel structures and a region rife with smuggling and organized crime -- remains perhaps the greatest threat facing Kosovo in the short and medium terms. Kosovo institutions have exercised little control there since 1999, and practically none since riots after Kosovo’s independence in 2008. The result has been a zone where customs collection is essentially on an “honor system,” courts don’t function, international police all but fear to tread, and the only municipal governments are those elected by the Republic of Serbia in polls held in direct contravention of UNSCR 1244. Lack of activity or even access by Kosovo authorities in Northern Kosovo is a constant irritant for Kosovo’s leaders and the country’s majority Albanian population, and it represents for both the very real threat of the partition of Kosovo -- a reversal of ten years of USG policy and a grave threat to stability in Kosovo and the Western Balkan region. A series of recent statements by Belgrade’s leadership has established that the ultimate partition of Kosovo is, at a minimum, one of the policy options Belgrade has in view (ref C).
NORTHERN STRATEGY AN OPPORTUNITY
--------------------------------
PRISTINA 00000044 002 OF 004
3. (C) For much of the past ten years, pursuit of our strategic goal of a stable, democratic, multi- ethnic Kosovo has taken a back seat in the North to tactical concerns of avoiding demonstrations and clashes. Fortunately, there is a growing consensus in the international community that the time is now to reverse this trend. Embassies of the major European powers, the U.S., the International Civilian Office and the European Union Rule of Law Mission EULEX have agreed on a Northern Strategy to displace the illegal parallel structures, introduce legitimate, legal GOK structures, and increase the presence and improve the performance of rule of law institutions (customs, police and courts) in Northern Kosovo. The GOK has accepted this strategy as its own, and has pledged budget resources toward its implementation.
4. (C) That this international and local alliance for action in Northern Kosovo comes while KFOR remains at a robust presence of roughly 10,000 troops is fortunate. The Northern Strategy (septel) has been designed to incentivize participation in GOK structures, not to impose them by force. That said, local forces, including Serbs and Albanians who benefit from the current near lawless environment, could attempt to use violence to disrupt attempts to collect customs duties or reopen courts. KFOR at 10,000 will play an important, if ancillary, role in this strategy to ensure Kosovo’s long-term stability and territorial integrity. At 10,000, KFOR remains capable to respond to multiple, simultaneous incidents. KFOR’s ability to respond with overwhelming force to multiple provocations will itself serve as a valuable deterrent. As recently as January 26, Serbian State Secretary for the Ministry of Kosovo and Metohija Oliver Ivanovic raised the specter of violence, arguing it is the inevitable outcome of the Northern Strategy. Whether meant as a warning, or simply to rattle the less committed elements of the International Community, Ivanovic’s statement was a useful reminder that some Serb elements consider such threats and tactics as legitimate. A strong KFOR is the best deterrent to extremists on either side of the River Ibar.
ACHIEVEMENTS IN THE NORTH ARE PRACTICAL SASE BENCHMARKS
--------------------------------------------- ----------
5. (SBU) While a robust KFOR is important to the success of the Northern Strategy, the implementation of the strategy is an opportunity for KFOR, a roadmap to a successful drawdown to deterrent presence. In our view, the central condition established by the North Atlantic Council for KFOR’s eventual drawdown to deterrent presence is “maintenance of a safe and secure environment (SASE), with a threat level assessed as low.” In the past, we have been all too quick to assess the durability of Kosovo’s threat level based on the presence or absence of security incidents on a daily basis. Depending on a definition of SASE as the absence of security incidents risks masking a disturbing reality -- Northern Kosovo can be, at the same time, both free of security incidents and a frozen conflict in the making, at risk of partition. A Northern Kosovo like this, as it is today, is a far cry from stability, and is in fact an engine for future instability in Kosovo and the wider Western Balkan region.
PRISTINA 00000044 003 OF 004
6. (SBU) As the NAC debates the move to “Gate 2” (5,000 troops) and beyond, we would argue that the time is ripe to move from a negative operationalization of security, based on the absence of incidents, to a positive one. Such an operationalization would establish realistic, observable measures of success in reversing a decade of erosion in Northern Kosovo and establishing Kosovo’s authority throughout its territory. Such benchmarks should include:
-- successful establishment of the decentralized municipality of North Mitrovica;
-- re-establishment of collection of customs revenue at Gates 1 and 31, as part of a single, Kosovo-wide customs regime;
-- the staffing of the Mitrovica District Court with ethnic Serb and Albanian judges recognized by the Kosovo justice system;
-- enhanced EULEX police presence in Northern Kosovo, and the full integration of Kosovo Serb members of the Kosovo Police (KP) in Kosovo Police structures;
-- the replacement of illegal parallel municipal authorities in Northern Kosovo with, legal, legitimately constituted Kosovo bodies;
-- the arrest and prosecution of major organized crime figures; and,
-- the normalization of electric power distribution and billing throughout Northern Kosovo by KEK, according to UNMIK law and regulation.
STATUS NEUTRAL, NOT VALUE NEUTRAL
---------------------------------
7. (C) Some may protest that the establishment of such benchmarks represents a break with KFOR’s status neutral stance. This is patently untrue. In no case do the benchmarks listed above violate UNSCR 1244, the source of KFOR’s mandate, and in most cases -- like electricity and local self- government -- success in these benchmarks would represent a re-establishment of the UNSCR 1244 regime, respect of UNMIK laws and UNMIK regulations. In the end, this is true status neutrality. What some would request, only taking positions and actions which are equally acceptable to Belgrade and Pristina, isn’t status neutrality, but rather value neutrality. This is neither in KFOR’s interest nor in Kosovo’s, and was never USG policy in the region.
COMMENT
-------
8. (C) For ten years, stability in Northern Kosovo has been defined as merely the lack of conflict. Today’s KFOR, at “Gate 1” levels of 10,000 troops, presents our best opportunity to define stability properly, as success in addressing Kosovo’s most vexing security threat: Northern Kosovo as an emerging frozen conflict. Success in the Northern Strategy -- including reintroducing Kosovo structures to this region, and eliminating illegal Serbian parallel structures -- represents our best chance for a peaceful, stable Kosovo governing within the
PRISTINA 00000044 004 OF 004
full extent of its recognized borders, and KFOR’s surest roadmap to a successful reduction in troop strength to “Gate 2” and beyond. DELL

Wikileaks cables- Kosovo: Scene setter for the visit of Vice President Biden

2010-12-11T09:27:00.001-06:00

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Saturday, 09 May 2009, 13:02
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRISTINA 000183
SIPDIS
CORRECTED COPY
DEPT FOR D, P, EUR (FRIED, JONES)
NSC FOR HELGERSON, OVP FOR BLINKEN
FOR THE VICE-PRESIDENT FROM THE AMBASSADOR
EO 12958 DECL: 05/09/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, UNMIK, KV
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF VICE PRESIDENT BIDEN
TO KOSOVO, MAY 21, 2009
PRISTINA 00000183 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: AMBASSADOR TINA KAIDANOW FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)
1. (C) Mr. Vice President: You last saw the President and Prime Minister of Kosovo in Washington during their first meetings with the new Administration in February, just after the one year anniversary of Kosovo’s independence. That meeting proved a huge boost for a Kosovo public anxious to be reassured of the continuing support of the United States, and your visit here will further encourage Kosovo to understand that it has the strong backing it needs, but must take the initiative on its own to pursue democratic and economic development in a way that meets the demands of its citizens.
2. (C) As Kosovo’s leaders told you then, they have emerged at the end of a long and arduous journey with independence achieved, but many serious challenges ahead. Their accomplishments in the last 18 months and longer -- in fact throughout the difficult status determination period -- are admirable and should be recognized. At our urging, Kosovo leaders have taken the high road and largely ignored the seemingly unendless provocations lobbed their way by successive regimes in Serbia: violence in Kosovo’s north sanctioned by Belgrade, the destruction of customs operations on the border with Serbia, Serbian support for parallel governing institutions and parallel elections, the continuing refusal of Belgrade to permit Kosovo Serb participation in multi-ethnic municipal administrations or in Kosovo’s police and security forces, a Serbian trade embargo on Kosovo’s exports, the insistence on raising a case against Kosovo’s declaration of independence in the International Court of Justice, and -- lately -- efforts by Belgrade to target prominent Kosovo figures for prosecution in Serbia and extradition from any Western country where they may travel. Though the pro-Western government of Serbian President Boris Tadic is an improvement on its predecessor in many ways, the general parameters of Serbia’s Kosovo policy remain unchanged under the single-minded focus of Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic and his Foreign Ministry cohort.
3. (C) The need to deal with the flow of problems stemming from Belgrade’s policy has cost us and the Kosovars. It opens the Kosovo leadership to venomous opposition accusations that the government is not doing enough to establish its own authority in response to these Serbian moves, particularly in Kosovo’s north, and it distracts from the real requirements of responsible governance in Kosovo -- expanding economic growth, eliminating corruption, and enhancing the transparency and effectiveness of major social institutions. Indeed, the north has become a proxy battleground for two differing visions of the region’s future: for Serbs and for Belgrade (notably for President Tadic himself, who has spoken openly in the past of his thinking), it represents that part of Kosovo most likely to be retained by Serbia in a partition scenario as a precursor to Serbia’s accession into the EU, while for ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, retention of the north remains the symbolic key to proving Kosovo’s legitimate sovereignty. The fragile EU rule of law presence inserted triumphantly last December in the north and elsewhere in Kosovo is no match for this political minefield, and we can expect regular ethnic confrontations -- with attendant casualties, including among international peacekeepers -- until such time as either side accepts the futility of its ultimate aims in the north.
4. (C) With close to 2000 EULEX police, justice and customs functionaries in Kosovo, the European Union should have an overriding interest in a stable relationship between Kosovo and Serbia, and indeed recent months have seen an ongoing dialogue among EU representatives and the governments in Pristina and Belgrade designed to press for practical progress on a variety of issues of importance to both sides. The talks, however, have limped along without much to show; full resumption of customs operations on the northern border is months away, assuming Belgrade ever gives the go-ahead, and Serb police remain outside the Kosovo Police structure in Kosovo’s south despite ample time (and full salaries paid by the Kosovo government) for their reabsorption. EU visitors from Brussels tell us that they “lack leverage” with Serbia (more accurately, they lack leverage with the five EU states that do not recognize Kosovo) and, despite the obvious imperative of gaining Belgrade’s cooperation to ensure the success and momentum of the EULEX mission, they seem to have
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abandoned any attempt at real leadership to push for concessions. We can already sense a strong degree of “Kosovo-fatigue” among our European counterparts which, coupled with the palpable sense here in the region that Europe has given up on further expansion, could prove a bad combination in providing the necessary EU-inspired incentives for further advancement in Kosovo.
5. (C) In the economic realm, Kosovo must find a way to deal with its moribund and budget-consuming energy sector if it is to attract investment and avoid popular unrest due to rolling blackouts. International organizations and donors -- the World Bank, the IMF (which Kosovo will join after a successful board vote this May), the European Commission, the U.S. and others -- must do a better job of coordination and providing effective guidance to the Kosovars, who lack the relevant experience and are often subject to mixed messages which do little to sketch out a clear way forward. The clearest example of this is in the energy arena, where the World Bank has taken a position on the development of Kosovo’s vast lignite deposits at odds with most of the other donors and stakeholders.
6. (C) All this, without question, makes continuing American leadership and support to Kosovo that much more imperative, in every sense possible -- political, technical and military. The need for KFOR to remain present in Kosovo, especially in the north but in other mixed ethnic areas as well (for example in Kosovo’s east and south where USKFOR has its area of responsibility and where the majority of Serbs live), cannot be overstated. Recent moves by some allies to depart Kosovo in a fashion uncoordinated through NATO bode ill for KFOR’s future effectiveness; that will be especially apparent if, as we anticipate, the French downsize their presence in Mitrovica and the north later this year.
7. (C) Kosovo is, thus far, a success story. Still, any of the factors we have enumerated -- continued Serbian pressure, counter-productive reactions from volatile political elites in Kosovo, EU vacillation and weakness, mounting territorial-cum-political tensions in the north, premature NATO withdrawal, or, maybe most serious, failure to secure a strong economic foundation for Kosovo’s future -- could create obstacles to Kosovo’s enduring survival. Kosovo is looking to the United States -- and to you, Mr. Vice President, as a known friend and long-time champion of human rights and dignity in the Balkans -- to assert yet one more time (and, yes, the continual reassurance is necessary under circumstances like those elaborated above) that we will be here for the long run to help get Kosovo through the difficult times ahead.
8. (C) But the quid pro quo, and one we must insist on with increased frequency and volume, is an acceptance of Kosovo’s own responsibilities -- in governance, in outreach to its non-majority communities, and in getting beyond the provocations from Serbia to focus on Kosovo’s future. Kosovo has been steeped in Serbia-related mayhem for too long; real maturity will come with the wisdom and ability to see beyond. You will carry this message in your meetings with leaders, in your address to the Assembly, and in your very appearance in Kosovo at this critical time. KAIDANOW

Wikileaks cables- Kosovo: Kaidanow's take on EULEX

2010-12-11T09:24:00.001-06:00

VZCZCXRO2841
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DE RUEHPS #0148/01 0981727
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY PRISTINA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8929
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Wednesday, 08 April 2009, 17:27
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 PRISTINA 000148
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR INL, EUR/SCE
NSC FOR HELGERSON
EO 12958 DECL: 03/14/2019
TAGS PGOV, PINR, PREL, KV
SUBJECT: KOSOVO/EULEX: AT FULL OPERATING CAPABILITY, BUT
NOT WITHOUT PROBLEMS
Classified By: Ambassador Tina S. Kaidanow for Reasons 1.4 (b), (d).

1. (C) SUMMARY: On April 6 the European Union’s rule-of-law mission in Kosovo, EULEX, declared full operational capability (FOC). Four months after its initiation, EULEX can claim some significant successes, including a complete and violence-free roll-out of the police component; the reopening of the problematic Mitrovica courthouse and hearing of a case, the first since violence closed the court on March 17, 2008; and establishing its customs presence at border crossing points Gates 1 and 31 with Serbia. However, the EULEX police component’s low profile and its limited executive authority, the absence of control over its judges, and EULEX unwillingness -- or inability -- to clarify the question of applicable law continue to dog the rule of law mission’s ability to do its job effectively. All of these problems are compounded in the Serb-majority north, where EULEX has yet to reinforce its authority with the local populace. Success also requires that Serbia play a constructive role in dealing with EULEX on a technical level to solve practical problems while keeping the UN firmly outside the process -- an outcome we wish Brussels would underscore with Belgrade in a far more decisive manner. END SUMMARY
POLICE

2. (C) EULEX’s Police component, with 1654 total staff (international and national), comprises by far the largest share of EULEX’s 2507 person presence in Kosovo. EULEX Police enjoyed some success when the Formed Police Units (FPUs or specialized riot police) responded to tense situations in January and March in the divided flashpoint city of Mitrovica. However, the EULEX Police component has remained largely invisible in day-to-day operations. This is largely due to a different mandate that EULEX sees for its police officers compared to how UNMIK Police operated. Where UNMIK Police possessed wide-ranging executive authority and were visible to the public throughout the country, EULEX Police focus primarily on monitoring, mentoring, and advising (MMA). EULEX headquarters tells us that this MMA role necessitates that its officers work most closely with the Kosovo Police on management functions, and this work requires primary staffing at the station level.

3. (C) American officers assigned to the Police component have expressed some frustration regarding this hands-off approach and the absence of executive authority when operating in the field. Officers in the Strengthening Department operating in Mitrovica and at border gates, for example, have no executive authority to enforce laws or make arrests for visible criminal violations committed in their presence. They can only perform their MMA activities, and acting outside of this mandate could expose individual officers to disciplinary action -- for example, responding with force to an agitated and threatening individual at a border crossing -- for exerting unlawful executive authority. As a result, EULEX refuses to deploy officers from the Strengthening Department to situations where they might be compelled to act in self-defense -- the very situations where an international presence would be most beneficial.

4. (C) As an example, March protests over power cuts in the eastern Serb enclave of Silovo/Shilovo (Gjilane/Gnjilane municipality) initially saw no EULEX police officers respond due to their absence of executive authority. U.S. officers assigned to work with Kosovo Police (KP) officers in station-level management positions in the region convinced KP commanders to visit the scene, thus creating a rationale for the U.S. officers to monitor the commanders’ performance in the field. At the same time, these officers exposed themselves to personal jeopardy by leaving what EULEX calls their primary workplace, the police station.

5. (C) As it stands now, there is a large gap in EULEX’s police activity. The Special Police Department provides in extremis crowd control and riot suppression and currently
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deploys the bulk of its 455 FPU officers in the Mitrovica region. The Strengthening Department assigns officers to monitor, mentor, and advise at the station-level across the country. However, due to its lack of executive authority, EULEX has little role to play in emerging situations not yet requiring an FPU response -- situations that might benefit from the presence of international police officers whom local residents may regard as more objective and professional than KP officers.

6. (C) EULEX Police’s Executive Police Department (EPD) does possess authority to conduct investigations into organized crime cases and incidents where political interference undermines the rule of law, but EULEX tells us that this activity is limited due to insufficient equipment. Without surveillance or wiretap equipment, EPD officers cannot conduct effective investigations.
JUSTICE

7. (C) The EULEX Justice component enjoys some success in the solid mentoring relationship it has developed with Kosovo judges and prosecutors. Feedback has been positive and cooperation with USG programs in these areas has been very good. Cooperation with EULEX Justice at the headquarters level has also been good, and weekly meetings, which include other international stakeholders including the International Civilian Office (ICO) and the European Commission (EC), have helped ensure a tighter, more unified message on the range of legal issues. Significantly, EULEX has occupied the Mitrovica court house and has begun prosecuting cases. Though Serbs in north Mitrovica initially protested EULEX’s presence, seeing the organization as a tool of the Kosovo government and independence, EULEX was able to conduct a prosecution against two Serb defendants in March that resulted in acquittal on charges of felony robbery. But continued confusion within EULEX on applicable law has detracted from the success of this proceeding. The judges chose to apply UNMIK law, arguing that the offenses occurred while Kosovo was under UNMIK jurisdiction. EULEXXXXXXXXXXXXX failed to clarify the question of applicable law with both the judges and the GOK prior to beginning the case. We expect the court to issue a written judgment on or about April 10, which could prompt an unhappy response from Kosovo leaders and media (a point we have made repeatedly to EULEX top officials).

8. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX

9. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX It’s also apparent that the rigidity of EULEX’s prosecutorial structure, with international prosecutors assigned to specific courts or prosecutor’s offices and case transfers among prosecutors necessary when a case moves to another court or jurisdiction, hampers quick and effective action.
CUSTOMS

10. (C) The EULEX Customs component has developed a strong mentoring, monitoring, and advising role with the Kosovo Customs Service and has gradually increased its activities since EULEX initiated operations on December 9, 2008. Coordination between Customs Head of Component Paul Acda and Kosovo Customs Director Naim Huruglica, stemming from their previous cooperation under UNMIK, is especially strong and transparent.

11. (C) Eight EULEX Customs staff are working at the Kosovo Customs Service headquarters, including the Customs Head of Component, his deputy, two media relations personnel, and four expert advisors working directly with relevant Kosovo Customs departments in revenue operations, law enforcement, legal, and finance and administration. EULEX Customs also has 18 personnel working as mobile customs units (six teams of three people), plus one team coordinator, monitoring all customs border posts. The mobile units group is based at a separate Kosovo Customs building located in Fushe Kosove/Kosovo Polje, just outside of Pristina. These units are fully staffed but are experiencing some equipment shortages, including phones, radios, cameras, GPS equipment, etc.

12. (C) The EULEX Customs Reinforcement Task Force has a staff of 22 internationals out of a planned 33, with no local staff deployed to date. This group first operated on a 9-to-5 basis in northern Kosovo in December 2008, and commenced 24/7 operations in mid-January 2009. On February 1, 2009, EULEX Customs officials began registering commercial goods entering through the two northern gates (1 and D31), data which had gone unrecorded since protesters destroyed the gates in February 2008. The registration process entails collecting basic information about shipments, such as company name, type of goods, value and quantity, to share with customs officials at the inland Mitrovica customs clearance terminal, and vehicles entering these gates receive instructions to proceed to the inland terminal. These are essentially the same procedures that were in place prior to independence (February 2008), except that EULEX officials are not yet withholding personal documents from drivers -- such as a passport or driver’s license -- as a guarantee that the driver will present the goods for clearance at the Mitrovica terminal.

13. (C) Full customs procedures will not restart at Gates 1 and D31 until the gates undergo repair and receive specialized inspection equipment. Possible next steps toward
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reestablishing full customs controls will include building customs offices at the northern gates, establishing freight forwarding and bank offices, installing cameras that connect directly to the main customs operations center in Pristina, and acceptance of customs duties at the gates. Some of these steps, such as installing cameras and collecting duties, are likely to spark political sensitivities in the north, with threats emanating regularly from northern Serb hardliners about the violent response that will ensue if customs is fully restored. EULEX Customs also needs clarification on which customs law applies in the north -- UNMIK or Kosovo -- in order to begin collecting customs duties at the two northern gates. Discussions on how to rectify this legal dilemma are on-going in the context of “practical issues” consultations between EULEX and the Belgrade and Kosovo governments. EULEX Customs has recommended adding an additional 20 international and 10 local staff in the north to cover eventual revenue collection at Gates 1 and D31, which would take the Customs component to fully operational status.
EULEX BEYOND FOC

14. (C) EULEX’s policy chief Dominique Orsini on April 2 told us that Full Operating Capability (FOC) is a military term in vogue and in use because of former French General Yves de Kermabon’s influence and reflects only that EULEX has sufficient personnel to fulfill its mission. While EULEX declared FOC on April 6, it does not mean that EULEX’s activities or its mandate have grown to meet Kosovo’s requirements for EULEX’s mission. Orsini told us that EULEX is actively considering how to improve its performance and told us that other participant countries and the UN have also noted the gap in policing left by the limited executive authority that EULEX police officers possess. EULEX is considering creating a very limited cadre of civilian affairs officers that might be able to respond to emerging situations, providing on-the-scene international voices working with Kosovo Police to help quell local tensions. Visiting EU CIVCOM representative Kim Friedberg told the Ambassador on April 7 that this was under active consideration for the north, though the very next day EULEX HOM de Kermabon denied to the Ambassador that this civilian or political component would do anything more than simply “coordinate” among EULEX elements and possibly other international actors operating in the north. Confusion obviously still exists on the methodologies EULEX will employ to overcome some of these “gap” issues.

15. (C) Orsini is also less confident that EULEX will resolve the applicable law question. As long as only 22 of 27 EU member states recognize Kosovo, EULEX will be unable, according to Orsini, to develop a consistent policy that identifies Kosovo law as the only legal system operating here. He added that Madrid and the other four non-recognizing capitals complain to Brussels each time a routine report even suggests that EULEX is venturing beyond the bounds of status-neutrality and straying from its mandate under UNSCR 1244, and Brussels, in turn, notifies EULEX headquarters of its offense. (At the recent EULEX ceremony marking the opening of their new headquarters and reaching FOC, no Kosovo flag was displayed, though all EU member state flags -- including that of the UK, which recently announced its withdrawal of most of its EULEX contingent -- were prominently featured. No U.S. or Turkish flag was flown, either.) We expect that this confusion will continue to plague both justice and customs operations in the North, and it will become an ever more vocal bone of contention among Kosovo Albanian political forces and the local media.
COMMENT

16. (C) EULEX has had some successes -- its deployment, de Kermabon’s receptiveness to our counsel, its effective response to violent outbreaks in Mitrovica, and a growing number of concluded court cases, including a war crimes conviction against a Kosovo Albanian that carried a 17-year
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prison sentence. Its cautiousness in hewing to status neutrality and defining its mission as purely technical, however, is a serious limitation. Right now EULEX is a stabilizing influence, helping to provide law and order in the absence of international consensus on Kosovo’s status, but it could quickly become immobilized by its inherent political limitations.

17. (C) EULEX must take a more active role in helping Kosovo resolve practical issues that fall within its legitimate mandate on customs, justice and police issues; this will obviously require an active dialogue with Serbia -- but without the UN presence in negotiations that convinces the Kosovars that these talks are just a continuation of the abortive “six point” discussions that almost led to a breakdown of stability in Kosovo last November. If EULEX -- the biggest and most ambitious ESDP mission to date -- is to succeed, it needs to make progress on the critical issues of the north, but that progress will only come if Brussels applies equal pressure on Belgrade and Pristina, rather than acceding to Belgrade’s political demands and alienating their Kosovo counterparts. Thus far the jury is still out on whether the EU will show the necessary degree of political leadership, but we will continue to urge a balanced and vigorous approach, as well as a more robust operational posture in Kosovo’s north. End Comment. KAIDANOW

Wikileaks cables- Kosovo: Scene setter for the visit of Kosovo President and PM to Washington

2010-12-11T09:21:00.001-06:00

VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHPS #0077/01 0541724
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 231724Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY PRISTINA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8846
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

Monday, 23 February 2009, 17:24
C O N F I D E N T I A L PRISTINA 000077
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR S, P, EUR (FRIED, JONES)
NSC FOR HELGERSON, OVP FOR BLINKEN
FOR THE SECRETARY AND THE VICE-PRESIDENT FROM THE AMBASSADOR
EO 12958 DECL: 02/14/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, UNMIK, KV
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF KOSOVO PRESIDENT
SEJDIU AND PRIME MINISTER THACI TO WASHINGTON, FEBRUARY 26, 2008
Classified By: AMBASSADOR TINA KAIDANOW FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

Monday, 23 February 2009, 17:24
C O N F I D E N T I A L PRISTINA 000077
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR S, P, EUR (FRIED, JONES)
NSC FOR HELGERSON, OVP FOR BLINKEN
FOR THE SECRETARY AND THE VICE-PRESIDENT FROM THE AMBASSADOR
EO 12958 DECL: 02/14/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, UNMIK, KV
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF KOSOVO PRESIDENT
SEJDIU AND PRIME MINISTER THACI TO WASHINGTON, FEBRUARY 26, 2008
Classified By: AMBASSADOR TINA KAIDANOW FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

¶1. (C) It has been a difficult but in many ways successful year since Kosovo declared its independence on February 17, 2008. Though we spent much time planning for the possibility of large-scale population flows after the declaration and took precautions lest the independence move sparked outright conflict between Kosovo and Serbia, none of this has taken place. Instead, with our strong support and encouragement, Kosovo has weathered a series of provocative and sometimes violent actions taken by Serb hardliners, demonstrating through patience and restraint that it is a responsible member of the international community and an eager aspirant for eventual inclusion in Euro-Atlantic institutions. Kosovo has a modern constitution, has passed laws to protect its minorities, and is looking to build a sustainable economic base through development of its energy sector and other private investment. Acknowledging Kosovo’s achievements, 55 of the most important countries in Europe and elsewhere have recognized Kosovo, though the pace of recognitions has been slowed by Serbia’s unfortunate decision to refer the question of Kosovo independence to the International Court of Justice. Kosovo is working to expand the group of recognizers, and would appreciate the assistance of the new U.S. administration in convincing friends and allies -- particularly in the Islamic world -- to come on board.

¶2. (C) Kosovo’s temperate line is in many ways due to the leadership of President Sejdiu and Prime Minister Thaci, two men of very different backgrounds and political sentiment who chose to make common cause at a critical time for Kosovo. The two formed a coalition government just prior to independence, an arrangement that has held steady despite historical animosities and considerable mistrust between their two parties. This visit and your visible endorsement of Kosovo’s moderate approach will help fend off growing domestic criticism -- from dissatisfied members of the governing coalition and from the vocal opposition -- that Kosovo leaders have not been assertive enough in establishing control over Kosovo’s rebellious Serb-majority north or defending against Serbian encroachments on Kosovo sovereignty.

¶3. (C) And those encroachments will likely persist, even under the pro-European government of Serbian President Tadic in Belgrade. The previous Serbian government under Prime Minister Kostunica engineered a policy of full ethnic separation in Kosovo, physically intimidating local Serbs into abandoning jobs in Kosovo’s once multi-ethnic police force and municipal administrations. Serbia held its own illegal municipal elections in Kosovo despite warnings from the UN that such a move violated UNSCR 1244 and moved rapidly to emplace parallel institutions in Serb-majority areas throughout Kosovo. Serbia also backed open violence by the thuggish and criminalized Serb leadership in Kosovo’s north, which ordered the destruction of two northern border gates and the subsequent March 17, 2008 attack on UN and KFOR peacekeepers.

¶4. (C) While Tadic has made significant steps on key issues of importance to the West, including on ICTY commitments, he has pursued a policy in Kosovo not materially different from that of his predecessor. Serbia continues to assert the authority of parallel Serb municipal authorities throughout Kosovo, sowing the seeds of potential conflict in areas where Serbs and Albanians live side by side. Tadic’s Serbia has refused to restore customs operations at the two northern gates, resulting in a rash of smuggling and organized crime in northern Kosovo. No local Serbs have yet been permitted by Belgrade to return to Kosovo institutions. While Tadic and his foreign minister Jeremic (the mastermind of Belgrade’s Kosovo policy) finally bowed to European pressure to accept the deployment of an EU rule of law mission (EULEX) throughout Kosovo, they have resisted engaging in discussions with EULEX on the resolution of practical issues including customs and police, insisting instead that the UN impose Belgrade-crafted measures -- the so-called “six points” -- to effectively separate Kosovo’s ethnic Serbs from its majority population. Should these six points be implemented in the way Belgrade foresees, Kosovars worry that partition could once again become a viable reality.

¶5. (C) The Kosovo government remains prepared to engage in quiet diplomacy with Serbia via EU mediation, and has held open those positions in the police and public sector that

were once occupied by local Serbs in anticipation of any signal from Belgrade to the Kosovo Serb community that they are free to resume a more collaborative approach. You can impress upon Sejdiu and Thaci once again the imperative to maintain outreach to their minority communities and implement fully those obligations they undertook to the Serb population under the plan developed by UN Special Envoy (and Nobel laureate) Ahtisaari.

¶6. (C) Kosovo’s challenges are not limited to the political and security realm. Last year’s Donors Conference saw over $1.5 billion pledged in support of Kosovo, but the momentum of Kosovo’s economic development and its attractiveness to international investors -- particularly in the energy field, where Kosovo’s huge lignite deposits can be transformed over the next decade into a reliable domestic supply of electricity as well as an export commodity -- will ultimately depend not on the largesse of donors but on the government’s own credible pursuit of its economic objectives, something you can stress in your discussions with them. They will also need to avoid the serious pitfalls of cronyism, corruption and political patronage in public appointments; the recent selections of solid professionals to lead their intelligence agency and the ministry of the Kosovo Security Force (the small, NATO-trained civil response force) gives at least some cause for hope in this regard.

¶7. (C) Sejdiu and Thaci may reaffirm their conviction that U.S. troop contributions in Kosovo remain essential, particularly since U.S. forces alone are trusted enough by Serbs and Albanians to maintain peace in one of the most volatile parts of Kosovo. Kosovo leaders will also express their belief that only the United States can provide the kind of lasting leadership in Kosovo and the region that is necessary for prolonged stability. Frankly, we agree. While many in the EU and most notably the “Quint” countries were vigorous in supporting Kosovo’s independence, the intensified problems we predict as a consequence of Belgrade’s intransigence -- especially those surrounding Kosovo’s north, where Serb extremists have shown their readiness for continued confrontation -- could easily lead some queasy Europeans to back away from their commitments over time and settle for a partition-like outcome that has been adamantly opposed by Kosovars of all political persuasions. The United Nations, as well, though “reconfiguring” and downsizing its presence here, has shown a negative tendency to retain certain important authorities, under pressure from Belgrade and Moscow. If Kosovo is to succeed as a long-term proposition -- and it most certainly can -- our sustained engagement is necessary to bolster European resolve, bring Belgrade to a more realistic sense of its equities in peace and stability, and take a firm line with the UN on further reducing its presence in Kosovo. These meetings in Washington will help reinforce the sense that Kosovo is moving forward and imbue Kosovo’s leadership with a renewed sense of confidence as they prepare to face the many challenges ahead. KAIDANOW

Kosovo's independence is legal, UN court rules

2010-07-22T10:42:00.000-05:00

This is the proverbial nail in coffin for Serbia's claim that Kosovo's independence was Illegal. Serbia now has zero-nada-zilch arguments against Kosovo. They no longer have any political room to maneuver whatsoever. The floodgates to many other recognition have been opened wide & partition is out of the questions now. Kosovo's independence has been crystallized by this ruling.

Thank Jeremic for this. If Serbia had not requested this opinion, Serbia would be claiming ( with some legitimacy in the eyes of some) for decades to come that Kosovo was part of Serbia. Thank you very much Jeremic! I gather you will resign for this utter failure of yours?

Serbia lost the war for Kosovo militarily 11 years ago, and it has now lost the legal war.

Ferik

Kosovo on the rise ( Travel Guide)

2010-07-11T08:08:00.000-05:00

They embrace their newfound peace, and they embrace Americans too

A statue of 15th century Albanian hero Gjergj Kastriot Skenderbeu, widely known as Skanderbeg, stamds guard in front of one of Pristina's new government guildings. Skanderbeg is credited with ousting Ottoman forces from his native land. (KAREN TORME OLSON, FOR THE TRIBUNE / July 5, 2010)

By Karen Torme Olson, Special to Tribune Newspapers

July 11, 2010

PRISTINA, Kosovo — The moment I deplaned at Pristina International Airport, I felt the new vitality that had emerged in the eight years since my last visit here.

The crush of people waiting to retrieve luggage was just as frenetic, but instead of mostly solemn-faced men in black leather jackets shoving their way to the baggage carousel, this crowd was composed of young families with small children, 20-somethings in designer duds, a swarm of U.S. teens on a community-service trip, and men and women in business attire. Instead of armed Russian KFOR troops ( NATO-led Kosovo Force) barking orders at the crowd, smiling young men and women in uniforms circulated among the new arrivals, asking if they could help with accommodations or transport.

Kosovo has been independent from Serbia since February 2008. It has a long and colorful history and considerable natural beauty, but many still associate the nation about the size of Iowa with war, and few travelers consider it a vacation destination.

My daughter-in-law Sanja met me at the airport, and as we covered the 10 miles to the city, I slipped into a then-and-now comparison. In 2002 the airport road was an obstacle course on a dirt-and-gravel strip that wound between weed-covered lots dotted with "beware of land mine" signs. It was us against crater-size potholes, slow-moving military vehicles and wrong-way drivers in smoke-belching Yugos.

This time our ride on smooth, new pavement was crowded with Audis, BMWs and environmentally friendly compacts. Glass and steel buildings housing luxury auto showrooms, gas stations, home-supply megastores and even a few water parks occupied the lots.

As we approached Pristina, a Paul Bunyan-size image of a smiling Bill Clinton painted on a high-rise greeted traffic. The words beneath former President Clinton's likeness read: "Welcome to Bill Clinton Boulevard," a clear message he remains a hero of epic proportion in Kosovo. There's even talk of building a park named for Clinton to enshrine an 11-foot-tall gilded statue of him unveiled in November 2009.

In 2002 most Pristina dwellings were run-down socialist towers covered with laundry lines and satellite dishes; streets and restaurants were often empty. Now the satellite dishes are gone, new construction is everywhere, and restaurant business has picked up because "Kosovo has cable now, and people have a little more money to go out for dinner," Sanja told me.

Flowers and flags were the biggest tipoff that Kosovo had changed. Eight years ago Kosovars' most urgent priorities were food, jobs and healing after war. There was no room for floral frivolities. Flying an Albanian flag near a Serb neighborhood had the power to set off a fight and vice versa. This time botanical color was visible on tables, in window boxes, on fences and along sidewalks, and Kosovo's new flag was flying but seldom alone. Usually it was flanked by the Stars and Stripes, the European Union banner and others.

The next morning in the apartment that Sanja and my son Greg share, I opened my eyes to the first of the day's five Muslim calls to prayer, which simultaneously emanate from loud speakers mounted on Pristina's 200 minarets. In 2002 I awoke to the cries of feral dogs that roamed Pristina's streets, and the prayer calls were silent, as many of the city's Albanian Muslim majority were keeping a low profile after the war.

We had a packed itinerary and left early for the museum city of Prizren 50 miles southwest of Pristina. Prizren is Kosovo's historical and cultural center, the site of many seminal events since its founding in Byzantine times. It also is the country's most ethnically diverse region, home to Albanians, Turks, Serbs, Bosnians and others.

A 16th century stone bridge that spans the Lumbardh River in Prizren's center is the city's most recognizable landmark. Others include the Sinan Pasha Mosque in the city center, elaborate Orthodox churches and the rebuilt League of Prizren building with its ethnographic museum. We also stopped at the 15th century Gazi Mehmet Pasha Hamam (an Ottoman bathhouse), but we got only a peek at its intricate woodwork and blue-and-white paintings because it is under renovation.

Prizren's cache of Ottoman buildings was virtually untouched during the 1998-99 war, but postwar ethnic violence and Albanian retaliation for destruction of the original League of Prizren building caused extensive damage to many Serbian churches. A guard on the grounds of the19th century Serbian Orthodox Church of St. George told us the building was closed for repair after being burned by rioting Albanians in March 2004. As a result, St. George's and other Orthodox churches and monasteries in Kosovo still are ringed with barbed wire and guarded by KFOR troops.

We decided to have breakfast and found a bakery where Sanja purchased cheese-filled burek while we ordered espresso at a coffee bar on Sadervan Square. Our table in front of a public fountain in the square turned out to be a great spot for people watching. We were treated to a parade of children, city workers, women in traditional Muslim dress and shoppers stopping to fill pails, take a drink, wash their hands or just splash around.

When we went to get our car to head for Gjakova, the parking attendant approached us with a dour look that immediately changed to a smile and handshakes all around when he realized we were Americans. This is not unusual in Kosovo, which in my experience is the only mostly Muslim nation that openly loves the U.S. and its people.

Gjakova is 25 miles north of Prizren and should have been a 40-minute ride, but it took us almost two hours because it was wedding season in Kosovo. We encountered no fewer than two dozen wedding caravans clogging the roads with cars carrying people waving white cloths out windows while horns honked and music blasted from car radios. I saw similar processions eight years ago, but mostly they celebrated the release of Albanian prisoners of war.

When we finally reached Gjakova, we headed for the Carshia, a bazaar set in wooden stalls with carved shutters. The market is from the 16th century, but the original buildings burned to the ground in 1999. They have been rebuilt, and Carshia is unique in Gjakova, though the town also has its share of museums, mosques and historic sites.

Our next stop would have been Peja and its 13th century monastery, but we instead detoured to Rahoveci to taste the new vintage at the Stone Castle winery, one of Kosovo's largest. We noticed a framed photograph of Clinton hanging on the wall along with the winery's awards and licenses.

Because we were determined to see a monastery that day, we chose Decani, an hour northwest of the winery. Italian KFOR troops outside the monastery gates examined our papers and held our passports while we went in, a procedure unchanged from 2002.

While in the monastery, we were approached by a young monk named Peter, who spoke excellent English. He asked if we wanted to see more than the church and invited us for tea and sesame honey cookies. When we finished, he showed us the monks' living quarters and the art studio where they create icons for Orthodox churches all over the world, and explained the monks' concept of community. He showed us Decani's state-of-the-art woodshop, then took us to the wine cellar. Our impromptu visit lasted more than two hours.

The next few days Sanja and I explored Pristina while Greg went to his job with the U.S. Agency for International Development. We joined crowds strolling along the wide pedestrian expanse that is Mother Teresa Boulevard, stopped at a French-style cafe for cafe au lait, visited the new Kosovo National Library building and the University of Kosovo campus, and toured the city's colorful farmers market/bazaar, where produce, cheese, pots and pans, eggs and meat, and mountains of cigarette cartons are for sale. We also went to Film City, a multistory mall in the hills above town where designer knockoffs rule.

Kosovo's once limited restaurant scene is now vibrant, thanks to the demands of a large international population. There is everything from Albanian fare such as beef pie with yogurt (mantija) at Tiffany or sushi with a side of karaoke at Tokyo.

Most people walk rather than ride in Pristina, and so did we. Sanja and I walked a route that took us to the Mother Teresa statue on the boulevard named for her, and to Kosovo's version of the Vietnam Wall. The memorial is an iron fence covered with photos of young men and women killed or missing during the war. We also passed Pristina's huge dormant Palace of Youth and Sports, which is one of the most recognizable landmarks but has been empty since a 1999 fire. Only its exterior has been repaired. A visit to the bright yellow Newborn sculpture in front of the sports palace summed up Kosovo's new spirit. It's not a great work of art, but it is symbolic: It was erected to mark Kosovo's independence as a nation.

Over dinner on my last evening in Kosovo, Greg asked what changes I had noticed since my previous visit. I mentioned the new buildings, the restaurants, the roads, the absence of land mine warnings and the air of optimism that seemed to be everywhere. But I also told him that the one thing that had touched me the most eight years ago hadn't changed at all: Kosovo's affection for America and its people. Nothing makes a traveler feel more at home.

If you go

Getting around

Taxis from the airport to Pristina cost about $35 one way for the 10-mile trip if you hail a cab waiting outside but just $21 if you order a taxi by phone. Buses run every two hours between the airport and the Grand Hotel in the center of Pristina for $4.25 one way. Be forewarned that the trip between town and the airport can take from 30 minutes to 3 hours depending on traffic and road construction. If you want to see anything besides Pristina, rent a car. Hertz and Europcar have offices at Pristina airport, and Europcar also has an office at the Grand Hotel. There is bus service between towns, but on-time arrivals and departures will be at the mercy of road conditions and traffic.

Lodging

When I visited Kosovo in 2002, the Grand Hotel (grandhotel-pr.com) was 25 years old and showing its age. Back then it was considered the best lodging in Pristina. The Grand still is drab, dour and overpriced ($145 for a double), but it is undergoing renovation. It has been overshadowed by newcomers such as the Royal (royalhotel-pr.com), a modern hotel in the same price range. The Royal ($131/double) sits in the midst of a neighborhood that is home to several bars and restaurants, which makes for a lively street scene. It offers amenities such as a pool, Wi-Fi and airport shuttle, but room decor is inexplicably Old World kitsch. The Ambassador (www.hotel-ambassador.com — Web site down at press time) is another good choice. It is pricier at $155/double, but it is also classier. The Victory (hotel-victory.com) attracts lots of international guests, though it is a comparatively expensive choice at $200/double. Maybe that's because of the big green faux Statue of Liberty on the roof.

Eating

You will eat well and inexpensively wherever you go in Kosovo. Pristina is loaded with excellent restaurants. We even found wine bars and respectable sushi. Food in the rest of Kosovo is plentiful and delicious but tends to cater to local tastes.

Entertainment

Jazz clubs are full well into the wee hours. Pubs, discos and al fresco restaurants are packed, even on Sunday nights. Go to jazzprishtina.com for more information.

Kosovo trip dispels common stereotypes

2010-07-11T08:05:00.000-05:00

July 10, 2010

BY MARY KAY SWEIKAR-Commercial-News

PRISTINA, Kosovo — When well-wishing family and friends learned my husband and I planned to stay in Kosovo for a week during our recent European travels, they expressed understandable concern: “Where in the world is Kosovo?” and “Isn’t it dangerous there?”

But not until we spent a week living in Pristina, the vibrant capital of this developing country, could I say with confidence that Kosovo is a safe, beautiful, and exciting place to visit.

My son, Michael Sweikar (1999 Schlarman High School graduate) had already done work in this Balkan country on three different occasions, and he was completing another 2-month assignment there when we decided to visit him. Michael works for the international division of the National Center for State Courts (NCSC), a non-profit organization based in Arlington, Va., specializing in international legal development.

Based on my son’s sound judgment and experience, I had reason to believe that visiting this newest nation in the world would be a worthwhile and fulfilling experience.

Kosovars love Americans, and they are abundantly thankful for U.S. assistance during and after their war for independence from Serbian rule in 1999. These are people who proudly fly the American flag, display a statue of President Bill Clinton on a major thoroughfare and celebrate the U.S. Fourth of July.

In recent years most visitors to Kosovo have been people who went there as part of the U.S. government’s mission, including diplomats, soldiers or development consultants. In the past, few Americans thought of Kosovo as a tourist destination, but that is changing.

Squeezed into a relatively small area, Kosovo offers a pleasing mixture of modern culture and tradition, as well as beautiful landscapes to admire — breathtaking mountain peaks, densely forested hills, spectacular waterfalls and abundant roses and wildflowers.

Visitors will discover fascinating cultural treasures — Ottoman-era buildings, stone houses, churches, mosques, medieval fresco paintings and many statues of political leaders and war heroes. There also is a statue of Mother Teresa and a boulevard in the capital city that is named after this saintly Albanian woman, who is revered worldwide.

It’s true that Pristina lacks some of the amenities that most of us have come to expect. For example, the water supply is shut off in parts of the city at 11 p.m. and returns with a loud “swish” at 6 a.m. the next morning. There are unannounced power interruptions, and passing several vehicles at a time on winding mountain roads is the norm.

The food in the restaurants we visited was well-prepared, though, and was served elegantly by the wait staff. We found fruit and vegetable stands everywhere, and small meat shops displayed whole lambs and legs of beef and pork in their windows. Crusty breads, delicious pastries, and morning coffee (macchiato) were served in cafes and restaurants. When compared to American prices, the cost of food, clothing, and personal items in Kosovo is relatively low, even though dollars were worth less than euros at the time.

The average age in Pristina is only 25. The young women dress in clinging jeans or short skirts, and 4-inch shoes or boots. For the most part, they tend to dress more formally than Americans do, and they all wear dark suits for official business meetings. Stylishly dressed male and female mannequins are lined up like soldiers outside the tiny clothing stores, even during a heavy rain.

Story of Kosovo

The Republic of Kosovo is a landlocked, mostly mountainous country about the size of Connecticut, with a little more than 2 million people. The region was ruled by many different ethnic groups throughout history, including the Slavs, Bulgarians, Serbs and Ottoman Turks. The Ottoman Empire ruled Kosovo for centuries, until Serbia resumed control over the region in 1913. In 1918, Kosovo became part of the Yugoslav Federation.

In 1998, the Yugoslav army and Serbian police began fighting against the Kosovo Liberation Army, but their brutal tactics were concentrated on the ethnic Albanian civilians who made up more than 90 per cent of the country. Kosovo’s Albanian leaders attempted to break away from Serbia using non-violent methods, but Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic cracked down brutally to stifle their efforts for independence.

After the NATO intervention to stop the inhumane treatment of the Kosovo Albanians, Serbia finally agreed to a peace accord. More than 900 Kosovars were killed in the 11 weeks of fighting, and nearly a million people were forced to flee their homes without adequate food and shelter.

Although other sections of Yugoslavia prospered, the wars of the 20th Century left the province of Kosovo poor and underdeveloped. Nevertheless, on Feb. 17, 2008, the Republic of Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia.

All this rich history makes Kosovo a unique and diverse country to visit. There are building and road signs lettered in three languages: Albanian, Serbian and Turkish. Muslim mosques and Orthodox monasteries co-exist, and elderly Albanian men wear the distinguishing white, fitted cap called a plise. Turkish women wearing their traditional costumes mingle with the young Albanians who are stylishly dressed in American fashions.

In Kosovo you can hear a wide range of recorded music in the trendy shops and cafes — from traditional pipe songs, to Albanian rap, to Michael Jackson and American musical hits of the 1980s.

Most people associate Kosovo only with the highly publicized war between the Albanians and the Serbs more than a decade ago, but one local Kosovar told me that “Conditions here are a thousand times better than they were 10 years ago, during the war. I was still a student back then, when my family fled the country and stayed with friends in Albania. I’m proud to return to Kosovo and work for an organization that is helping our beautiful country to rebuild.”

U.S. helps

Thanks to the United States and European nation agencies and volunteers, millions of dollars and invaluable human resources have been poured into helping Kosovo get back on its feet.

The National Center for State Courts is a non-profit organization that continues to do good work in Kosovo. Under a USAID-funded project (www.drejtesia-ks.org/?cid2,1) NCSC is helping to establish a modern, functional judicial system that can better serve the citizens of Kosovo. During our time there, we were privileged to attend the inauguration of the recently renovated court in Prizren (about two hours from Pristina).

On that same day, we especially enjoyed participating in the Children’s Day events at a grade school in Prizren. NCSC has provided the second graders in schools throughout Kosovo with “Let’s Learn About Law” coloring books, along with boxes of crayons that were donated by people back in the United States. The students waved both American and Albanian flags, and some were dressed in their traditional costumes.

There are opportunities to assist the effort in Kosovo through the National Center for State Courts. Donations to buy Crayola crayons can be sent to benefit the school children in Kosovo (http://www.ncscinternational.org/Projects/Kosovo_coloring_book_series.asp).

Shan't!-Serbia ruins an attempt at western Balkan unity

2010-03-23T09:06:00.000-05:00

Mar 21st 2010 | From The Economist online

BRDO castle, in the middle of Slovenia, has played host to a number of important events in recent Balkan history. In 1980, Marshal Tito, Yugoslavia’s leader, suffered a stroke there and died soon afterwards. In April 1991, the leaders of the six constituent Yugoslav republics met at the castle in a vain attempt to avert their doomed country’s descent into violence. This weekend their successors reconvened, along with the prime ministers of Kosovo and Albania, to show the world—or rather the European Union—how committed they are to good neighbourly relations.

The happy occasion was to be blessed by Herman Van Rompuy, the new president of the European Council, and Miguel Ángel Moratinos, foreign minister of Spain, which holds the EU’s rotating presidency. But proceedings were torpedoed by a last-minute decision by Boris Tadic, Serbia’s president, to boycott the meeting because of the presence, on equal terms, of Kosovo. Brave faces all round could not hide the failure.

Tadic stays at home

The summit was the result of a warming of relations between Slovenia and Croatia. After spending much of the last year squabbling over a maritime border, the two countries agreed, in November, to put the case to arbitration. Today, says Danilo Turk, Slovenia’s president, “there is almost an explosion of happiness between Croatia and Slovenia.” What better way to celebrate this lovefest than for the two countries to invite the leaders of all the other former Yugoslav states, and Albania, to commit publicly to work towards their common future in the EU?

The sticking point, as so often, was Kosovo. Ever since the former Serbian province declared independence in February 2008, Serbia, which regards Kosovo as its historic heart, has been fighting to keep its independence from becoming diplomatic fact. Helped by powerful states like Russia and China, and, within the EU, Spain, Serbia has kept Kosovo out of the UN and many other international organisations. It has also brought the case of Kosovo’s declaration of independence to the International Court of Justice in The Hague; a ruling is expected later this year.

The two countries have nevertheless adopted a relatively grown-up attitude towards meeting together, give or take the odd tantrum. One successful format involves ensuring that delegates do not use national nameplates, allowing them to sit in the same room together. Balkan-watchers hoped that a similar pragmatism would prevail in Brdo.

The problem was the high profile of the summit. Brdo presented Mr Tadic with a dismal choice. Had he attended, Serbs at home would have seen images of him sitting around a small table with Hashim Thaci, Kosovo’s prime minister, with the implication that the pair were talking as equals. But staying away would have only enhanced Serbia's international image as a recalcitrant regional bully that refuses to accept the reality of Kosovo's independence. In the end Mr Tadic decided that domestic needs trumped statesmanship, and stayed at home. Mr Van Rompuy and Mr Moratinos then pulled out themselves, fatally undermining the meeting.

By wrecking the Brdo summit, Mr Tadic won a battle, but he cannot win the war. Smarting from its humiliation, Slovenia’s government may choose to take revenge by slowing the EU’s integration process with Serbia. Later this year, a major EU-Balkans summit is planned in Sarajevo, and the EU is increasing pressure on the states of the region to improve their mutual relations. If Serbia stays away again, the consequences could be grave. Many powerful voices in the EU, including Germany’s ruling Christian Democrats, want to see a long pause in enlargement for “digestion” once the EU takes in Iceland and Croatia, possibly in 2012. They won't mind a bit if Mr Tadic insists on putting Kosovo before Europe. If that happens, Serbia, which long ago lost Kosovo, may lose the EU.

Commentary: An independent Kosova after two years

2010-02-28T12:21:00.000-06:00

By Dr. Bujar Bukoshi | Special to McClatchy Newspapers

Kosova's independence — declared two years ago — is the realization of a nation's yearning and a triumph over brutal repression.

We resisted through non-violent means for decades, including from 1989-1998 when I led a government-in-exile as Prime Minister. We were forced to take up arms to defend ourselves in the late 1990s, and remain grateful to have had NATO's help in 1999 to end the repression and bloodshed.

In only two years since declaring independence, Kosova has demonstrated resolute commitments to democratic processes, the rule of law, and inter-ethnic equality. Kosova's independence is a stabilizing factor for the Western Balkans, and will neither be compromised nor reversed.

Recognized by sixty-five states, all states of the former Yugoslavia except Serbia, and all but a few NATO members, Kosova's sovereignty and increasing self-responsibility can bring to a halt to debates about peoples and borders. Irredentism is, in the new Europe, a thing of the past. Kosova exemplifies that principle.

And, Kosova's effect on regional stability can be seen in recent nation-wide municipal elections that not only assured a viable opposition but also confirmed the government coalition. At the same time, consistent with the Ahtassari Plan, Kosova is creating new minority municipalities — and the much larger Serbian minority participation in those late 2009 municipal elections support the wisdom of that policy. A market of more than seven million Albanian speakers in Kosova, Albania, and Macedonia also augurs for a stable and prosperous cross-border region of trade, investment, and development.

Democracy has been tested in Kosova and has emerged victorious. American, EU, and NATO's nation-building efforts have been tested and, in this case, have worked. Kosova today, little more than a decade after NATO's intervention forced Serb military withdrawal, is a stable, self-governing, sustainable democracy.
But, that is hardly to say that Kosova is without challenges. Indeed, Kosova has and will continue to confront enormous obstacles notwithstanding independence.

The legacy of Belgrade's brutal rule was an exhausted population, ruined infrastructure, and despoiled land. People had fled, buildings, housing and roads were destroyed, livestock killed, communications disrupted, and commerce brought to a standstill. The Serbs left, but they left viciously.
Still on our arduous "to do" list are combating endemic corrupt practices that, while not unique to Kosova, are debilitating. Too, we have much to do to convince other governments that they should recognize Kosova, and exchange diplomatic representation. While some countries await an International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling, most simply need stronger arguments — and we can provide them.

Further, the north of Kosova, where the Serb minority is more concentrated and Belgrade's interference most pronounced, must be addressed with international help. This zone requires internationally overseen, direct talks — lest incidents occur that might tip the scale towards confrontation not compromise. With considerable irony, Serbia needs Kosova to fully re-enter Europe while Kosova needs Serbia to realize its European goals. It is not too far fetched to say that the futures of both peoples remain intertwined as they have been for centuries.

Independence has enabled us to do for ourselves what must be done for our citizens. Such self-reliance is as welcome as it is daunting. While the journey of securing the well-being and prosperity of all Kosovars has only begun, we have taken critical first steps. Support of the International Community will continue to be essential, particularly to ensure that further Serbian interference is deterred and channeled into cooperation not confrontation.

Kosova is still very, very early in its life as an independent state. But, even at such a stage, I have seen the rapid maturation of my country's political and socioeconomic life. Our capacity for success was born from our struggle to achieve independence.

ABOUT THE WRITER
Dr. Bujar Bukoshi is a Member of Parliament in Kosova, a vice-president of the Democratic League of Kosova (LDK), a party he co-founded with Ibrahim Rugova in 1989, and a renowned physician and surgeon. Bukoshi served as Prime Minister of Kosova's Government in Exile from 1989 through 1999.

Gallup Balkan Monitor: 2009 Survey Results

2010-01-31T22:46:00.002-06:00

Gallup has released its '09 comprehensive survey of the Balkans.This treasure trove of information is a must read.

Some of the key findings include:

1. Do you consider United States a Friendly or Hostile country?
59% of Serbs and 26% of Bosnians ( probably most Serbs) consider United States to be hostile country but only 1% of people of Kosovo and .5% of Albania share that opinion. Serb hostility towards U.S.A is at the same level you find in Arab countries if not higher.

2.Is religion an Important part of your life?
An astonishing 53% of people of Albania say religion is not an important part of their life, followed by 44% in Serbia and 28% in Croatia. In Kosovo, only 8% say religion is not an important part of their life. Knowing what I know about Kosovo, I am very surprised by very low % of people who say religion is not an important part of their life. There is a huge difference in the perception of religion between Kosovo and Albania ( I guess 40 year of atheism does that to you). In Kosovo, 90% say Religion is an important part of their life (again, very surprising) but only 39% of people in Albania agree. Other countries fall somewhere in between with 77% of Bosnians answering in the affirmative, 76% of Macedonians and 54% of Serbs.

3. Has the independence of Kosovo been a good or a bad thing?
This questions was only asked in Montenegro ( for some reason?) and Kosovo. A fairly large percentage (54%) of Montenegrins consider the independence of Kosovo to have been a good thing with only 12% saying its been a bad thing. If we assume that most of those who said its been a bad thing are Serbs, then it goes to show that only a minority of Serbs in Montenegro have a negative attitude towards Kosovo's Independence. That goes against conventional wisdom that Serbs are uniformly against the Independence of Kosovo. In Kosovo itself, 70% say its been a good thing and 8% says it was a bad idea.

4. Would you support the creation of "Greater Albania"? ( Presumably unification of Kosovo with Albania and 1/3 of Macedonia?)
The conventional wisdom is that most people of Kosovo and Albania are not interested in "unification", but Albanians of Macedonia are as they are living under a minority status there. This poll proved quite the opposite. In Kosovo 74% say they would support such an idea, followed by 71% in Albania ( so much for the supposed difference of opinion on this question between Albanians of Albania and those of Kosovo) and about 13% of people of Macedonia ( assuming all those who answered yes were Albanians, we can deduct that only 50% of Albanians there support the so called "Greater Albania").

5. Do you think it's possible to live together peacefully with Albanians/Serbs? This question was asked of Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo. Only 12% of Serbs said it was possible to live peacefully with Albanians, but a vast majority of Albanians (60%) said it was indeed possible to live peacefully with Serbs. So much for the Serb claims that Albanians don't want Serbs to live in Kosovo. According to this poll, its Kosovo Serbs who don't seem so keen in living peacefully with Albanians.

6. Is Serbia a Friendly, Neutral or a Hostile Country?
In Kosovo, 83% said Serbia was a hostile country towards them and 50% of Croats shared the same opinion. In Albania, only 47% said they considered Serbia to be a hostile country. A bit surprised here that Croatians view Serbia in a more negative light than people of Albania.

Who is Serbia's biggest friend? According to this poll, it's Montenegro where 69% of people viewed Serbia as a Friendly nation followed up by 55% of Mecedonians,44% of Bosnians,8% of Albanians and only 7% of Croatians. To top it off, a wapping 3% of people of Kosovoo consider Serbia to be a friendly nation. We can safely conclude here there is no love lost between people of Kosovo and Serbia and between Croatians and Serbs.

Much more at http://www.balkan-monitor.eu/index.php/dashboard

Kosovo Case at ICJ: Public hearing transcripts

2009-12-05T09:00:00.002-06:00

1. Kosovo's Arguments

2.Serbia's Arguments

3. Arguments by Albania, Germany, Saudi Arabia and Argentina

4.Arguments by Austria, Azerbaijan and Belarus

5.Arguments by Bulgaria, Brazil, Bolivia and Burundi

Bulgaria Summary of main Arguments( as presented by Dr. Zlatko Dimitroff Director of the International Law Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

a)."there can be no doubt that the decision to recognize Kosovo, taken almost two years ago, was the right one. It is quite wrong to argue that the great majority of States opposed the declaration of independence. The fact is, that one third of the United Nations Member States have already recognized Kosovo while many others have not yet taken a position." ( refuting false Serb arguments that most countries are against Kosovo's Independence by the mere fact that the have not taken a position)

b). " With Resolution 1244 the overall sovereignty of the FRY over Kosovo was suspended. Res. 1244 authorized the United Nations to facilitate a political process that will determine Kosovo’s future status “taking full account . . . of the Rambouillet accords” ( Rambouillet accords state that the will of the people of Kosovo should be taken into account when final status is resolved)

c)."It is commonly accepted that declarations of independence are a matter of fact that are neither prohibited nor authorized by international law. A declaration of independence is an expression of will by an entity aimed at the creation of a new State. Whether this result will be achieved depends on a number of conditions and prerequisites,among which are population, territory, effective government over this territory and recognition by other States. The issuance of the Declaration of Independence is governed only by domestic constitutional law."

d)."It is wrong to associate unlawfulness in domestic law with international unlawfulness. It is also wrong to state that the agreement of the parent State is a condition sine qua non for the birth of a new sovereign State. Suffice is to mention the example of the States that emerged from the break-up of the Soviet Union and the former Yugoslav Federation" ( Croatia and Bosnia succeeded without asking Serbia).

e). "Territorial integrity applies only to inter-State relations and it is not related to events within States." ( This is Serbia's main argument, but international law does not regulate infernal affairs of states -only cross country relations).

f). "Resolution 1244 did not preclude any of the possible outcomes for the future status of Kosovo."

g). "The territorial integrity of Yugoslavia is mentioned in resolution 1244 in connection with the interim period."

6.?

Kosovo votes in first election since Independence ( updated with results)

2009-11-15T09:15:00.020-06:00

Today Kosovo is holding its first local election since it declared Independence. "Democracy in Action, an association of civic organization monitoring the election, reports the process is going smoothly so far. Gazeta Express is reporting that it has seen a considerable participation from Serbs in the voting station it visited, including the one in Gracanica. If this is true, it will be e severe blow to Serbia who has advised and threaten Kosovo Serbs not to participate in these elections. Kosovo Serbs have boycotted all previous election in Kosovo, but this time they are very divided with a significant number of their leaders encouraging participation.

Another thing I am looking to see is how these election in Kosovo compare, in terms of organization, to the ones held in Albania earlier in the year. Election in Albanian were deemed to be free and fair by the monitoring organizations, but there significant delays and problems in counting the votes.

11am update:

Various parties are reporting that 30% of the electorate has voted by 2pm local time. Central Election Commission says 15 % by 11:30 am.

Serb majority municipalities until 11:30 am: Klotok 6.1%, Ranilug 3%, Gracanica 8.5%, Sterpce 10.5%. Albanian areas average 16%.

Serbs in the North of Kosovo, 35% of overall Serb population in Kosovo, appear to have boycotted the election. Less than 3% by 11:30am.

11:30am update:

CEC reports the results up to 15:30: says 33% have voted so far.Serb majority areas: Klotok 14%,Ranilug 9.2%, Gracanica 14.3%,Sterpce 23.5%. Serbs municipalities in the north voted less than 3%. This is a major split between the minority of Serbs who live in the north of Kosovo and the rest of them who are scattered throughout the country.

Kosovo Serbs voting -sample of comments in Serbian

3pm update:
Central Election Commission held another conference saying the voting process has ended without any significant incidents. It reports the total number of votes at 709,632 or 45% of eligible electorate.. this is bit more than it was expected and several % higher than in previous election.

Turnout in municipalities with majority Serb population: Klotok 25.5%,Ranilug 14%, Gracanica 24%,Sterpce 31%, Novoberd 26% and Zubin Potok 7% . This is way more than in the previous election when only 3% of Serbs voted.

Final Update:11/19: Election Results per Election Commission ( taken from front page of daily Gazeta Express)

Biggest surprise was the almost 100% increase of votes for AAK, the party of former KLA commander Ramush Haradinaj. This is the only opposition part that has been acting like the proper opposition by criticizing the government. The other opposition parties, AKR and LDD, lost a large chunk of votes especially LDD ( a splinter group from LKD) which lost almost half of it's electorate. Looks like all the losses from AKR and LDD went to AAK. Perhaps voters wanted to vote for an opposition party that stood up to the government.

Break down my municipality:

Results from the Second Round of Mayoral Election (12-13-09- Fina Update):

Gjilan - PDK 51.4%, LDK 48.6%

Dragash – PDK 53.3%, LDK 46.7%

Istog – LDK 70.8%, AAK 29.2%

Kaçanik – PDK 57.9%, AAK 42.1%

Klinë – PDK 56.3%, AAK 43.7%

Kamenicë – PDK 45.9%, LDK 54.1%

Mitrovicë – PDK 53.0%, AKR 47%

Lipjan – PDK 50.5%, LDK 49.5%

Obiliq – PDK 48.1%, LDK 51.9%

Rahovec – PDK 50.8%, LDK 49.2%

Pejë – AAK 76.7%, LDD 23.3%

Prizren – PDK 50.00% or 24,982 votes, LDK 50% or 24,940. ( difference of 42 votes, winner undetermined)

Viti – LDD 44.8%, PDK 55.2%

Suharekë – PDK 47.6%, AAK 52.4%

Vushtrri – AAK 36.5%, PDK 63.5%

Malishevë – PDK 61.8%, LDK 38.2%

Junik – AAK 56.7%, LDK 43.3%

Hani i Elezit – Independent Candidate Refki Suma 53.3%, PDK 46.7%

Shtërpcë – SLS ( Serb) 65% ( , 35%

Podujevë – LDK 66.5%, PDK 33.5%

Novobërdë – LDK 80.9%, SNSD 18.1%

Kosovo election divides Serbs

2009-11-14T11:35:00.001-06:00

By Mark Lowen
BBC News, Kosovo

A spirit of co-operation is taking hold in Strpce

Deep in the south of Kosovo, near the Macedonian border, the town of Strpce is an isolated little place.

Surrounded by the snowy peaks of Kosovo's neglected ski resort, communication here is poor. The town's one factory stands empty.

Serbs make up 70% of Strpce's population. And, like most of the 120,000 Serbs in Kosovo, they have largely boycotted all previous elections that were not organised by Belgrade. In their eyes, Kosovo's declaration of independence from Serbia last year was illegal, favoured only by the territory's Albanian majority.

But this time a handful of posters line the centre of town, advertising candidates for Sunday's local election.

It is the first poll in Kosovo since independence and the authorities are hoping for a moderate Serb turnout. Many in Strpce feel cut off from Belgrade. So Serbs here are increasingly working with local institutions, obliged to stomach reality.

Serbs moving on

Armed with a pile of fliers, Serb mayoral hopeful Bratislav Nikolic works his way down the main street. Ten years after Kosovo's brutal war between Serbs and Albanians, he tells me it is time to move on.

Anti-independence feelings do not stop Mr Nikolic running for office

"We have to live and work together. We have to play soccer together," he says. "We can't escape co-operating with Albanians."

He denies that running in the election means he is accepting Kosovo's independence.

"On a local level, we can't recognise a country," he says. "We're fighting for our lives here."

There is little expectation that Serbs will openly recognise Kosovo anytime soon. But if they are beginning to engage with Kosovan government structures on the ground, that is still a significant change.

Among Strpce's Serb population, opinions are divided over whether to take part in the poll.

"I don't want to give legitimacy to what the Albanian government is doing around here", says Ivan. "That's why I'm not going to vote in unfair elections."

Q&A: Kosovo local elections

But Dmitry, a local translator, tells me he supports the elections. "They have to be held. We are the minority in Kosovo, but we can take responsibility for what happens in this municipality if we go out and vote."

In the centre of town, Albanian construction workers are re-roofing a Serb-owned house - the two communities slowly building a new future. Surrounded by his tools, Afrim says life here is returning to normal. "I hope the Serbs do vote," he says, "so we can live together like we used to".

Flashpoint town

But about 100km (60 miles) north, it is a very different story. The town of Mitrovica, near the Serbian border, has frequently been the flashpoint for clashes between Serbs and Albanians in the past. It remains cut in two by the Ibar river.

In Mitrovica Serbs have scrawled reminders of their loyalty to Belgrade

In the Albanian-dominated south, election posters hang from the lampposts. But cross the bridge to the Serb north, and they are replaced by Serbian flags. No election is being held here - almost two years after Kosovan independence, Pristina still wields no authority.

Mitrovica's concrete walls are plastered with slogans like "EU go home", "Welcome Russian army". And the Serb national sign - a cross adorned with the Cyrillic letter "S" - is scrawled in graffiti on street corners. It stands for "Samo sloga Srbina spasava": "Only unity saves the Serbs".

Partitioning Kosovo along the Ibar river dividing line has long been discussed. But were it to be implemented, it could destabilise the wider region if other ethnically-split areas demanded the same.

In reality, though, de facto partition already exists and as Serbs elsewhere show signs of co-operating with local institutions, the division between north and south is growing ever wider.

"These are illegitimate elections organised by a quasi-state," says Milan Ivanovic, President of the Serbian National Council for Northern Kosovo. "Some of the Serbs running for office have a criminal past. And those who are going to vote are betraying our national interest."

I put it to him that it is simple for him to maintain that stance: close to the Serbian border, the north has always received the bulk of attention - and money - from Belgrade. But down in enclaves like Strpce, Serbs resent the approach of the hardline north - they do not have the luxury of resisting Kosovan independence so easily.

Mr Ivanovic disagrees. "We have to support our own institutions. Anyway, the Serbs calling for people to take part in the election have very little support."

Afrim, an ethnic Albanian, wants Serbs to help build a new Kosovo

Test of statehood

It is still unclear just how many Serbs will go out to vote - many feel pressurised by Belgrade to boycott the poll and fear for their government-sponsored jobs if they choose to take part.

The Serbian government maintains the line that conditions are not right for Kosovan Serbs to participate.

The first election entirely organised by the Kosovan government is a big test for Pristina, keen to show it can run a free and fair vote.

If Kosovo is to grow into an all-inclusive nation, a lot rests on whether the Serbs will take part. They hold the key to Kosovo reaching its goal of becoming a truly multi-ethnic democracy.

Demography in the Balkans:A birth dearth

2009-11-13T21:52:00.006-06:00

As usual, a very good article from The Economist. Slavic population in Serbia and Macedonia declining at an Alarming rate, but I was also very shocked by dramatic drop of birthrate in Kosovo from 3.6 in 1990 to 2.2 now. Albania will grow by a mere 100K in 2050 and Serbia will shrink by 1.2mil to 6mil. They didn't dare publish any prediction for Albs and Slavs in Macedonia...........

Nov 12th 2009 | BELGRADE AND PRISTINA
From The Economist

The tricky politics of population in the former Yugoslavia

OUTSIDE a hospital in Belgrade, two parking spots are reserved for parents with babies. A placard shows a stork delivering a baby that is then driven off in a car. What is telling is that there are only two spaces. Serbia’s population is shrinking.

Demography is causing alarm in many Balkan countries. In Bosnia and Kosovo, the issue can be fundamental. In Macedonia, a bid by the government to give financial aid to encourage (low-birth) Macedonians to have more children but to exclude (high-birth) Albanians was struck down by the constitutional court in April.

Goran Penev, a Serbian demographer, says his country has 7.2m people (excluding Kosovo). But Serbia has one of the oldest populations in Europe and a low fertility rate, so the population is shrinking by 30,000 a year. This is not because Serbs are becoming rich and want smaller families. Rather, the war years and ensuing economic hardship have knocked the stuffing out of Slavs across former Yugoslavia, leading to fewer children, lots of emigration and high abortion rates.

Mr Penev fears that, at worst, Serbia’s population could shrink by mid-century to only 6m. The population of Croatia, now 4.4m, is also shrinking, if not so drastically. As in Spain and Italy, the influence of the Catholic church has collapsed. Regions inhabited by Serbs who fled in 1995 remain sparsely populated. Plans to repopulate them with ethnic Croats from other countries have largely failed. Similarly, Serbs who saw demographic salvation in the hundreds of thousands of Serbs flooding in from Bosnia, Croatia and Kosovo in the 1990s have been disappointed.

In Bosnia, demography is high politics. In the last Yugoslav census in 1991, Bosnia had a population of 4.3m. Now it is estimated at only 3.8m, thanks to emigration and some 100,000 war dead. But nobody really knows, and time is running out to prepare a census in 2011. In October Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) and Croats voted down legislation to get ready for the census. Milorad Dodik, prime minister of the Republika Srpska, the Serb bit of Bosnia, says he will accept a census only if people are asked about their ethnicity. Bosniak leaders fear that Mr Dodik wants to show how few non-Serbs live in Republika Srpska, giving him more reason to ask why a Bosnian state exists.

In Kosovo, as in Bosnia, demography is war by other means. Ethnic Albanians boycotted the 1991 census. A 2006 estimate put the number of people in Kosovo at 2.1m, just over 90% of them Albanian Kosovars. Yet Mimoza Dushi, a demographer, reckons there are now 2.5m people in Kosovo. The implications could be huge. Kosovo gave its minority Serbs big concessions to secure Western recognition, but most Serbs still refuse to participate in its institutions. Oliver Ivanovic, a Serbian government official who deals with Kosovo, believes there are no more than 115,000 Serbs there. Some Kosovars may wonder why so few still merit such special treatment. Mr Ivanovic says Kosovo’s Serbs will not take part in the 2011 census. It would be easy to manipulate, he says, adding that there are actually only 1.7m Albanians in Kosovo.

Kosovar fertility is dropping, too. Ms Dushi believes the rate is 2.2, just above the level needed for a stable population. In 1950, she says, it was 7.8; as late as 1990, it was still 3.6. Even more dramatic is the collapse of fertility in Albania itself, from 2.0 in 2000 to 1.33 in 2007. In 1999 Albania’s population was 3.3m; by 2008 it had fallen to 3.1m (though it will rise by 2050). This is not because Albanians are having fewer children, but because so many women of child-bearing age have emigrated. So much for all those Balkan storks.

A Jewish Holocaust survivor returns to Albania to meet the family that saved her life.

2009-11-08T14:10:00.005-06:00

The Righteous: A Little-Known Secret was that Albanian Hid Jews from the Nazis; Now a Survivor Reunites With Her Savior. Just an amazing human story.

CBS Sunday Morning

Kosovo unveils giant statue to Bill Clinton

2009-11-01T10:22:00.003-06:00

Former US President Bill Clinton has attended the unveiling of a statue of himself in Kosovo's capital Pristina.

The 3.5m (11 ft) bronze statue was inaugurated at Bill Clinton Boulevard - to loud cheers of thousands of ethnic Albanians.

Many of them regard Mr Clinton as a hero for launching Nato's air bombing campaign to drive Yugoslavia's troops out of the Serbian province in 1999.

Kosovo unilaterally declared independence from Belgrade last year.

The move was supported by the US and many Western powers, but a number of countries - including China and Russia - still regard Kosovo as part of Serbia.

'Big statue'

Mr Clinton waved to the crowds as the red cover was pulled off from the statue on Sunday.

"I never expected that anywhere, someone would make such a big statue of me," Mr Clinton was quoted as saying by the Associated Press news agency.

The statue portrays the former president with his left arm raised while holding documents bearing the date when Nato started its air campaign against Yugoslavia - 24 March 1999.

At the time Yugoslav forces of the late President Slobodan Milosevic were attempting to suppress an ethnic Albanian insurgency in Kosovo.

The 78-day bombing forced the Yugoslav army to leave, placing Kosovo under UN administration.

But Mr Clinton's statue is unlikely to be revered by the Serbs who see Washington as the driving force behind a plan to tear away Serbia's cherished southern province, the BBC's Mark Lowen in Belgrade says.

EU removes visas for Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro but excludes Bosnia,Albania and Kosovo for "technical reasons"

2009-07-16T20:00:00.021-05:00

This is the first posting of what I hope will be a weekly update with the latest development in the Balkans. My goal is to write about the major events in the Balkans with a bit of my own analysis of what those events mean for the region, Europe and if applicable to the United States. Suggestion and comments are welcomed and appreciated.

Serbia

This week brought one of the best news for the people of Serbia in 18 years. The European Commission proposed to the EU parliament that it remove visa requirements for the citizen of Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro. Serbia has been trying to get on the so called white Schengen list for the past 8 years, but has been rebuffed numerous times by some EU countries because of its failure/inability to arrest some of the major war crime suspects indicted by the International Hague Tribunal for the wars in the former Yugoslavia. After Serbia arrested Radovan Karadzic last year, the leader of Bosnian Serbs during the war, most European countries became convinced that Serbia now had the political will to confront its past even though two of the most wanted suspects, Ratko Mladic and Goran Hadzic, remain at large ( Serbia claims it cannot find them).

What will this mean for Serbia? First and obviously its citizen can now travel throughout Europe hassle free and at will. Second, this will be good news for the party of President Tadic. He has been promising this for years now and if he had failed to achieve it in this term his credibility would have been lost. In the last election held in Serbia the so called Democrats ( Tadic and co) barely won against extremist forces lead by the party of war crime suspect Vojislav_Šešelj and nationalist Vojislav Kostunica. Chances are good now that the "Democrats" will expand their lead against the extremists in the next elections. This is good news for the future development of Serbia and stability of the region.

Kosovo

The third implication deals with Kosovo. In its recommendation, the EU Commission said that this recommendation did not apply to anyone holding a Serbian passport with an address in Kosovo. This is a big blow to Serbia because it was forced to accept this recommendation even though it claims Kosovo as its integral part. Kosovo Serbs and opposition in Serbia cried wolf saying this is a tacit approval of Kosovo's independence. At the same time Kosovo PM Hashim Thaci speculated, I think wishfully, that Serbia was considering recognizing Kosovo. I do not think Serbia is about to recognize Kosovo anytime soon, but its willingness to accept this recommendation which does not apply to Kosovo signals a softening of its positions visa via Kosovo. E.U official have indicated that they will try to find a modality regarding the visa regime for Kosovo in the fall of this year.

Macedonia

As I stated early, Macedonia was also the beneficiary of the visa liberalization move by the EU. Macedonia had meet technical requirements a long time ago, but its dispute with Greece over its name has been a stumbling block on its road to integrating within the EU. Ethnic Albanians in Macedonia have recently warned the government to resolve the dispute with Greece as they are losing patience over a decade long dispute. Albanians basically don't care how Macedonia is called and have kept a hands off approach over the dispute. The removal of visas may give Macedonia some more breathing room on the name dispute with Greece.

Montenegro

The tiny republic of Montenegro has made impressive progress towards the E.U since it split with Serbia three years ago.Its quite possible that it may be the next country to join the E.U together with Croatia and Macedonia.

Albania and Bosnia and Kosovo excluded for "technical reason" or political ones?

All three countries were excluded from the visa liberalization regime. Javier Solana and Olli Rehn insisted this was done for "technical reasons and no political ones". In other words, Albania, Bosnia and Kosovo were not included because they did not satisfy the technical requirements for border and passport controls and not because they were majority Muslim countries. Kosovo public television published an article titled " EU Isolates Albania, Bosnia and Kosovo", with the clear implication that it was done for political reasons. A lot of people have commented on the fact that Albania has much stricter control of its borders and passport issuing process than Serbia. Anyone with a 500 euros and a claim that they live in Kosovo can get a Serbian passport. I am really surprised that EU overlooked this, even though it wrote a provision to exclude Serbian passports holder from Kosovo from the "no visa" regime.

Even some within the EU have criticized the move to leave Albania and Bosnia out.Valter Kolbov of the Social Democratic Party of Germany was quoted by Kosovo Publis Television as saying he regretted the EU move to leave Albania and Bosnia out. Christian Schwarz Schilling, who was the international representative to Bosnia in 2006-2007, told Bild, as quoted by RTK, that the EU should be ashamed "for rewarding genocide", referring to the Srebrenica massacre committed by Serb forces. " In Bosnia and Hercegovina Serbia committed the biggest genocide in Europe since WWII. And now, on the exact 14 anniversary of Srebrenica Massacre the EU gives the Serbs the right to move freely in Europe and denies this right to Kosovo and Bosnia". He went on to say that when when one accounts for the fact that Bosnia and Kosovo exist today because NATO intervened to prevent their wipe out from Serbs, what the EU is doing is " the biggest hit to the European values and it is in direct contrast will all European principles".

Schilling is certainly correct when it comes to Bosnia. The reason Bosnia was not included in the "no visa" regime is precisely because Bosnian Serbs,with active encouragement from Serbia, have blocked the passage of certain laws the E.U wants . Bosnian Serbs won those precise rights to block those laws via the indiscriminate war they committed on Bosnian Muslims, including the Srebrenica Genocide. This is what Schilling is referring to when he says the E.U is rewarding genocide.

I am not to much concerned about Kosovo as it needs more time to establish its authority countrywide, and I think one can make the case that Kosovo has not indeed meet the "technical" requirements. I am more concerned with the fact that Albania was excluded, even though, as I stated earlier, it has a better or the same control of its borders and passports as Serbia. The E.U has not explained how Serbia was qualified but not Albania. This is why a lot of people, including myself, consider the decision to exclude Albania a political one.

"Israel Prepares to Recognize Kosovo" ?

2009-06-21T15:44:00.006-05:00

Saturday, 20 June 2009 (Palluxo Media)

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Saturday his cabinet is readying to recognize the indepenedence of Kosovo in August. His decision comes as a result of recent negotiations with the President Barack Obama.

Knesset member Otniel Schneller said she is concerned about Serbia's nazi past and that Israel is in in "no debt" to Serbia.

The United States has consistently shown its support for the government of Kosovo in the defence of its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Netanyahu said that Israel has a very close relationship with the United States and will follow recommendations of Obama administration to recognize Kosovo. Netanyahu explained that negotiated solution for Kosovo was not possible and Israel cannot sit on the sidelines.

As of 20 June 2009, 60 out of 192 sovereign United Nations member states have formally recognised the Republic of Kosovo as an independent state. Notably, a majority of European Union member states have formally recognised Kosovo (22 out of 27). 24 out of 28 NATO member states have recognised Kosovo. Of the four countries that border Kosovo, only Serbia refuses to recognise it.

I don't know what kind of reputation the "Palluxo Media" has ( Never heard of them) but Kosovo's public television RTK has a story alone similar lines. At the same time it should be noted that this story has NOT been reported in any major Israeli media ( Haaretz,Jpost etc). So will see what happens.

Edit: Looks like this "news" was only speculation from the no name Palluxo Media. All the Kosovo media published the story because they wanted to believe it. Israel has not confirmed anything on this.

No going back for Kosovo, says US

2009-05-21T22:01:00.001-05:00

Kosovans have been keen to show their appreciation of the US

US Vice-President Joe Biden has told Kosovo's parliament its independence is "absolutely irreversible" and the only viable option for regional stability.

"The success of an independent Kosovo is a priority for our administration," Mr Biden said in a speech that received several standing ovations from MPs.

Earlier, he received an enthusiastic welcome from crowds of ethnic Albanians in the capital, Pristina.

However, the Serb minority said it was planning to hold anti-US protests.

The US played a leading role in the Nato bombing campaign which expelled Serbian forces from Kosovo a decade ago.

Medal

On the final stage of his three-day tour of the Balkans, Mr Biden became the most senior US official to visit Kosovo since it declared independence in February 2008.

Your independence, is irreversible, absolutely irreversible

US Vice-President Joe Biden

The US and more than 50 other countries have recognised its independence, but more than 100 have not, including Serbia and Russia.

"Kosovo's independence was and remains today in my view, in the view of my government, the only viable option for stability in the region," he told a special sitting of the parliament in Pristina.

"And your independence - as I've said in the countries I have visited - your independence, is irreversible, absolutely irreversible," he added to applause from the ethnic Albanian-dominated assembly.

Earlier, after holding talks with President Fatmir Sejdiu, Prime Minister Hashim Thaci and other leaders, Mr Biden said he had been awarded the Golden Medal of Freedom, Kosovo's highest honour.

"I don't deserve it, but I received it on behalf of the United States," said the vice-president, who many Kosovans credit with helping them gain independence while he was a senator.

Earlier, thousands of schoolchildren waved US flags along the route his motorcade took from Pristina airport, while posters lined the route declaring "Welcome, and thank you".

Re-engagement

His reception contrasted markedly with that in his previous stop, Serbia, where police lined the streets amid nationalist anger.

MPs from the hardline nationalist Serbian Radical Party held up banners in parliament saying: "Biden, you Nazi scum, go home."

Mr Biden said he did not expect Serbia to recognise Kosovo's independence

Serbian President Boris Tadic told Mr Biden on Tuesday that his country would never give up its claim to Kosovo.

But despite that outstanding issue, and the antipathy of many Serbs to the US because of the Nato bombing campaign in 1999, Mr Biden and the pro-Western Mr Tadic exchanged warm words.

Mr Biden said: "The United States does not, I emphasise, does not expect Serbia to recognise the independence of Kosovo."

"It is not a precondition for our relationship or our support for Serbia becoming part of the European Union," he said.

Mr Tadic said Serbia and the US could move their relationship forward "on the basis of dialogue rooted in mutual respect".

The rare visit by a top US official marks a new effort by President Barack Obama to re-engage with the Balkans, BBC Eastern Europe correspondent Nick Thorpe says.

As well as Serbia and Kosovo, he has also visited Bosnia-Hercegovina. BBC Article

Hero's welcome for Biden in Kosovo

2009-05-21T21:09:00.000-05:00

" Vice President Joe Biden traveled to Kosovo on Thursday, receiving a hero's welcome as the most senior US official to visit the Balkan country since Washington backed its split from Serbia last year, AFP reported.

Biden's US Air Force Two plane landed at a NATO-controlled airstrip of Pristina airport, where Foreign Minister Skender Hyseni and students bearing US flags were ready to greet him.
He then travelled to NATO headquarters in a helicopter and arrived at parliament where huge crowds greeted him with banners, reading: "Welcome Mr Biden", "Kosovo loves the USA" and "Thank you USA" ". FOCUS News Agency

Biden seeks new U.S. start in Balkans

2009-05-18T11:25:00.001-05:00

By Adam Tanner
BELGRADE (Reuters) - Vice President Joe Biden makes the highest-level U.S. visit to Serbia in a quarter century this week seeking a new diplomatic start in the Balkans, a region where Washington twice intervened militarily in the 1990s.
In visiting two of Serbia's former adversaries, Bosnia and Kosovo on the same trip, the former U.S. senator with much experience in foreign affairs faces a tricky balancing act where sensitivities about the past wars and divisions remain strong.
"The main point really is that, in a sense, the United States is back; the focus that we had in the 1990s on the region is back," a senior U.S. official told reporters.
"We haven't been as focused on the Balkans in recent years, maybe some of the momentum, for example, in Bosnia, has been lost or, in some cases, reversed."
In 1991 just before the start of the wars that ended Yugoslavia, then Secretary of State James Baker said: "We don't have a dog in this fight." But by 1995 Washington and NATO were bombing Bosnian Serbs and then brokering a peace deal to end a war that killed 100,000 people.
In 1999, the United States and NATO bombed Belgrade in an effort to force rump Yugoslavia to withdraw from Kosovo. A few major buildings in the Serbian capital Belgrade remain in rubble and resentment over the bombing endures.
In recent years, the United States has focused on Kosovo, which declared independence last year, after devoting much attention on warring and postwar Bosnia in the mid 1990s.
"We have had an approach in the last 20 years where we have tried to address what we see as the most critical problems," U.S. Ambassador to Serbia Cameron Munter said in an interview. "What that sometimes leads to is a focus so that those problems sometimes become the defining element of the Balkan policy."
Washington now seeks a broader view of interlocking Balkan issues, he said, a region hoping to join the European Union.
THREE DAYS, THREE COUNTRIES
The vice president arrives on Tuesday in Bosnia, where he meets leaders from both halves of a country divided along ethnic lines. The Bosnian Serb half has acted more assertively since 2006 on boosting its autonomy and the Muslim-Croat half remains stuck in a political and economic morass.
"What the problems are here is a clear demonstration that appeasement does not work," said Raffi Gregorian, a U.S. diplomat who is the deputy peace envoy to Bosnia. "Messages of keep Bosnia quiet but don't do anything have not succeeded on behalf of the international community."
Highlighting the division is an announced protest during Biden's visit by Serb veterans to draw attention to what they call discrimination of non-Muslims in Bosnia. Diplomats and analysts say the ethnic standoff could endanger the entire region's stability and slow EU integration.
Bosnian Serbs are wary about Biden visit and a big U.S. role, but Bosnia's foreign minister welcomed him.
"It is a very clear sign of the willingness of this new administration to engage in Bosnia-Herzegovina, to finalize the project that was started during the Clinton Administration," Sven Alkalaj told Reuters.

Serbs in particularly are watching Biden skeptically because of his past criticism of Serb actions in Kosovo, its ex-province that remains a sore point in relations with the West. Biden, who visits Belgrade on Wednesday, is the highest-ranking U.S. official to Serbia since Vice President George Bush in 1983.
By contrast, Biden is likely to receive a warm welcome on Thursday in Kosovo, where he is celebrated as a long-time supporter of Kosovo independence during his years as a U.S. senator. Kosovo is strongly pro-American and the capital Pristina has a Bill Clinton Boulevard and will soon rename one of the city's street after George. W. Bush.
The vice president also had a family link to Kosovo. His son Joseph III, now Delaware's attorney general, served as a U.S. Justice Department adviser in Kosovo in 2001.
(Additional reporting by Daria Sito-Sucic in Sarajevo and Fatos Bytyci in Pristina; editing by Alison Williams)

Kosovo was a just war, not an imperialist dress rehearsal

2009-04-20T15:18:00.001-05:00

Ten years on, the conflict should be remembered as a responsible western intervention. It is a very different example to Iraq

David Clark
The Guardian, Thursday 16 April 2009

Ten years after Nato jets went into action against Serbia, the Kosovo war remains as controversial as ever. Welcomed by many at the time as evidence of a humanitarian world order in the making, its legacy has been overtaken, subsumed and ultimately distorted by the debate about the war on terror. What Vaclav Havel called "the first war for values" is now more often described as a dangerous precedent. Even Clare Short, a forceful advocate of intervention in the Balkans, attributed Tony Blair's foreign policy errors to the "taste for grandstanding" he acquired in Kosovo.

There are several reasons for this, the most important undoubtedly the effect of the Iraq war in sowing doubt about the legitimacy and efficacy of western military power. In departing from the principle of non-intervention and lacking a UN mandate, Kosovo is often regarded as the original sin that made Iraq possible. Even Russia's invasion and recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have been characterised as blowback from Kosovo's declaration of independence a few months before.

Comparisons of this kind confuse more than they clarify. The war in Kosovo was a response to a humanitarian emergency, not a geopolitical power play. Even so, this point is still contested. Self-styled anti-imperialists, all too often apologists for the imperialism of any regime that opposes the west, have constructed an alternative history in which Slobodan Milosevic's crimes are minimised or excused and a rapacious west portrayed as the instigator of violence. In this history, his efforts to reach a negotiated solution were sabotaged at the Rambouillet peace conference by Europe and the US; and the deaths and refugee movements inside Kosovo were caused by Nato bombing.

These critics talk as if the destruction of Bosnia was a figment of the imagination. The reality is that by the time of Rambouillet, western leaders had wised up to Milosevic's game of rope-a-dope in which he negotiated peace in bad faith while continuing to unleash ethnic terror on the ground. They had already endured eight years of it. In Kosovo, Serbian forces had killed 1,500 and driven 270,000 from their homes before Nato acted. The violence accelerated immediately before and after the start of the bombing campaign, but opponents deliberately invert cause and effect.

A survey by eminent statisticians in 2002 confirmed what refugees had always maintained - they were fleeing an organised programme of ethnic slaughter. An analysis of available data revealed a strong correlation between deaths and displacements, and Serbian military activity. There was no correlation with Nato or Kosovo Liberation Army actions. And the speed and extent of Serbia's mobilisation was indicative of a preconceived plan, not a spontaneous reaction to Nato bombing.

About 850,000 people - half Kosovo's Albanian population - were driven out of the country, many with their papers seized to prevent them returning. About 10,000 were murdered by Serbian forces. These atrocities may not have passed the legal test of genocide, but the reality was awful enough. The Serbian state carried out a crime against humanity - a ruthlessly executed plan to change the ethnic composition of Kosovo through expulsion and mass murder.
Had Milosevic completed his ethnic cleansing, the Balkans would be a very different place. A nationalist successor regime in Belgrade would be dedicated to preserving his victorious legacy and destabilising the region with unfulfilled dreams of a Greater Serbia. Hundreds of thousands of Kosovan Albanians would still be in refugee camps in Albania and Macedonia. The expulsion of the Kosovans would have joined al-Qaida's rap sheet of "Crusader" crimes against Muslims, an accusation doubtless echoed by the same critics who condemn Nato for preventing it. Let's not forget that Milosevic waged his war in the name of Orthodox Christian supremacy, or that Ariel Sharon, obsessed with the "Islamic threat" of a Greater Albania, was among his most vocal cheerleaders.

Kosovo also differed radically from the Iraq war in its intended effect on the international system. In the case of Kosovo, it was Russia that acted unilaterally in refusing to accept the balance of international opinion. Every member of Nato and every EU country, and all Serbia's neighbours, supported military action. Operations were conducted through the multilateral structures of Nato, with post-conflict authority handed to the UN. The governments carrying out this intervention knew it was a radical departure, but didn't do it to undermine multilateralism or strengthen US dominance. They wanted the international community to accept that the UN's commitment to individual human rights should count for more than the sovereign rights of states and their rulers. They wanted to enforce international legal norms, not undermine them.

Aspects of Nato's conduct can be criticised. The use of cluster munitions, careless and illegitimate targeting, and high-altitude bombing all resulted in unnecessary loss of life. The failure of Nato troops to prevent revenge attacks on Serbian and Roma civilians dishonoured their humanitarian purpose. But it is bogus to compare such serious errors to state-sponsored ethnic cleansing.

A decade on, many problems remain. Reconciliation between ethnic communities has not been achieved; Serbian enclaves are unwilling to co-operate with the Pristina government; and Serbia still refuses to face up to the loss of sovereignty over Kosovo. Yet independence has not led to the predicted upsurge of ethnic violence and extremism. The region's countries are moving steadily, if awkwardly, towards a new kind of unity as EU members. This includes Serbia, whose democratic government has already handed over Radovan Karadzic to The Hague and is committed to meeting its international obligations. Ultra-nationalists are marginalised, and the region has the opportunity of a future free of violence and despair.

The war in Kosovo was ultimately a question of whether the fall of the Berlin Wall would mark a return to the ethnic barbarism and power politics of the pre-cold war era, or a better phase in European history. That legacy has not been honoured as it should have been. Nevertheless, Kosovo should be remembered as an example of western nations using their power, however imperfectly, to do something good and necessary.

David Clark served as Europe adviser at the Foreign Office, 1997-2001 dkclark@aol.com

Kosovo War massacre: sole survivor found by Telegraph ten years on

2009-04-01T15:52:00.000-05:00

Massacre survivor Dren Caka, photographed by the Telegraph in 1999, remembers the night his mother and sisters were murdered by Serbian police in one of the most notorious episodes of the war.

By Neil TweedieLast Updated: 5:25PM BST 01 Apr 2009

Vancouver is almost 6,000 miles from Kosovo but Dren Caka visits his homeland most nights.
He goes back in his dreams, to his home in Milosa Gilica Street in the town of Gjakova where he lived with his extended family, and to the neighbouring pool hall owned by Luli Vejsa, a family friend. Finally, in his darkest moments, he makes the journey to Luli’s house, back to the night of April 1 1999, when the Serbs came.

A decade on from the Kosovo War, that last great exercise in 20th-century European blood-letting, Dren Caka, 20, is a casualty still.
“I have nightmares a lot,” he says, looking out over Vancouver’s glistening waterfront. “I can’t sleep at night and feel constantly tired; I usually have bags under my eyes.”
He speaks with a Canadian accent now, and looks and behaves like a typical young Canadian, but his history separates him from friends who have known nothing but peace and affluence by the Pacific Ocean.
“If you were to look at me walking along you would think ‘he’s just a normal a kid’, but I’m not just a normal kid. When I tell them, when I tell my friends, they are speechless.”
Dren Caka is the sole survivor - the miraculous survivor - of one of the most notorious episodes of the war: the massacre of 19 women and children, including his mother and three sisters, by Serb police. Kosovo has already faded from the popular memory, overtaken by the seismic events of September 11 2001 and their aftermath. Slobodan Milosevic is dead and many of the henchmen responsible for the ethnic cleansing of the former Serbian province have stood trial before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague, but the war continues to cast a shadow over people like Dren.
He was 10 years old in March 1999 when the Serbs began their campaign of deportation and murder against the predominantly ethnic Albanian population of Kosovo. On the night of April 1, a week after Nato began bombing Serb forces, the paramilitary police arrived in Milosa Galica Street.
Gjakova - Djakovica to the Serbs - was a particular target, standing as it does in the shadow of the Accursed Mountains, which separate Kosovo from Albania. Members of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), fighting for independence from Serbia, were using mountain tracks to import weapons from Albania and the Serbs wanted to choke off the insurgents’ supply routes. That meant clearing Gjakova of its majority Albanian population and fortifying the area.
To escape Nato bombs and Serb reprisals, women and children living in Milosa Galica Street slept in the basement of Luli Vejsa’s pool hall. The men, including Dren’s father, Ali, hid elsewhere - it was thought only males of military age were at risk.
“Ever since I was a kid I’ve known when bad things are going to happen,” says Dren. “Things were getting bad and the adults were talking about it. Helicopters overhead were telling us we must hand in our weapons and no harm would come to us. I didn’t know who was doing the bombing but it didn’t scare me much - my sisters would scream but I would just carry on watching TV. That night, though, I had a really bad feeling.”
Valbone, his mother, said he could stay in the house with his grandparents and aunt and uncle if he wanted, but that she was taking his sisters, Dalina, 14, Delvina, six, and Diona, aged two, to Luli’s basement. Reluctantly, Dren accompanied them.
There were 21 people in the cellar that night: women, children - most of them under 10 years of age - and one man aged 60. Dren and the other children were given sleeping pills. Between two and three o’clock in the morning the door opened, revealing a Serb policeman. One of the men was a neighbour of the Caka family. “He was an okay kind of guy”, says Dren.
“My mom woke me and the first thing I said was ‘I told you so’. There were about six police yelling in Serb and Albanian saying we were KLA and hiding the men. My mother spoke and said we just women and children trying to stay safe.”
The group was taken to Luli’s house. As they arrived a little girl ran for the door. One of the police opened fire, narrowly missing the child. Once inside mothers and children were ordered to sit down in the living room. Then the shooting began.
“A girl called Flaka - she was in her teens - got up to make tea. A policeman pushed her back and fired at her. Her mother got up to get hold of her and was shot, and then the policeman started shooting everybody.”
Luli’s wife and baby daughter were shot next, then Dren’s mother. She fell on top of Diona, shielding her from the bullets. Dalina and Delvina collapsed in a hail of Kalashnikov fire.
“My mother had been changing my baby sister, who turned two that night. One man was shooting inside the house and there was another man shooting through the window.
“I was sitting behind a woman who was quite big and I was kind of lying down when I was shot. There was smoke everywhere because they had set fire to the closet and the guy got his flashlight out to check that everyone was dead. He shot and I could feel the bullet move between my hair. I dropped my head and he took off.”
Diona was still alive under her mother but Dren had lost the use of his right arm and could not help her.
“I tried to save my baby sister but I only had one good arm and the house was smoking up. I knew if I stayed there I would be gone too.”
He lay for five minutes before running from the house, Diona’s cries ringing in his ears. He thinks his oldest sister, dying from her wounds, passed him a glove to cover his nose and mouth from the smoke. He managed to escape over a wall.
When he reached his own home his aunt did not believe what had happened.
“She told me I had a bad dream.”
His grandfather was similarly unimpressed.
“He kind of slapped me – he said ‘snap out of it’. Then he took off my jacket and saw I was soaked with blood. He bandaged me up.”
His father returned at daylight to learn that most of his family had gone.
“He was crying, saying ‘go with your aunt and uncle and I’ll see you in Albania’.
“I said ‘dad can I have one last kiss in case I don’t see you ever again’, and he gave me a kiss and said ‘don’t worry son, you’ll see me’.
Patched up in the local hospital, Dren then travelled by car to the Albanian border with his aunt, uncle and cousin. They were specks in a human tide. Some 700,000 Kosovans were expelled from their homeland between March and June 1999.
The boy spent two months in hospital in the Albanian capital, Tirana, believing his father was dead. until one day he walked through the door.
“I was learning to accept that he was gone. That day when he came to the hospital it was a most amazing day. I was asleep and when I woke up the first thing I saw was my dad. ‘Dad!’ I said, and jumped up and kissed him.”
It was Canada which offered Dren and Ali Caka sanctuary. Dren works as a carpet fitter now; his father remarried and had a second son, Dennis. Dren wears his half-brother’s name in a tattoo on his arm.
“My dad still hasn’t learned to let go. I hope for happiness for my dad - I really do.”
For himself there is memory and a sense of dislocation.
“Vancouver can be fun but boring at the same time. If you don’t have money you get stuck in the boring part.”
Dren loves football and still dreams of returning to Kosovo. He misses the sociability of life there, the evening gatherings in cafes.
“The Serbs and Kosovans in Vancouver play football together now,” he says, before laughing: “Then they have a fight.”
Seaplanes are landing and taking off in Vancouver’s harbour as he speaks. The Rockies provide an impressive backdrop to his adopted home, not unlike the mountains he crossed to escape the war that claimed his loved ones.
“In some ways I’ve had the most amazing life. At that age I didn’t know what Canada was. It is another life here but not the one I wanted.”
The conflict refuses to leave him alone. He has testified twice before the tribunal in The Hague, the first time as a protected (anonymous) witness in the trial of Milosevic. During his second appearance as a witness, in the trial of senior Serb politicians and officers indicted for war crimes, he shed his title of Witness K13 and used his own name. He may be soon be going to The Hague again.
“I want to do it to show people that I haven’t forgotten. I will never forget. I am more than glad to go and testify and get these guys locked up.”
Kosovo is independent of Serbia now, its self-proclaimed status guaranteed by a Nato garrison. The hearings in The Hague are due to conclude in 2011. Will the fate of his mother and sisters ever cease to haunt him?
“Maybe when I get a family of my own - my dad wants me to find a girl in Kosovo - but I will never be 100 per cent. I have nightmares, can’t sleep sometimes. Sometimes when I smile it is the most fake smile I will ever give because I’m just not happy. It’s just something I’m going to have to live with.”
And why, why did he survive?
“I ask that question every day of my life. Is there a purpose for me to be here? I don’t know. “

Kosovo's independence: One year on

2009-02-15T11:44:00.003-06:00

Feb 12th 2009
The Economist
Confounding the sceptics, up to a point

NEXT week Kosovo will be one year old. It was the seventh state to emerge from former Yugoslavia. Sceptics predicted dire consequences: the Serb minority would leave, the region would see a new round of violence, Serbia would fall into the hands of extreme nationalists. Happily, none of this has actually happened.

Unlike the other six former Yugoslav countries, Kosovo was technically a province of Serbia in the old Yugoslavia, not a republic, even though over 90% of its 2m people are ethnic Albanians. That distinction gave Russia an excuse to block a United Nations resolution on Kosovo’s status. It also explains why only 54 countries recognise Kosovo’s independence.

The greatest success of Kosovo has been to avert a Serb exodus. Kosovo’s Serbs live mostly in enclaves or in the north of the country, under de facto Serbian control. They are under pressure from Belgrade not to participate in any of Kosovo’s institutions. Yet Serbia now has a firmly pro-European government; in the wake of Kosovo’s independence, the extreme nationalist threat has evaporated, not exploded.

After a slow start EULEX, the European Union’s police and justice mission, deployed across Kosovo in December. For most of 2008 it was hampered by Serbian opposition and by splits within the EU. The former UN administration, which was meant to leave with Kosovo’s independence, has shrunk but not completely disappeared. A 15,000-strong NATO-led force remains.

The bad news is that Kosovo remains poor and its administration weak. Serbia’s government has led a highly effective diplomatic campaign against it and Kosovo has a bad image abroad. Yet it is often unfairly singled out for blame. It lies on a main drug-trafficking route, for instance; but so do some EU members, such as Bulgaria and even Austria.

It is widely believed that Albanians, including Kosovars, play an inordinately large role in Europe’s drug cartels, but research does not often bear this out. According to a report by the Kosovar Stability Initiative, a think-tank, in 2006 only 6% of those arrested for heroin smuggling in Italy were ethnic Albanians; 65% were Italians and 19% were north Africans. Some stereotypes widely believed and repeated about Kosovars abroad are merely racist.
So are Kosovars downcast? Far from it. A recent survey by the European Fund for the Balkans and Gallup found that, among seven western Balkan countries, Kosovo’s people are the most satisfied. They will certainly enjoy their birthday.

Balkan exceptionalism

2008-05-18T11:36:00.001-05:00

May 15th 2008
From The Economist print edition

What Serbia's election says about the European Union's enlargement

Illustration by Peter Schrank

A BRITISH tabloid set a high standard for bombast when it once took credit for the re-election of a Tory government with the headline: “It's The Sun Wot Won It”. This week European Union leaders were taking credit for another election upset: the unexpected success of the pro-European coalition led by the Serbian president, Boris Tadic, in the general election on May 11th. The Serbs had “clearly chosen Europe,” said the French foreign minister, Bernard Kouchner. Jan Marinus Wiersma, a Dutch member of the European Parliament, declared that the election was “a form of referendum in which citizens gave their support for the country's future membership of the EU.”

That may be a little premature. It is true that Mr Tadic's block is called the “Coalition for a European Serbia”. His supporters waved the EU flag of gold stars on blue. But Mr Tadic did not win outright, and it matters enormously which parties end up in a new coalition government. If the wrong parties cobble together a deal, they could yet lead Serbia into deeper isolation.

Yet it would be absurd to deny that the EU played a role in the election. European governments agreed to offer Serbia a couple of timely (if symbolic) concessions just days before the vote. Serbs may feel “humiliated” that 19 EU countries have recognised the independence of Kosovo after the province broke away in February, says a diplomat. But the EU also reminded them that Europe is about good things, such as freedom to travel. If it was not exactly the EU “wot won it”, European governments did at least send a signal that they would rather have Serbia in the club than brooding dangerously outside.

That holds true also for Serbia's neighbours in the western Balkans, who are being jollied along with visa concessions and the like, and assured that they enjoy a “European perspective” (to use the Brussels jargon for eventual membership). It all feels rather pragmatic, even generous. And that is odd, because when it comes to enlargement in general, older members of the club are in a foul temper.

It is not only the future that causes alarm. The mood is sulphurous over Romania and Bulgaria, which joined in 2007. Bulgaria has already seen tens of millions of EU funds frozen amid fears of fraud. The figure of suspended aid could rise to billions when a European Commission monitoring report comes out this summer. The new Italian government is talking menacingly about restricting Romanian migrants. The latest Eurobarometer poll on enlargement found majority support for the admission of only one new country: Croatia, a relatively advanced place whose beaches heave with sizzling Italians and Germans each summer. Croatia is on course to join in 2010 or 2011.

Even more paradoxically, some of the countries keenest on admitting Serbia and others have voters who are the most alarmed by enlargement. Migrant-phobic Italy led the way (together with Greece) in arguing for the EU to be flexible over demands that Serbia co-operate with prosecutors hunting war criminals. Austria has lobbied tirelessly for Balkan bits of the former Austro-Hungarian empire, starting with Croatia. Yet Austrian voters now oppose admitting any Balkan country other than Croatia by large margins (and a whopping 81% are against Turkish membership). Similarly, French ministers may rejoice that Serbia's voters choose Europe, but in 2006 France was pushing the idea that future enlargement should be assessed according to the EU's “absorption capacity”, a dangerously vague term that includes voters' “perceptions”. The French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, is publicly against Turkey's membership.

If enlargement is so unpopular, why do so many EU leaders want the credit for Serbia's vote for Europe? There are two, linked explanations. The first is that holding the door open to Balkan countries such as Croatia, Serbia, Macedonia and the rest does not imply support for enlargement in general—it is a specific strategy for preventing further instability in Europe's backyard. And the second is that enlargement mostly works like that.

Consolidation, not enlargement

Arguably, enlargement as a general project does not exist. Moves to expand the EU are more often responses to particular crises, and they trigger big squabbles until it becomes clear that no better alternative exists (the 1995 expansion to take in Finland, Sweden and Austria being the exception). Greece was admitted in 1981 to bind it to the West, even though everybody feared it was not ready. It took nine years of argument to get Spain and Portugal in, amid cries of alarm (loudest in France) over cheap Iberian workers and farm produce. In December 1989, as Communist regimes fell across eastern Europe, the French president, François Mitterrand, proposed that ex-Warsaw Pact nations should be invited to join a loose “European confederation” (the idea died, not least because Mr Mitterrand invited Russia too). The EU hopes of Bulgaria and Romania only became plausible during the Kosovo crisis of 1999, when their airspace was needed to allow NATO jets to bomb Serbia.

Today's Serbia and the other Balkan applicants for entry may not be easy cases. But their admission does not pose “existential” questions for the EU, notes one diplomat, just a lot of hard work on building up clean, capable governments, in which scary nationalists are marginalised. Croatian negotiators even talk smoothly of “consolidation” rather than “enlargement” nowadays. Larger candidates for the EU, notably Turkey and Ukraine, cannot do that. They pose big questions, such as how to relate to the Muslim world or how to live with Russia.

The Serbian election could have been a lot worse. A thumping win for nasty nationalists would have seriously delayed EU expansion into the western Balkans. But supporters of admitting Turkey, say, should avoid premature congratulation. The western Balkans remains an exceptional case. Enlargement as a broader cause was not the winner this week.

The Balkans' bakers keep on rolling

2008-05-18T11:28:00.001-05:00

By Nick Thorpe
BBC News, Kosovo

Almost all the bakers of the old Yugoslavia were Albanians, from one small corner of Kosovo. They have lived through war and upheaval but the toughest test for some came in February this year when Kosovo broke away from Serbia.

he first poppies of summer are blood scarlet on the shores of the White Drim river as we drive out of Prizren, up onto the slopes of Mount Pashtrik.

The lunchtime bread in the largest village, Djonaj, is white and so fresh it melts like chocolate in your mouth.

Dine Rexhbecaj is 50 and home for a short break to see his family. He has eight children, six girls and two boys. They live here while he works in distant Zagreb, in Croatia, seven or eight months of the year.

"I like my work," he said. "But I would hope for something better for my children. Now that Kosovo is independent, I hope they can find work here and not travel abroad."

'Bread money'

The village streets bustle with women and children on their way home from school. Four little girls, each dressed in a different shade of pink, giggle by.

In a graveyard beside the road, children play ball, and brown cows graze among red and black Albanian flags.

Houses are being repaired with money sent from abroad, "bread money" one might call it. It goes towards new bathrooms in the traditional extended-family compounds, and to repair the tall outside walls and daunting gateways.

This is a male-dominated society but the men are gone, scattered to the four corners of the Balkans, to Serbia and Croatia, Bosnia and Slovenia.

Working a baker's dozen of hours each day, they roll out the much sought after burek - spinach or cheese, potato or meat-filled pies - round breads and crescent-moon-shaped rolls, star-scattered with sesame seeds.

And when they finish their long shifts, the fathers can only dream of the children growing up without them.

"I started work as a baker in Montenegro when I was 13," Alush Maloku tells me in Planeja, a village at the end of a mountain road, hunched against the Albanian border.

"Then I came home and worked as a shepherd for 12 years."

Then he went back into baking, this time in western Serbia. All these places were part of one country, then Yugoslavia.

In 1979 when his father died, he came home to run the village shop. As the eldest son, he had to care for his family.

Trade map

We are sitting barefoot, cross-legged on a rug on his porch, looking across the valley at the ruins of his old house.

We knew we were in trouble when the Serbs stopped delivering our flour

Azem Collaku, retired baker

American B52 bombers blasted the Serbs into submission here in 1999 after the Albanian villagers had been driven out. The Serbian army, living in quarters nearby, sustained some of its heaviest losses in the air raids.

Unexploded bombs still lie buried deep in the earth. Alush said he knows of five people from a neighbouring village who have lost limbs as they stumbled across war litter.

"We paid a high price for liberation," he says.

"Why do all the men here become bakers?" I ask 79-year-old Azem Collaku from the village of Zym.

He rolls out a mental map of Kosovo, divided by traditional trades.

Keeping it in the family: Azem Collaku, right, with his son Afrim

The bakers from the Harsi i Thata - the dry hearth - so called because of its paucity of water. The builders from a certain valley. The farmers from the flat, fertile lands between Prizren and Djakova.

Azem worked for 40 years in the family bakery in northern Kosovo, in the ethnically-mixed town of Mitrovica. In 1999, when the Nato bombing started, the hostility of the local Serbs to the Albanians increased.

Like all the Albanians here, he tells the history of the Balkans in bakers' terms.

"We knew we were in trouble when the Serbs stopped delivering our flour," said Azem.

So they had to stop baking.

"The strange thing was, the day we fled the city, the flour we had paid for weeks before actually arrived. But by then it was too dangerous to stay," he added.

Radical youths

His son Afrim worked in the Serbian capital Belgrade until January this year. Then Serb refugees from Kosovo smashed the windows of the bakery in a spate of anger, on the eve of Kosovo's declaration of independence from Serbia.

"They didn't like the idea that we could come to work in their country, while they couldn't return to Kosovo," said Afrim, almost sympathetically.

Kosovo declared independence in February 2008

But he is hopeful the bakery will soon re-open after the defeat of Serb nationalists in last weekend's elections.

Only a month ago, radical youths in Sombor, in northern Serbia, handed out free bread outside an Albanian-run bakery to try to drive it out of business.

And like-minded youths posted a film clip of themselves on the video sharing website YouTube setting fire to another Albanian bakery. (You can see the video below)

In the Kosovan capital Pristina, Ramadan and Lerim from the village of Djonaj load logs into their wood-burning ovens, and mix flour and water and great cakes of yeast from Serbia into a stainless-steel drum.

"There is no better job than this," Ramadan explains. "You can sleep soundly knowing that the money you spend you earned with your own sweat."

He blows out the candles, by the light of which he kneaded the new loaves. Only the early morning sunshine breaks through the windows here.

The Serb Problem

2008-03-21T07:04:00.002-05:00

Excellent editorial from the Wall Street Journal .
03/20/2008.

Slobodan Milosevic must be smiling in his coffin. Earlier this week, a Serbian mob took over a United Nations courthouse in the northern Kosovo city of Mitrovica to protest Kosovo independence. In the ensuing melee a Ukrainian policeman serving with the U.N. force was killed; more than a hundred others were injured. In Belgrade, similar mobs attacked foreign embassies, setting part of the U.S. mission ablaze.

As in the Milosevic days, the Serbs were whipped into this frenzy by their leaders. Having spurned U.N. talks over Kosovo's future for years, Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica and other nationalists appealed to Serb feelings of persecution and aggrievement the moment the Kosovars decided on their own to declare independence. "It is clear to us that the violence was orchestrated," said the deputy U.N. administrator for Kosovo, Larry Rossin, after the Mitrovica riots.

Belgrade's intentions aren't hard to divine. Its government ministers are traveling the world to stop countries from recognizing Kosovo's independence, with a view to undoing it one day. Moscow and Beijing encourage Serbia in this fantasy. As a backup plan, it may settle for a partition of Kosovo with the mostly ethnic Serb area around Mitrovica run out of Belgrade.

European and American leaders need to face up to the political challenge posed by the Serbs and their allies in Moscow and Beijing. Since Kosovo joined the Slovenes, Croats, Bosnians, Macedonians and Montenegrins in casting their lot with freedom in independence, Serbia has received a free pass on the intellectual argument. It is a question of national sovereignty, the Serbs say, and even some of Kosovo's backers concede the point.

But it's not a question of national sovereignty, at least not Serbian sovereignty. Before the U.N. took over Kosovo's administration, the region was part of Yugoslavia. The U.N. Security Council resolution that set up that mission in 1999 does not mention the word "Serbia." In the meantime, what was left of Yugoslavia died and Montenegro split away.

A new Serbia was born with a new constitution adopted by referendum that claimed Kosovo as its own; the Kosovars had no vote, and in any event nine in 10 of them don't want anything to do with Serbia. Last month's move toward independence was a classic case of legitimate national self-determination, albeit closely supervised by the "international community." It went off peacefully, except for the Serb outbursts.

Outside military, diplomatic and economic support will be crucial to Kosovo's future. Serb thugs in the streets, and Serb thuggery in international diplomatic salons, have succeeded in giving certain countries pause. Brazil and India don't want to stick their necks out and recognize Kosovo lest Russia and China get angry. The Muslim world has been silent about this new, tiny, democratic Muslim state in Europe. A weakened, much less a partitioned, Kosovo would seriously derail a decade-plus effort led by the U.S. to build a stable Balkans.

Serbia did too much harm in the 1990s to get a free pass on its destructive behavior over Kosovo today. Fortunately, with every other country in its immediate vicinity opting for a future in the West, Serbia isn't strategically important. With NATO on the case -- and it will need to stay -- Serbia isn't a threat to Kosovo's sovereignty. The 16,000 NATO troops in Kosovo, as well as in a still unsettled Bosnia, are the first line of defense against Serb recidivism.

If Serbs want their country to become the Belarus of the Balkans -- an isolated appendage of Russia cut off from the West -- that's their choice. In May's parliamentary elections, they will be able to make it. Mr. Kostunica has teamed up with the Radical Party, which wants to discontinue membership talks with the EU unless Brussels acknowledges Serbia's claim to Kosovo. Serb President Boris Tadic, who barely beat the Radical's candidate in elections earlier in the year, represents the pro-Western camp.

Should the Serbs see their future in the West and not with Russia, the first step is to desist from violence. Eventually, they will have to recognize an independent Kosovo. In the meantime, Serbia's leaders don't deserve our understanding or indulgence. They deserve the world's condemnation.

Obama and Kosovo

2008-02-27T10:30:00.001-06:00

The anti Albanian crowd has been spreading false rumors that Obama does not support Kosovo’s independence and that somehow he will be more pro Serb. You will see comments like this all over Serbian, Russian and other Slavic websites. They assume that because there are a lot of Serbs in Illinois and because of Rade Blagojevic (governor of Illinois who is ethic Serb) he will be more favorable towards Serbs. Nothing could be farther from the truth.

Obama made his feeling clear last night at the debate on MSNBC when he was asked by Tim Russert to comment what he would do if Russia threatens Kosovo. He said U.S is obligated to defend Kosovo and that he will work with the NATO and E.U to do so. This talk about Obama being a pro Serb or not a supporter of Kosovo is utter nonsense. His comments last night were pretty clear on where he stand on this issue. The fact that there are a lot of Serbs in Illinois apparently carries no weight on this issue as far as he is concerned. The anti Albanian crowd has been hopelessly hoping that because Obama is running against Clinton, that somehow he will repudiate Clinton’s policy in the Balkans. In fact he said Clinton did a very good job in the Balkans and he agreed with that policy. Still not convinced? Please go watch the debate on MSNBC.

Justice for Kosovo – Chance for Serbia

2008-02-27T09:34:00.003-06:00

A reality check by two reality based Serbs:

By Andrej Nosov and Dragan Popovic

After the declaration of independence of Kosovo and the "spontaneous" reaction of "rage and anger" depicted in the Prime Minister's words, demolished Embassies, public lynching of those with different political opinions, as well as the declarative call to "peace and peaceful protests", Serbia has hit rock bottom. It is less of a problem that in the previous decades we have gotten used to seeing violence, living in it every day and doing it spontaneously to people around us. It is more of a problem that the state politics of Slobodan Milosevic, the politics of violence, has officially returned as the main, driving force, that on which there is a consensus even of the democratic Presedent Tadic, and almost President Nikolic and all the other actes gathered around the leader of the defense of Kosovo, Vojislav Kostunica.

This rock bottom, and this fear that every normal citizen feels regarding what is going to happen the next day, is actually another big chance that we are once again missing. It is a chance for the society in Serbia to face their errors of judgement, to reconsider the politics of the past few decades, to look back and draw the line underneath the decade of conquest, murder, ethnic cleansing, terror over their own citizens and the inhabitants of the region. Kosovo has not been under the rule of Serbia since the day Slobodan Milosevic ended his project by retreating the army and police forces from Kosovo. The politics of conquering territories and nineteenth-century centralistic nationalism is facing a breakdown. Whether it will take something else on its way down, depends on the elite groups in Serbia. Or maybe new politics will arise in its place, appropriate for the modern age, based on cooperation and respect.

Everyone is in wonder because 17 February has happened to us, because there was a celebration and declaration of something we knew had happened in June 1999. Everyone makes excuses for violent behaviour, ancient rights and other mythologies by "our" right to rule "them". Breaking things in Belgrade, they say, is not much in relation to what has happened to us. They talk of cultural heritage, NATO bombing, the Serbs that died in Kosovo. There is no mention of the Albanians except as "separatists, terrorists, immature people, uncivilized snatchers of our land". Everyone is silent about Albanians. Because, I guess, one does not mention the name of evil. And the evil that Belgrade has done to the Albanians has symbolically ended for them on that very 17 February.

State enemy No 1 is Natasa Kandic, because she dared to sit in the Kosovo Parliament in the name of different values. Some media say that she shouldn't exist. Others have a problem with Sonja Biserko, Biljana Kovacevic Vuco. The rest would be satisfied with banning and destroying LDP or the expedition to the apartment of Ceda Jovanovic and insulting and lynching the politics and citizens which he represents. These steps are well known, Milosevic used them too.

Kostunica is now simply applying the matrix he had inherited from his predecessor. Just as he had copied the rhetoric, he also did everything to leave Serbia in the gutter and through fear and terrot enforce the final establishment of the new Russian province, which is obviously his goal.
The last colony in Europe gained its freedom on 17 February 2008. From 1912 Kosovo has been ruled by boot and sabre. The people living there had no say in anything. Military authorities were imposed on them since the occupation. At that time, they were pronounced to be a nation not mature enough for democracy. Instead of a civil state and civil management, they recieved a hoard of officers and officials, mostly the worst ones, sent by punishment to Kosovo.

Many testimonies from that time speak of violence, discrimination and collonial behaviour of the new masters towards the Albanian population in the region. While Kosovo was ruled by the army, the intelligence in Belgrade was making plans on how to change the national make-up of the population. The documents of the Serbian Culture Club lead by Slobodan Jovanovic speak of horrible and cruel entertainment of the Serbian national elite. People are refered to as merchandise, something not alive, calculations are made about how many people should move in and move out from different places. The exact same standards will be applied much more efficiently at the end of the 20th century by academics, writers, poets, bishops... "Humane displacement" will become the official politics which will finally result in the creation of Republika Srpska. That is why it is possible today to speak of territory, but not the people, to pledge in Kosovo, but not give pensions to the Albanians, to erase the complete population from the electorial register or the share of free stocks.

The parties changed names, from the National Radical to the League of Communists, from the Socialist Party of Serbia to the Serbian Radical or the Democratic Party of Serbia. The continuity of colonial rule was maintained after the Second World War through military management. Even though the former colonists were forbidden to return to Kosovo, new ones soon arrived.

Authority was established through bloody massacres in Drenica and all over Kosovo. Once again there were no "conditions" for civil authorities. The UDBA sovereignly ruled Kosovo until 1966. Many people, rich today, owe their family posessions to the gold stolen from Kosovo Albanians. After the Brioni Plenum there was an ease, but as soon as the ruling circles saw that Kosovo inhabits people who want their rights and who will not reconcile with the existing situation, everything went to the way it used to be. One year after Tito's death, the Yugoslav National Army "establishes order" in the streets of Pristina, Pec, Prizren... The number of killed Albanians has never been revealed. In the end, in 1989, the "easily promised speed" completely overtakes the legitimate politics. The sovereignity of Kosovo is annuled by tanks, martial law is established and a system very similar to apartheid.

During the nineties, if you were an Albanian, you could not live without fear, let alone work in a school, hospital, the police, or government institutions. Even when the Albanians reacted to such a situation with violence, the elite circles in Serbia did not wonder why, but ravaged villages, civillians, women and children. To be an Albanian, male or female, meant a death sentence. Many were saved by some money or gold. For others, there was no way out.

The nineties are a disgrace for Serbain history, and that must be said out loud in reference to Kosovo. Today in Kosovo, as well as Serbia and the other countries in the region, a large number of people is waiting for the answer to the question where their loved ones are, what happened to them, who killed them. Vojislav Kostunica and his security services hide the answer to that question. Boris Tadic surpresses the answer to that question becase of "stability and the future" and tycoon interests.

There is no justice for the Serbs either, if we do not tell the others what we have done to them. There will be no other future if we conceal the facts. And it is futile to rant about crimes over Serbs, world injustice, double standards... Ivica Dacic clearly stated on the parliamentary speakers stand that the politics of the nineties has been confirmed once more. When in 1999 revenge and retaliation against the Serbs started, there were no academics or scientists who would look for the cause in the behaviour of the state of Serbia. Or even to be determined according to the 800.000 banished people, mass murders in Meja, Djakovica, Suva Reka, Podujevo, Izbica, Vucitrn... Maybe that would have saved more Serbs than any books written in the name of the defense of Kosovo and such politics. Or any journalist scribblings which announced lynching, which the newspapers are full of these days.

The complete state apparatus was involved in hiding the tracks of mass crimes. Bodies were buried all over Serbia, burned in factories and power plants, sunk into the Danube or Perucac. The policemen, officers, members of National Security, politicians, local tycoons and enterpreneurs, judges and prosecutors, the Government and political parties were involved too. And after all that, Serbia is in wonder. Not a trace of regret, sense of responsibility, readiness to change behaviour. The people directly responsible for Serbia's loss of the right to rule the Kosovo people, today decide our own fate. They will not admit to their mistakes. Instead of that, they will try to tailor the international legislature according to their own dreams.

To turn it into a calcified shell which cannot be adjusted to new situations. Because that is how one rules Serbia. That is how laws and constitutions are made here. Full of strong words and phrases, but inapplicable. Legitimately and legally, the democratic and free part of the world estimated that we cannot terrorize our own citizens forever. Maybe Russia or China still can, but that time will soon pass too. Then the people in Chechnya or Tibet will also gain their deserved place in the community of independent nations. The world's decision (at least the better part of it) to recognize Kosovo, should not be taken as punishment by Serbia. It is not a punishment, it is an opportunity. Not only for Serbia, but for the whole world to strengthen the mechanisms of the protection of human rights and more decisively defy the terror of local dictators. From Beijing to Havana, from Teheran to Moscow.

Serbia is obliged to recognize the Republic of Kosovo. To give a hand of friendship to their legally elected representatives, to help them establish a modern, democratic society. Not because we are more advanced or cultured, but because we owe at least that much to the Kosovo society. And through Kosovo, we can open the issue of the society in Serbia. To reconsider all the illusons and false values, reform institutions, start creating a critical conscience in young people, to reverse the value system and set things in their place. Serbia must, from the mistakes of the past, learn the lessons which will take us to building a new society and a different future. By making violence legitimate and attacking people with different political opinions, the authorities are only continuing the old and already seen practice. Those who think that they will destroy critical thinking and the need for different relations with the neigbours in this way, are sadly mistaken. The mass "events of the people" just take us back and create new mistakes which will cost us dearly.

US embassy in Belgrade attacked

2008-02-21T16:24:00.002-06:00

Ok, so now Belgrade is in the same league as Gaza Strip, Karachi and Tehran where burning US flags is a fashion. These images of U.S embassy going up in flames are being beamed right now thru out US and every other country. I have always said, you can always count on Serbs to bungle it. With leader like Kostunica, and Nikolic who needs enemies? The 51% who voted for Tadic are being overrun by the other half that voted for Nikolic. This is what you get when half of your population supports a neo nazi party. I only feel sorry for the ½ of the Serbian population, but I wish good for all of Serbia for the sake of the children of this country. When will Serbia wake up? The flames of hate and nationalism will burn you again.

BBC article below:

Several hundred protesters have attacked the US and other embassies in Serbia's capital in anger at Western support for Kosovo's independence.

Protesters broke into the US compound and briefly set part of the embassy alight. Firemen later found an unidentified charred body inside.

The UK, Belgian, Croatian and Turkish missions were also attacked.
The violence followed a peaceful rally earlier by at least 150,000 people outside the main parliament building.
The US, UK, Germany and Italy are among those to have recognised Kosovo.
Kosovo belongs to the Serbian people
Vojislav Kostunica
In pictures: Belgrade rally

Earlier, Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica delivered an impassioned speech condemning the territory's secession.
"As long as we live, Kosovo is Serbia. Kosovo belongs to the Serbian people," he told the flag-waving crowd.
Most Serbs regard Kosovo as their religious and cultural heartland.
Ripped flag
The United States expressed outrage at the attack.
The US ambassador to the United Nations, Zalmay Khalilzad, said the Serbian government should be reminded "of its responsibility to protect diplomatic facilities".

The main rally outside parliament was peacefulSerbian President Boris Tadic appealed for calm.
"This only keeps Kosovo distant from Serbia," he said.
About 1,000 protesters attacked the building, throwing flares through the window while others scaled walls to rip down the US flag.

At the time there appeared to be no police protecting the embassy, but riot police later intervened, firing tear gas.
The fires raged for half an hour, and when firemen finally managed to get inside the building they found a charred body.
The body has not been identified, though US officials said all embassy staff of US nationality had been accounted for.

State department spokesman Sean McCormack said the protesters had entered the chancellery but did not breach the embassy's secure area, and the entire compound had now been cleared.
Washington received assurances from Mr Kostunica that there would be no repeat of the incident, he added.
Kosovo 'stolen'
Several other embassies were also attacked by crowds. There are reports of various businesses and restaurants being attacked.

Up to 100 people are believed to have been injured.
Serbia, supported by Russia and China, says Kosovo's Sunday declaration violates international law.
During Thursday's rally, ultra-nationalist leader Tomislav Nikolic accused the US and EU of trying to steal Kosovo.

"Hitler could not take it away from us, and neither will today's [Western powers]."
After the speeches, the crowd marched to the city's biggest church, the Temple of Saint Sava.
Thick, black smoke had also earlier billowed from the crossing point at

"We are here in support of the Serbs who still live in Kosovo," Dejan Milosevic, one of the organisers, told the Associated Press news agency.
The Kosovo police, backed by Czech troops from the Nato-led peacekeeping force, put a steel barrier across the road and were able to hold their line.
Protest rallies were also held in the Bosnian Serb republic (Republika Srpska). There were unconfirmed reports of injuries as several hundred protesters clashed with police outside the US consulate in Banja Luka.
In the coming weeks, an almost 2,000-strong EU mission will be deployed to help the country develop its police force and judiciary.

Cheers to the new future- U.S. recognizes independent Kosovo

2008-02-18T11:43:00.003-06:00

(CNN) -- The United States officially recognized Kosovo -- the Balkan state which split from Serbia on Sunday -- as an independent nation on Monday, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said in a written statement.

"We congratulate the people of Kosovo on this historic occasion," Rice said. "President Bush has responded affirmatively to a request from Kosovo to establish diplomatic relations between our two countries."

European Union nations Monday were also starting to recognize Kosovo as the world's newest nation, agencies have reported.

Britain, Germany and France were among EU member states which said they would establish official diplomatic ties with the Balkan state following a meeting of European ministers in Brussels Monday, according to The Associated Press. "We intend to recognize Kosovo," France foreign minister Bernard Kouchner told reporters afterwards.

EU foreign ministers decided that the bloc's 27 member nations should decide individually whether to recognise Kosovo.

They agreed its secession was a one-off under international law, justified by Belgrade's oppression and rejection of a negotiated final status for the region.

But other EU nations including Greece, Spain and Romania have signalled that they would not follow suit amid concerns about the precedent that such a move would set.

Facing severe economic problems and high unemployment, Kosovo is banking on the support of Western powers including the United States and key EU nations to give it immediate backing.

But while independence is broadly favored by the West, U.N. Security Council members Russia and China have expressed outright opposition and "grave concern" over Kosovo's unilateral decision.

Serbia insists it will not respond with violence to Kosovo's sovereignty claim, although it refuses to recognize the move.

In the Serb-dominated northern Kosovo town of Mitrovica, scores of Kosovo Serbs took to the streets waving Serbian flags in a demonstration against independence.

U.S. President George W. Bush said he acknowledged Monday Kosovo's declaration of independence from Serbia, but stopped short of a formal recognition.Watch mixed reaction to independence declaration

"We'll watch and see how the events unfold today," Bush told NBC News from Tanzania. "But the Kosovars are now independent. It's something that I have advocated, along with my government."

Asked earlier Monday whether the United States would officially recognize Kosovo, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said: "Stay tuned."

"We will not recognize Kosovo independence because we do not consider it in line with international law," said Spain's foreign minister, Miguel Angel Moratinos before Monday's meeting. "There is a division within the international community, division in the Security Council and division in the European Union, and we don't know what will be the consequences for the region," he said. Spain has struggled with separatists in its Basque region.

"Our position is that this declaration should be disregarded by the international community," as well as by the head of the U.N. mission in Kosovo, Moscow's U.N. ambassador, Vitaly Churkin said on Sunday.

In Beijing Monday, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao expressed grave concern over Kosovo's move for independence.

"Kosovo's unilateral act can produce a series of results that will lead to seriously negative influence on peace and stability in the Balkan region ..." Liu said, according to China's Xinhua news agency. He called on Kosovo and Serbia to seek a solution under international law.

Fireworks lit the skies and crowds filled the streets of Kosovo's capital Sunday after the territory's parliament declared independence from Serbia.

"The day has come," Prime Minister Hashim Thaci, a former separatist guerrilla leader, told his parliament. "From this day onwards, Kosovo is proud, independent and free." Watch how U.N. is divided over Kosovo's future

The province has been under U.N. administration and patrolled by NATO troops since a 1999 bombing campaign that halted a Serb-led campaign against Kosovo's ethnic Albanian majority.

Thousands of people swarmed Pristina's streets ahead of Sunday's parliamentary declaration, singing, dancing and holding signs in freezing wind after the vote was announced. But Serbs consider the territory the cradle of their civilization, and protesters clashed with police outside the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade as the declaration was issued.

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Serbia said it will not oppose independence with violence, but Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica said his country will never accept the establishment of a "false country" on its territory.

Russia expressed similar concerns at Sunday's emergency Security Council meeting in New York.

"Our concern is for the safety of Serbs and other minorities in Kosovo," Churkin stated, adding that Russia will "strongly warn against any attempts at repressive measures should Serbs in Kosovo decide not to comply with this unilateral proclamation of independence."

About 100,000 Serbs still live in Kosovo, making up about 5 percent of the population, and Kostunica said Serbs have been killed or lost their land in the eight-plus years the country has been under international rule. But Fatmir Sejdiu, the nascent republic's president, pledged to create a nation "where all citizens of all ethnicities feel appreciated."

"Today is probably a day of trepidation for some of you, but your property and your rights will be respected in the future," he said.

Former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic launched a crackdown against ethnic Albanian insurgents led by Thaci in 1998 and refused to yield to Western pressure to halt the campaign. When NATO responded by launching airstrikes against Serbia and Montenegro, the last remaining Yugoslav republics, Yugoslav troops drove hundreds of thousands of Kosovars out of the region and killed thousands more.

Milosevic died in 2005 while awaiting trial for war crimes before a U.N. tribunal in The Hague.

The United States and leading European nations, including France, Britain and Germany, have supported Kosovo's move toward independence. But Russia, the Serbs' historical ally, has opposed independence, fearing it would incite other separatist movements in its backyard.

But no country supported the Russian call for the U.N. to declare Sunday's declaration "null and void," said Sir John Sawers, the British ambassador to the world body.

Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon urged all parties "to refrain from any actions or statements that could endanger peace, incite violence or jeopardize security in Kosovo and the region."

The European Union decided Saturday to launch a mission of about 2,000 police and judicial officers to replace the U.N. mission that has controlled the province since 1999. And U.S. State Department Spokesman Sean McCormack said the United States had "noted" that Kosovo had declared its independence and was reviewing the issue.

New beginnings?Could 2008 see the Balkans finally shake off the shadow of war?

2007-12-26T16:25:00.000-06:00

Dramatic 2008 beckons for Balkans
By Nick Thorpe BBC News

Among the many strange ironies of history, consider this: the independence of Kosovo in the first half of 2008 will be overseen by Slovenia, as rotating president of the EU.

The richest corner of the old Yugoslavia - and the first to escape from it in 1991 - will steer, from Brussels, the rocky road to independence of its poorest segment.
It took Yugoslavia, that once amiable giant, 17 years to die.
2008 is set to be a dramatic year in the Balkans, though probably not as tragic as some prophesy.

Kosovo, Bosnia, and Macedonia all have intricate safety nets, thanks both to the international presence and the experience gathered in many previous storms.
Serbia has perhaps the greatest potential for international isolation and misery.
The new government and assembly in Kosovo will begin quietly implementing the Ahtisaari plan for conditional independence, despite the sometimes dignified, sometimes desperate, protests of Belgrade.

Kosovo Police Service
The European Union will rapidly phase in its civilian, 1,800-strong law and justice mission, just as the UN phases out.

A poll win for Tomislav Nikolic could damage Serbia's EU hopes
The crucial role in ensuring a peaceful transition to independence will be played by the multi-ethnic Kosovo Police Service (KPS).

The 7,000-strong force, with many Serbs in its ranks, will be in the frontline at a local level, reassuring people with their presence, and searching cars to minimise the movement of weapons.

Behind them the UN police - in place until mid-2008 - can provide extra muscle.
And, finally, the Nato-led peacekeepers of K-For are on call to intervene if law and order breaks down. But that may not be necessary.

If Tomislav Nikolic of the Serbian Radical Party wins January's presidential elections, the potential for Serbia's public anger, and international isolation grows exponentially
As Kosovo slips quietly away, radical Serb leaders in the predominantly Serb north will declare that they want nothing to do with an independent Kosovo.

Theirs is above all a defensive position. They will prepare for "Albanian attacks". But the Albanians will be on their best behaviour, under the watchful eyes of the EU.
The KPS, UN police force, and K-For will continue to patrol in the north too. UN Security Council resolution 1244 speaks of both an "international civilian and military presence".

EU countries and the US say that is quite enough to legalise the new EU mission.
President Boris Tadic of Serbia has already announced that his country will, quite properly, take its case to the International Court of Justice.

Serbia's promised economic blockade will affect less than 20% of Kosovo's imports, and can be sidestepped easily with increased imports from Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania.
Threats to cut off the water and electricity supply from the Gazivoda reservoir in the north are serious, but would rebound on the north.

Water is treated in the south, then sent back. KFOR soldiers are set to secure the reservoir.

Presidential race
The central question of the year is how Serbia copes with the trauma of the loss of Kosovo.

Kosovan towns such as Mitrovica are divided over independence
The presidential election due on 20 January will influence that.
If Boris Tadic of the Democratic Party wins again he will keep Serbia firmly on the road to EU integration - despite Kosovo.

If Tomislav Nikolic of the Serbian Radical Party wins, the potential for Serbia's public anger, and international isolation grows exponentially.
Vojislav Kostunica, the Serbian prime minister, is a nationalist who only appears moderate when set against the radicals.

His Serbian Democratic Party is being squeezed all the time between Tadic's pro-Europe stance, and the blood and thunder rhetoric of Nikolic and his master, Vojislav Seselj, on trial for war crimes in the Hague.

This looks like the year Kostunica will have to choose one camp or the other. The presidential race will be close.
If Nikolic wins, the EU can be expected to turn its back on Serbia again. Investment will dry up. And other parts of the Balkans may benefit from increased international help.
If Tadic wins, the pro-Europe camp wins with him.

Quarrelsome politicians
In Bosnia, a compromise in November over a police reform which goes some way to re-integrating the country, was a precondition for further steps to EU membership.

Many in the Balkans hope EU entry will lift living standards
The sudden shock of being thrown to the end of a very long queue to join the EU seems to have done Bosnia's quarrelsome politicians some good.
The Bosnian Serb leadership are interested above all in preserving their own fiefdom - the Serb Republic in Bosnia. Theirs is a tale of power and money, coloured with identity.

With the sun from Brussels shining a little brighter in the streets of Banja Luka, as well as Sarajevo, there is no reason why Kosovan independence would encourage them to revive their long-lost dream of joining Serbia. The Nato summit in Bucharest in April will be crucial in terms of the overall stability of the Balkans. Macedonia, Albania and Croatia have all worked hard on securing their invitations to join the alliance.

Despite what its president describes as "a wasted year" in 2007, the promise of Nato membership should soothe troubled brows in Skopje.
None of Serbia's neighbours - Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria included - are in any hurry to recognise an independent Kosovo.
But the future of the Balkans will depend on investment, and wages - not the race to set up diplomatic representation in Pristina.
2008 could be the year the clouds of war finally disappear.

Balkan bagatelle

2007-12-26T05:12:00.000-06:00

Balkan bagatelle

Dec 13th 2007-The Economist.

The delicate diplomacy over the handling of Kosovo's looming independence

A JOKE has been circulating among diplomats concerned with the Balkans. The reply to the question, “what comes after December 10th?” is “December 11th.” And so it has proved. The 10th was the deadline for a mission led by ambassadors from the European Union, America and Russia to report to the United Nations on the outcome of negotiations between Serbia and its breakaway province of Kosovo. In the event, the talks produced so little that the report was handed in early.

It would be wrong to conclude that nothing has changed after the failure of the troika's talks. The end of almost two years of diplomatic efforts to find an agreement means that one chapter on Kosovo has closed and a new one is opening. A period of turbulence lies ahead, and it could even be accompanied by a few spasms of violence. But it is almost inconceivable that there will be a general return to the Balkan wars of the 1990s.

Kosovo is the last remaining piece of the former Yugoslav jigsaw. Some 90% of its 2m people are ethnic Albanians who have long demanded independence. Unlike the six countries that have already emerged from the old Yugoslavia, Kosovo was not a republic but a province—and one with a special historical significance for Serbs. Serbia's present leaders have offered maximum autonomy, but Kosovo's Albanians have said they will settle for nothing less than independence.

On December 19th the UN Security Council will take up the question. Russia, Serbia's backer, will demand that talks continue. This will be rejected by America and the EU countries, who say there is nothing left to discuss. At the same time, Western diplomats are working out next steps. Serbia is to hold a two-round presidential election in January and February. The Kosovo Albanians are being asked to hold off declaring independence before then, in a bid to boost the chances of the pro-European incumbent, Boris Tadic.

The diplomats are trying to find a legal cover to replace the UN mission in Kosovo with one from the EU. This is proving hard. Kosovo is governed by the Security Council's resolution 1244, which says it is part of Yugoslavia, to which Serbia is the legal successor state. “On this the Serbs and the Russians probably have the law on their side,” sighs a top European diplomat. “But then this is a political decision, not a legal one.”

Once Kosovo declares independence, it is likely to be recognised by the Americans, most EU members and many Muslim countries. Serbia may try to blockade the new country, apart from the Serb-inhabited part of Mitrovica and the north that it already, in effect, runs. So this may turn into Europe's newest “frozen conflict”. Kosovo exports nothing to Serbia, but Serbian exports to Kosovo amount to €200m ($280m) a year. This trade may be diverted through Montenegro and Macedonia.

The biggest worry concerns the 50,000 or more Serbs who live in enclaves scattered across Kosovo proper. Most, but not all, seem to be staying put. If the birth of a new Kosovo is accompanied by violence these are the most vulnerable targets.

As for Serbia, it is at a fork in the road. The EU's leaders may soften the blow over Kosovo by waiving a precondition that the country co-operate in full with the Yugoslav war-crimes tribunal in The Hague before signing a stabilisation and association agreement that would bring it large sums of aid. But Vojislav Kostunica, Serbia's prime minister, says it is insulting to believe that his country would trade Kosovo for eventual EU membership, and even hints that his country might refuse to sign the deal. Others close to Mr Tadic retort that Serbia has nowhere else to go.

Kosovo: Escaping from limboland

2007-11-17T22:55:00.000-06:00

Nov 17th, 2007 | NEW YORK
From Economist.com

Kosovo at the polls, as tension grows over its future

AFP

OUTSIDERS can be forgiven for not being able to tell much—from the names at least—about the Democratic Party of Kosovo, the Democratic League of Kosovo, the New Kosovo Alliance and the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo. The main four parties competing in an election on Saturday November 17th are in fact quite different from each other. One is dominated by former guerrillas; another is run by a man indicted for war crimes; another was founded as the non-violent opposition to Slobodan Milosevic; a fourth is run by a construction tycoon promising investment and jobs for Kosovo.

The parties do, however, agree on the most important thing about Kosovo: that it should become independent. Whichever party wins is likely to declare Kosovo’s independence after December 10th. That date marks a deadline for mediators who are trying to get Serbia and Kosovo, the latter still technically a province of the former, to agree on the Kosovars' future status. The Serbian position has been that Kosovo could have “more than autonomy” but “less than independence”, citing Hong Kong as an example. For most in Kosovo independence is the one thing not negotiable.

The fate of Kosovo’s 2m people, 90% of whom are ethnically Albanian, matters to the outside world mainly because of the great powers paying it attention. NATO bombed Serbia for 78 days in 1999 until Milosevic withdrew his soldiers from the province. Since then, it has lived in limbo under international supervision. But Russia, Serbia’s ally (partly because of their shared eastern Orthodox Christian tradition), has vetoed any UN approval of independence.

For Europe, too, Kosovo matters for foreign policy. Some guilt persists for past indecisiveness, when Europe's leaders were divided over how to react to the Yugoslav wars. Wider concern is how Kosovo's future could affect the whole Balkans now. Some in the Serb dominated part of Bosnia, for example, give warning that if Kosovo declares independence from Serbia, then they, too, will secede from the rest of Bosnia. No wonder the European Union takes a close interest as it ponders possible enlargement to include parts of the Balkans.

But ahead of the December deadline, talks remain deadlocked. The UN’s special envoy, Martti Ahtisaari, has proposed a form of “supervised independence” for Kosovo. This would make it sovereign, but within certain limits, including some that already exist. A chunk of seats in the parliament would be reserved for Serbs (and another chunk for other minorities); the Serbian Orthodox church would get special protection; Serbian would be a co-equal official language with Albanian. The whole arrangement would be overseen, as with Bosnia, by an official from the EU with the power to annul laws or dismiss officials if they violate the agreement.

Russia is insisting that any status change must have the agreement of all parties. But for Kosovo’s Western backers it seems that more talks are unlikely to produce progress. Kosovo cannot remain in limbo forever, and its population will never consent to remain part of Serbia. Yet given a newly assertive Russian foreign policy, under Vladimir Putin, it will be difficult for Kosovo, backed by Western allies, simply to push on for independence regardless. It is not clear how many countries would recognise Kosovo as an independent country if the declaration lacked UN approval.

The election is unlikely to help much. Serbia and the Orthodox church have urged Serbs in Kosovo not to take part in the election as that would legitimise the poll. The prospects of effective dialogue either within Kosovo, or without, look dim indeed.

Bosnian Politics: Cracking up

2007-10-26T07:03:00.000-05:00

BANJA LUKA AND SARAJEVO-Oct 25th 2007
From The Economist print edition

Spurred by Russia, the Bosnian Serbs are making trouble again!

ON THE face of it, Bosnia is doing fine. The economy is forecast to grow by a healthy 6% this year. When politics is not at issue, Serbs, Bosniaks and Croats get on better now than at any time since the end of the war. But politics keeps rearing its head. The past week has seen battle joined in a power-struggle that will determine where real authority lies in Bosnia and even if, in the long run, it will survive.

At the end of the Bosnian war in 1995 the country was divided into two parts, a federation of Croats and Bosniaks (Muslims) and the Serbian Republika Srpska (RS). Croats and Serbs were unenthusiastic about being forced to remain in a Bosnian state, but accepted that this was the result of the war. To keep this complex show running, the peace agreement provided for an international governor-general to arbitrate between the Bosnians and intervene when necessary.

The last high representative, as he is known, believed it was time for Bosnians to run their own show, so he stepped back from political life. After all, he argued, the office was due to be closed in June 2007. The result was political gridlock and stagnation, so the office stayed open. An agreement with the EU, widely regarded as the first step towards membership, has been ready since 2006. But Bosnia's leaders have not been able to agree on a number of political reforms that are required first, especially of the police.

Enter Miroslav Lajcak, a highly regarded Slovak diplomat who took over as high representative in July. He tried to break the deadlock over police reform, and warned Bosnia's leaders that unless they agreed to it they would lose another opportunity to move forward on the EU track. They failed, and so on October 19th he unveiled the first of what he says is a series of proposals for big changes.

Mr Lajcak is demanding that the Bosnian parliament and government can no longer be blocked simply because their members refuse to show up, which is often the case now. Bosnia's Serbian leader, Milorad Dodik, erupted in fury. This, he said, meant that Croats and Bosniaks could outvote Serbs; and, in revenge, he threatened to withdraw all Serbs from state institutions. If this happened, it would lead to chaos. Bosnians still remember how the RS was formed on the eve of war in 1992, when the Serbs left Bosnia's institutions.

On October 22nd a meeting between Mr Lajcak and Mr Dodik appeared to calm tensions. Immediately afterwards Mr Dodik left for a meeting in Belgrade with Serbia's prime minister, Vojislav Kostunica, and Vladimir Titov, Russia's deputy foreign minister. The threats to bring political chaos to Bosnia then started again. “They should either stop this or reveal their real intentions,” says Mr Lajcak. Asked whether, if things got worse, he would use his legal power to sack Mr Dodik, he replied with a firm “Yes”.

The looming struggle is closely connected to Kosovo. Technically it is a part of Serbia. If it gains independence soon, it will strengthen the hands of those, such as Mr Dodik, who oppose the centralising of the Bosnian state and sometimes threaten RS independence. This week Serbia's leaders have weighed in with denunciations of Mr Lajcak, as have the Russians, who have previously co-operated well in Bosnia with their Western counterparts. Now it seems clear that they are opening a new line of confrontation with the West, which stretches via Kosovo to the dispute over America's proposed missile shield.

Western diplomats have shelved the idea of closing down Mr Lajcak's post. Russia has not, and in November Russia's agreement in the Security Council will be required to renew the mandate for the remaining 2,500 EU peacekeeping troops in Bosnia. A fight may be in the offing. And even if Russia agrees to the renewal of the mandate, the broader outlook for the region is not hopeful. Judy Batt of the EU's Institute for Security Studies, who is working with Mr Lajcak, says that “politics in Bosnia and Serbia now mean that the EU perspective for the whole region is dying.”

Serbia's future: Serbia's future

2007-10-18T16:17:00.000-05:00

Oct 18th 2007
BELGRADE AND MITROVICA
From The Economist print edition

Some Serbs dream of a Russian alternative to the European Union

DOTTED across the Serbian north of the divided city of Mitrovica are pictures of its hero: Vladimir Putin. Russia, Kosovo's Serbs believe, has saved them from the independence demanded by its Albanians (Kosovars), who make up 90% of Kosovo's 2m people. It is too early to be sure they are right. But Western diplomats are worried by Serbia's dalliance with Russia.
Marko Jaksic, a member of Serbia's Kosovo negotiating team, helps to run northern Kosovo. He is a deputy leader of the party of Vojislav Kostunica, Serbia's prime minister. If America and many European Union countries recognise a unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo, he expects Serbia to offer Russia military bases “in Serbia, and especially on the border of Kosovo”. He adds that Serbia should abandon its bid to join the EU, and claims that Mr Kostunica thinks similarly but has less freedom to talk openly.

Such talk is meant to send chills down Western spines. If Serbia gave up trying to join the EU, not only would it return to the isolation of the 1990s but it could also drag the whole region down with it. How serious is the risk? Mr Kostunica's party is aligned with Mr Putin's United Russia party, and its official position is that Serbia should be neutral. Mr Kostunica has disparaged a potentially independent Kosovo as nothing but a “NATO state”.

A source close to President Boris Tadic, whose party is in uneasy coalition with Mr Kostunica, concedes that, if Kosovo's independence is recognised, it will be hard to instil “European values” in Serbia. Even Serbs who would secretly like to be shot of their troublesome southern province fear that full independence would be disastrous. They predict that Mr Kostunica would, if not formally end the country's bid for EU membership, at least slow it down, as well as trying to punish countries that recognise Kosovo and companies that trade there and in Serbia.

Yet the Russian alternative does not look appetising. The prospect of Russian bases in Serbia is “very unlikely”, says Ivan Vejvoda, who heads the Balkan Trust for Democracy, a big regional donor to good causes. Serbia is surrounded by the EU and NATO. “The Russian thing is a temporary, opportunistic thing, a balloon which will burst once we are over Kosovo,” he says. There is much excitement in Serbia about Russian companies moving in. On the list for privatisations that may interest them are JAT Serbian airlines, Belgrade airport, a mine in Bor and NIS, Serbia's oil company. Alexei Miller, head of Russia's energy giant, Gazprom, met Serbian leaders to discuss potential pipelines on October 9th. But so far Russian companies (except for Lukoil) have been notable by their absence. Russia is only the 18th-biggest investor in Serbia; the country's largest single exporter is owned by US Steel. The EU has poured lots of money into rebuilding Serbia. If Serbia kept on track, a lot more cash could come—and Russia offers little.

On October 15th Montenegro signed a “stabilisation and association agreement” with the EU, normally a step towards membership. Serbia could soon do the same. But a negative report to the EU from Carla Del Ponte, chief prosecutor at The Hague war-crimes tribunal, means that it must first be seen to do more to catch the fugitive Ratko Mladic. Ms Del Ponte will visit Serbia soon to check progress (the government has posted a reward for the missing general, 12 years after he was indicted). This suggests that the Russian option is, as one diplomat puts it, “loose talk”—for now. If many EU countries recognise an independent Kosovo next year, it will be their turn to call Serbia's bluff.

Kosovo's future: Fretting

2007-10-18T16:14:00.000-05:00

Oct 18th 2007
PRISTINA-From The Economist print edition

Independence is not quite in the bag

KOSOVO should be abuzz. A general election is due on November 17th. Soon afterwards Kosovo's Albanians (Kosovars) hope to declare independence, becoming the seventh country to emerge from the wreckage of Yugoslavia. Yet gloom hangs over the province, under United Nations jurisdiction since the end of the war in 1999. Too many promises have been broken for the Kosovars, who account for 90% of Kosovo's 2m population, to buzz.

The election will change little. None of the parties has any policies beyond independence. They are based on personalities and quarrels over who did what in the war. It will be, sighs a source close to government, “only a reshuffling of the pack”. There is a wild card, in the shape of Behgjet Pacolli. This Kosovar tycoon made his fortune as a builder in Russia and the former Soviet Union and has plastered Kosovo with posters of the Kremlin and other buildings he worked on, stating how many Kosovars he employed on each.

A troika of ambassadors from Russia, America and the European Union is holding talks between the Kosovars and Serbia, due to end on December 10th. After that, as there is unlikely to be a deal, the Kosovars want to declare independence. But a declaration will be worthless unless many countries, especially in the EU, recognise it.

With holidays and time needed to form a government, little will happen until early next year. Then Kosovar leaders fear that there may be calls for yet another round of diplomacy. They are nervous of a repeat of the Balkan past. In 1878 Bosnia came under Austro-Hungarian rule, but with nominal sovereignty staying with the Ottomans. The Kosovars fear that, once the UN mission is replaced by an EU one, the big powers might press them to accept that, even if Kosovo begins acting as an independent state, Serbia should retain sovereignty at least for a few years.

Kosovo's leaders will not accept this. Ominously, one armed group has made a dramatic appearance on television. Albin Kurti, a former student leader under house arrest for leading a protest that turned violent, says that 2m people in Kosovo are, in effect, under house arrest. He argues against any further negotiations, since negotiations always aim at compromise—and Kosovo cannot compromise on independence.

Sovereignty and Limits for Kosovo

2007-10-05T21:06:00.000-05:00

New York Times Editorial.

Eight years after NATO went to war to stop the ethnic purge in Kosovo, it’s time for the international community to recognize the province’s independence from Serbia. The United States and Europe are inching toward that decision, but Russia is blocking action by the Security Council. Although Kosovo’s Albanian-dominated government still has a way to go to fully guarantee the rights of its minority Serb population, more delays would only feed the resentments that led to so much turmoil and bloodshed throughout the 1990s.

Last February, a United Nations envoy presented a sensible plan that would grant Kosovo — which has been under the supervision of the United Nations since 1999 — a carefully limited independence, with extensive international supervision and protection for ethnic Serbs and other minorities. After Belgrade and Moscow fiercely objected, the Security Council agreed to another round of negotiations between Kosovo’s Albanians and Serbs. But Kosovo’s Serbs, and their allies in Belgrade, say they’ll never recognize Kosovo’s independence, while Kosovo’s Albanians, who compose 90 percent of the population, say they’ll accept nothing less.

The major powers now face a Dec. 10 deadline for deciding Kosovo’s future. Kosovo’s Albanians have agreed to the United Nations’ plan, which gives the Serbs much of what they want, including autonomy for Serb communities and protections for Serb monuments. The Albanians say they will declare independence unilaterally if the Security Council does not act. It is in everyone’s interest, including Russia’s, to have the United Nations maintain a strong role in this process.

Moscow and Belgrade have hinted at partition of Kosovo between Serbs and Albanians. That is a dangerous, unworkable approach that would embolden Serb nationalists and fuel more resentment among Albanians in a region that needs to restrain both sets of passions.

The United States and the majority of European Union countries that also favor independence must now take a firm stand. If Russia continues to oppose the United Nations’ plan, Washington and its allies must move ahead anyway and recognize Kosovo in time for the Dec. 10 deadline. They must also make clear to Belgrade that it has a lot to gain — including eventual membership in the European Union and NATO — if it doesn’t object too loudly or too destructively. Many Serbs would clearly prefer to be a favored ally of the West than of Russia.

A sovereign Kosovo, like all new democracies, will need long-term help meeting legal, human rights, economic and other challenges, but its people deserve the chance to try. And Serbs need to come to terms with the fact that Kosovo will never again be ruled by Belgrade. It’s time to begin healing this last Balkan wound.

Rice: Only independent Kosovo can stabilize Balkans

2007-09-25T07:29:00.000-05:00

Interview by Reuters.

QUESTION: Kosovo is one of the looming crises between now and the end of the year. Is the United States considering unilaterally recognizing Kosovo as independent if no broader agreement is reached in the Security Council this year?

SECRETARY RICE: Well, the United States is certainly committed to the logic of the Ahtisaari plan. And the logic of the Ahtisarri plan is that there isn't going to be a reunification of Serbia and Kosovo, and that both Kosovo and Serbia need to get on with their futures and leave behind their past.

We have committed to 120 days to see if the circumstances, the atmosphere, even some of the actual moves that the two sides could make, could make it a more amicable outcome. But in the final analysis, you know, the President was very clear when he was in Albania that there is going to be an independent Kosovo. Now, the question of how we get there, who else - I do believe the Europeans are in the same posture. How we get there, I think, is what's still to be determined. But there's going to be an independent Kosovo. We're dedicated to that. I think it's the only potential - the only solution that is potentially stabilizing for the Balkans rather than destabilizing for the Balkans.

QUESTION: Some of the diplomats involved say that the problem is that the Kosovars and the Serbs have no real incentive to negotiate seriously because they count on the Russians to veto a resolution and the Kosovars have no incentive because they can count on the United States to recognize UDI. What's your response to that?

SECRETARY RICE: Well, frankly, I was concerned about the same thing. Now, we've told the Kosovars that we don't think that a unilateral declaration of independence is a very good idea and so we need to go through this process.

I've been pleasantly surprised, as somebody who is fairly skeptical about what could be achieved, that I do think they're making some progress. Not that the Serbs and the Kosovars have - are suddenly going to come to the same understanding of what the final status will look like, but they are making, I think, some progress on some of the other issues that could lead to a more amicable and sustainable outcome at the end of this. And as I said, there's been good feeling about the cooperation between the EU, Russia and the United States.

QUESTION: Do you feel at the end of the process it will - you'll be prepared to let the European Union, as it were, take the lead in determining the final status, or do you think it's going to take American leadership to get the Europeans there?

SECRETARY RICE: Oh, I think it'll take the United States and Europe together on this one and when I talk to the Europeans, they all say, you know, we know that Europe - the Europeans say about themselves that they know that ultimately, the Balkans is, of course, much closer to Europe than to the United States and they need a stable Balkans so they're going to have to do - they're going to have to take the tough decisions and do the right thing.

We want very much to have good relations with Serbia and for Serbia to find its European home, but it's going to be difficult for Serbia to find a European home if it holds on to - you know, to old hopes. It's really time for everybody to move forward.

I've heard good things, frankly, about the meetings that have been going on, good things about the coordination and work that Russia, the EU and the United States are doing together in the troika. There are new ideas on the table, not about the actual status but about some of the tools and mechanisms that might be used to make relations between Serbia and Kosovo smoother. The Kosovars could do more, and we're pressing them to do more, to assure everyone that they really are going to live up to the other logic of the Ahtisaari plan, which is that this has to be a state that is completely devoted to minority rights, religious protections and so forth.

Nicolas Sarkozy: Kosovo’s independence is inevitable

2007-09-25T07:24:00.000-05:00

Interview by NYT. Below is the question and answer regarding the status of Kosovo:

NYT - (Q): If you’ll allow me to continue with Kosovo, when we’re talking about Kosovo it seems very likely that Russia will stick by its decision to veto any United Nations Security Council resolution. The United States regards this issue as a test of the European Union’s determination with respect to Moscow. Is Europe ready to see Moscow dictate it its foreign policy or is it going to endorse the decision?

Sarkozy- ( A): First, Kosovo’s independence is inevitable in the long term. Second, that Russia should want to regain its full place seems to me legitimate, and even desirable. Third, France wants excellent relations with Russia, but Russia cannot expect the rights of a big power without taking on the duties. Fourth, on the question of Kosovo, Europe has to remain united. It is all together that we must in the end back independence for Kosovo. And if I’ve said it is not a question of months or weeks, it’s because I wanted to preserve that unity. And Mr. [Vladimir V.] Putin [President of Russia] must understand that no one wants to humiliate him, that everyone understands efforts he is making to restore Russia to its standing, and no one can criticize him for this. But at the same time he must understand that his interlocutors have convictions every bit as much as he does, regarding human rights, respect for minorities, the rule of law, and democracy. It is called a frank dialogue.

Q. Is that what you had with him at [the G8 summit in] Heiligendamm [Germany, in June]?

A. Exactly. Just that. I found the talks with him very interesting. He told me his side of the truth frankly. I answered with equal frankness. I believe in Russia’s role. Russia is a great power. But no great power can exempt itself from its duties.

Albania's government:No power, no glory

2007-08-16T23:44:00.000-05:00

Aug 16th 2007 TIRANA

From The Economist print edition

A tale of corruption and power cuts

BAMIR TOPI, Albania's recently elected president, may find himself doing rather more than his job description would suggest. A 50-year-old biologist, he is the first head of the republican state never to have been a member of the Communist Party. He is also one of the country's few senior politicians not to have been seriously tainted by scandal.

The president does not have executive powers, but he has a say in appointing senior members of the judiciary and is also head of the armed forces. Mr Topi, deputy leader of the ruling Democratic Party under Sali Berisha, the present prime minister, has a reputation as a moderate. Could he give Albania's image abroad a boost and help to calm the chronic political in-fighting that came close to wrecking last month's presidential vote and precipitating an early general election?

It took four rounds of voting for Mr Topi to scrape together the three-fifths majority he needed to win. The final vote came after days of behind-the-scenes manoeuvring between Mr Berisha and Fatos Nano, his Socialist predecessor. Mr Nano's own hopes of becoming president were dashed when he failed to win the backing of his successor as party leader, Edi Rama.

The feud between Mr Berisha and Mr Nano, both prominent under Enver Hoxha, is one reason why Albania still suffers from high unemployment and low investment. Albanian migrants working in western Europe and America send home almost $1 billion a year in remittances. Most goes towards building homes and looking after jobless family members. Many Albanians are wary of setting up businesses at home, where licences are given out to political cronies, existing firms use blackmail and intimidation to discourage rivals and the judiciary is corrupt.

Mr Topi's first big task will be to name a new chief prosecutor to replace Theodhori Sollaku, who has been accused of having links with organised crime. Mr Sollaku, who was appointed by the Socialists in 2002, denies this, and his mandate has no expiry date. But Mr Topi is expected to push for a constitutional amendment to set a time limit. He will present this as one of the reforms that are needed for entry into NATO, a goal Albania hopes to achieve at next year's NATO summit in Romania. Without even a remote chance of early European Union membership, Albania is eager to join the other principal Western club soon.

Mr Berisha hopes to attract more foreign investment with his “Albania one-euro” policy of offering sites to foreign companies at minimal rents. But there are likely to be few takers so long as electricity shortages persist. In Tirana this summer, power has been switched off for at least six hours a day; in the countryside, power cuts can last as long as 20 hours. Plans for private investors to build new power plants are way behind schedule. Continuing power cuts are a big reason for a recent dip in the government's popularity and a revival in the Socialists' fortunes.

On the other hand, the economy is growing by about 6% a year. Land prices are rising, especially along the Adriatic coast, as foreigners buy up plots for future development. If the future of Kosovo is settled satisfactorily later this year, the prospects for Albania should brighten.

Liberating Kosovo

2007-08-14T08:22:00.000-05:00

Chicago Tribute Editorial

August 13, 2007

Eight years after bombing by U.S.-led forces put an end to ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, the troubled province still lacks its independence -- an evolution now threatened with further delay. Kosovo, with ethnic Albanian Muslims making up 90 percent of its 2 million people, still is part of Serbia, although it has been administered by the United Nations since the end of the war there in 1999. The U.S. and its European allies want Kosovo to achieve independence. The main diplomatic obstacle: Mother Russia, with its ancestral ties to the Serbian people.

But that's not the whole story. Russia's obstructionist stance is less about deep solidarity with its Slavic sister nation than with Moscow's tussle against Washington for spheres of influence in Europe. There's also Russia's fear that freedom for Kosovo will only encourage impatient separatists in its own multiethnic realm.

As a consequence, Russia in recent weeks has forced the U.S. and the Europeans to withdraw several Kosovo resolutions they had offered to the UN Security Council. All of these proposals would have paved the way for an independent Kosovo while providing for the protection of the prospective nation's Serbian minority.

How to attack the stalemate? The West has now agreed that a troika composed of the U.S., Russia and the European Union will conduct 120 days of shuttle diplomacy, which began Friday, with Serbian officials in Belgrade and Kosovo officials in Pristina. This may be the final attempt to find an amicable solution.

Should those talks surprisingly bear fruit, the EU likely would take over the administration of Kosovo. The EU then could economically rebuild this region of 4,200 square miles that has largely depended on the generosity of ethnic Albanians living across Europe. The Serbs would be compensated for giving away 15 percent of their territory, which many of them consider the cradle of their nation, with the prospect of joining the EU and enjoying the economic boost it has brought in recent years to its new member states.

But persuading the Serbs that liberating Kosovo serves their own long-term interests is a demanding task. They do, after all, have Russia's support for insisting on their territorial integrity, which was enshrined in the Security Council resolution that put the interim UN administration in place. And the perceived strength of their position may well entice Serbian leaders in Belgrade to thwart the West in repayment for what they still regard as unjust and humiliating treatment during the Balkan wars in the 1990s.

The Bush administration is ready to recognize an independent Kosovo regardless of the outcome of the new talks. This proper (and calculated) move has stepped up pressure not only on the Serbs but also on those European governments that have been reluctant to take the same step. Some, such as Spain and Cyprus, would prefer to extend the status quo indefinitely rather than do anything to keep their own domestic separatists from growing bolder. Others, such as Germany and France, want the Security Council involved, both to bolster the UN's credibility and to give the EU legal authority to be involved in Kosovo's reconstruction.

Washington's task is to convince the European governments that the Kosovars are finally entitled to assume responsibility for their own fate. That means pushing the Europeans to set aside their respective domestic fears and act as a group.

Getting Europe united and having the West speak with one voice would send a long-overdue signal to Russia that its muscular tactics won't increase its influence in European affairs.

And in practical terms, a united Europe also is crucial to securing a strong engagement of the EU in Kosovo, even if the shuttle diplomacy fails. Given that, according to the UN, 400,000 arms are still being kept in the province illegally, an EU commitment going forward is critical to prevent new eruptions of violence in what remains Europe's most explosive spot.

Fair use from Chicago Tribune.

Letters home: School uniform is 'cool' for Kosovo girl shot 16 times and now in UK

2007-08-11T11:18:00.000-05:00

From Manchester with love

Cool school uniform, warm Manchester days and refugee theatre form some of the early impressions of a young orphan rescued from Kosovo, recounted in letters home.

Picture: Saranda lost 14 members of her family in the war.

Saranda Bogujevci, 22, enjoyed the most miraculous of miraculous escapes as Serbian paramilitary killers riddled her body with 16 bullets in a massacre in the garden of her family home in the village of Podujevo on the 28th March 1999. Six of her family - including her mother and brother - were killed.

Saranda left the bloodshed in Pristina behind as she settled in Manchester and recovered from her injuries. But the horror of her family's murder follows her, and years later she returns to the region to testify against the killers.

Below are extracts from letters she wrote home to her grandmother, as she gets to grips with her new surroundings in the north-west of England.

10 SEPTEMBER 1999

Dear Grandma, It's been months since I saw you but so much has happened and I want to tell you how I've ended up here, sitting in a hospital bed in Manchester, England.

We were rescued from the hospital in Kosovo and sent here. I can remember the night so clearly in my head. 14 June. All four of us cousins were in Pristina Hospital. This was where the other soldiers had sent us after the shooting of the family.

I've not been able to say what I'm thinking because my English isn't good enough. It's driving me mad

It was very dark outside - pitch, pitch black. The lights in the corridor were really dim. It was so quiet inside. I could see the nurses going up and down the corridor but there were no soldiers. Usually this corridor was filled with drunken or injured soldiers. With lots of noise, shouting, laughing, singing, even shooting sometimes, but on this night there was none of that.

In the morning, when the time came for the nurses to wake us up, nothing happened. So I got up with the girl who was sharing my room to go to the toilet. Whilst I was waiting for her, I looked out the window and I caught sight of a Nato sign on one of the tanks. Even though I was tired and weak, I ran down the corridor to tell my cousin Jehona. I just wanted to scream as loud as I could.

2 FEBRUARY 2000

Dear Grandma, The last time I wrote I was lying in a hospital bed. Well, things have got better since then. I still have physiotherapy all the time, sometimes up to five times a week but at least I get to go home in the evenings.

About three months ago I had the major operation on my arm. Please don't worry about my injuries, though, the doctors here did a great job. So good in fact that I'm back at school. It's great to be back amongst kids my own age. Plus I get to wear a school uniform which is really cool. No one back home would wear them but here we all turn up in our grey skirts, jumpers and purple ties.

It's hot here too today - it doesn't happen often but Manchester can get pretty warm

The lessons take my mind off what has happened in the last year. Even though it's only science, maths and the odd art lesson, I can lose myself in the tasks. Plus the other pupils and the teachers are really nice, which makes all the difference.

It's strange though, as the whole school system is different to how it would be in Kosovo. Instead of the teachers having their own room, my class has a room and the teachers have to come to us.

Although I'm healing well on the inside there are still things that get in my way. I can't tell people what I think. So many times I've not been able to say what I'm thinking because my English isn't good enough. It's driving me mad, I want to say to people: "This isn't me, I'm not coming across in the way I intend!"

But I can't so I feel like a different person. I hate it. I was never quiet back home and here the teachers think I'm so well behaved. If only they knew! I miss you and home so much. Hope to see you soon. Love Saranda.

20 AUGUST 2002

Dear Grandma, I was just thinking about you. I'd got my music system on and cousin Ismet's track was playing. You know, the one about the wedding. If I close my eyes, I can see myself out in the garden in Podujevo, in the bright sun. It's hot here too today. It doesn't happen often but Manchester can get pretty warm, not like home though.

Anyway, I've got some good news. Today I got my GCSE results (they're sort of like the exams you'd do at the end of primary school). I got the top mark in art!

Ever since that day, when the Serbian army came in and shot us, I wanted to see them brought to justice

I think I had a really good teacher but still, I feel a little weird, I really didn't write that much for the coursework. I wasn't even sure if I'd pass the exam. So to get an A* is, well, not what I expected.

Having said that, recently I have become so much more confident in speaking to people in English. Now I can say what I really think. I've felt invisible for the past few years and its great not to have someone else talk for me at last. I think I might take art at college, since it was my best grade. The place I've decided to go to has a great art department.

Remember how I thought I might have to be a pharmacist? Well, how things change. I can tell you, I would have been a really bad pharmacist, it's probably better for everyone's health now. Hope to see you soon. Love Saranda.

MARCH 2003

Dear Grandma, I'm feeling so odd today. We got back from the airport yesterday but it still hasn't sunk in that the trial is over. Ever since that day, when the Serbian army came in and shot us, I wanted to see them brought to justice. Seeing them sitting in the courtroom everyday, it felt so, on the one hand great because we could say what they'd done to us but also scary.

We were worried that something could happen again. It was tough getting through the process: we needed 24-hour protection. From the moment we landed in Belgrade to the moment we left again.

It's funny, when I went home this summer and tried to hook up with my old mates it was harder than I expected - most are now married, or have moved away

It was weird because I ended up testifying on mum's birthday and in the car on the way back I remember resting my head on the car window and looking at the sun, it was so bright. Anyway, just for a second, there she was, smiling face-to-face at me. I'd forgotten it was her birthday and it took my mobile phone's calendar to remind me of it. When I switched it on at the end of the day it beeped up with the message, "Mum's birthday".

We had to go and I'm glad we did but I'm pleased to be back home in Manchester. I've spent so long thinking about what happened back in 1999 and now, at last, I feel like I can move on, that it's okay to move on, that the people that did this to me, to you, to all the women and children, that they've been punished. I miss you. Love Saranda.

SEPTEMBER 2004

Dear Grandma, I've just come back from meeting a friend in town. She's like me; she has family abroad and totally gets what it's like to have two cultures in your life, one foot in Manchester and one foot elsewhere. She's so chilled out and doesn't judge me at all.

Aside from Claire, I'm making other new friends here all of the time. It's funny, when I went home this summer and tried to hook up with my old mates it was harder than I expected. Most are now married, or have moved away. I suppose we've all grown apart. We're not the people we were back in primary school.

There are other good things going on in Manchester too. I've started to do loads more activities. The local theatre, the Royal Exchange, has got a group together of refugees who act and we're devising a show for the studio theatre. I learned a lot from the cast. Most of us hadn't acted before but this made us all really close as we needed each other. The show we devised was called Face to Face: Love in the UK and is all about relationships. It's very funny. I wished you'd seen it. Love Saranda.

30 JUNE 2007

Dear Grandma, I've got time to write to you as I've finished my uni for the summer. You'll never guess where I'm going next year though... Canada. I can remember wanting to go places as a kid, especially coming to England. I never thought I'd live here and now I'm heading off for another land.

I can't wait to see you all. You know that Kosovo will always be the place of my childhood and where I was made but Manchester is what made me an adult. I wish I could talk to Mum and ask her what she thinks of me as an adult. Is this the grown up Saranda she had in mind? I'll never know. I'll write soon, love Saranda.

Fair use from BBC.

Russian Bear lurking in the shadows

2007-08-04T17:26:00.001-05:00

Slovenia to break Kosovo logjam with EU offer

2007-07-31T22:39:00.000-05:00

By Christopher Condon in Budapest, Neil MacDonald in Belgrade,and George Parker in Brussels
Published: July 31 2007 03:00-Financial Times.

Slovenia will try to persuade Serbia to give Kosovo independence in exchange for a chance to join the European Union.

Officials in Ljubljana hope to use Slovenia's presidency of the EU next year to break the logjam over the United Nations-administered breakaway province, in exchange for EU candidate status for Serbia. After the failure of talks between Belgrade and separatist Kosovo Albanian leaders this year, Martti Ahtisaari, the UN mediator, urged the UN Security Council to impose independence, with EU-led supervision to protect Serbs and other minorities in the province of 2m people.

But Russia, Serbia's veto-holding ally on the Security Council, has blocked three pro-independence draft resolutions put forward by the US and EU countries.
Nevertheless Dimitrij Ru-pel, Slovenia's foreign minister, is optimistic. "I have never felt as confident as I feel now dealing with my colleagues from Serbia."
As the only ex-Yugoslav republic in the 27-nation bloc, Slovenia hopes it can broker closer ties with other former Yugoslav countries.

Eight years after the end of the last Balkan war, efforts to solidify the region's peace badly need a jump-start. The EU is struggling to overcome the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina, inter-ethnic political deadlock in Macedonia and the status of Kosovo.

Although the EU endorsed the Ahtisaari plan, many EU members have resisted pushing Serbia too hard over Kosovo, fearing a resurgence of extreme Serb nationalism and a return to economic isolation for the largest ex-Yugoslav republic.

Slovenia's chief advantage in approaching each of these is its intimate familiarity with the region. Slovenes share a similar language and culture with most former Yugoslavs, especially Croats and Serbs. Yugoslav-era political connections remain as well.
Unlike Croatia or Bosnia, Slovenia won its independence almost without bloodshed. No deep scars of war prevented it from re-establishing relatively good relations with its former Yugoslav partners.

Ljubljana is motivated by growing commercial interests across the region.Slovenian investments in the western Balkans ac-counted for nearly two-thirds of the country's out-going foreign direct investment in 2006. "Slovenia has a similar interest in a region in the way Portugal has an interest in Africa," said Janez Jansa, prime minister.

Slovenia's understanding of the region, however, guarantees very little. Its plans for Serbia and Macedonia could be overly ambitious. Even shepherding Croatia closer to EU membership may prove problematic. Despite generally good relations, Ljubljana and Zagreb have been in dispute over their borders. Croatia has accused Slovenia of obstructing Croatia's EU accession talks to gain the upper hand in a maritime dispute, which Ljubljana denies.

Plucky nation of 2m ready to take on the might of union's giants

Europe's political game of musical chairs has entered an intriguing new phase. The next time the music stops, Slovenia - an Alpine country of 2m people - will be in the hot seat, running the presidency of the EU, a bloc of almost 500m people.

For the former communist country, the first of the EU's 2004 intake of new members to assume the rotating presidency, it is a sign and a test of Slovenia's growing maturity.
Other countries have run a mile from taking on the cost and commitment of running the EU. Estonia, for example, has managed to avoid the fateful moment until 2018; Poland will not have its go until 2011.

One can see why. Slovenia has pencilled in €62m ($85m, £42m) as the cost of running the six-month presidency starting on January 1, while Janez Jansa, prime minister, reckons at least 70 per cent of his time will be devoted to European issues.
It is the diplomatic equivalent of hosting the Olympics. A brand new conference facility is taking shape at the lakeside venue of Brdo in the shadow of the Alps.

Slovenes expect to chair 3,000-4,000 meetings and are taking courses in how to conduct them, as well as crash courses in French; scores of officials are being dispatched to Brussels.
There was near unanimous parliamentary support in 2004 for Slovenia taking on the presidency, and the main parties have agreed to suspend hostilities on European issues while Mr Jansa is in the chair.

Fair use from Financial Times.

Kosovo-Out with the UN, in with the EU

2007-07-26T20:55:00.000-05:00

Jul 26th 2007-From The Economist print edition

The West seeks a way around Russia's veto in the Balkans

WHEN the Americans and their friends in the European Union last week withdrew a proposed resolution on the future of Kosovo from the UN Security Council, it was clear that Russia and Serbia had won a hard-fought diplomatic battle. But Vojislav Kostunica, Serbia's prime minister, said that many more fierce engagements lay ahead. This is all the more true because Kosovo has increasingly become part of an argument between the West and Russia which has little to do with its rival Serbs and Albanians.

Still technically part of Serbia, Kosovo and its 2m people have been under the jurisdiction of the UN since the end of a war there in 1999. Some 90% of the population consists of ethnic Albanians who demand nothing less than independence. Serbia's leaders say that Kosovo, a land studded with medieval Serbian churches, can have anything it wants except full independence—the only thing Kosovo's Albanian leaders say they will not compromise on.

In the past four months Western countries have circulated several draft Security Council resolutions on Kosovo's future. All aimed to give it independence, making it the seventh and last state to emerge from the wreckage of what was Yugoslavia. Russia, with its power of veto, objected every time. It said it would support such a package only if it were agreed between Serbia and Kosovo's Albanians. Last year 14 rounds of talks between them, overseen by Martti Ahtisaari, a former Finnish president, failed to achieve any result.

Now, say the diplomats, it is time for the parties to talk again, this time under the aegis of the Contact Group, the informal body that has co-ordinated policy towards the former Yugoslavia since the early 1990s. Its members are Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Russia and the United States. Officially, this is what Russia and Serbia want. In fact, Serbia has no idea what its strategy should be. Kosovo's Albanians have no intention of making any more compromises than they already have for Mr Ahtisaari's plan for an internationally “supervised independence”, which has now hit the buffers at the UN.

Russia may have less interest in Kosovo itself than in the chance to stir up differences between its EU neighbours. But some EU diplomats say they have no intention of being thwarted by Russia. Along with the Americans, they aim to use the coming months to build up a critical mass of European countries ready to recognise a unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo when the talks inevitably fail. But, in exchange for this, the EU wants Kosovo's government to invite a strong EU mission to replace the withering UN one in the disputed territory.

Fires wreak havoc in the Balkans, Southeast Europe

2007-07-24T14:26:00.000-05:00

By Radu Marinas
BUCHAREST, July 24 (Reuters) - Twelve Romanians died and fire-fighters, soldiers and volunteers battled wildfires across southeastern Europe on Tuesday as a persistent heat wave broke temperature records across the region.

Serbia was battling 50 forest fires on what meteorologists predicted would be the hottest day of the year, with the temperature topping 43 degrees Celsius (109 Fahrenheit).
In Romania, the heat wave's death toll rose to 30 and 19,000 people had been admitted to hospital in the region's second devastating hot spell this year.

Bucharest tried to cope with sporadic power blackouts under an increased load of air conditioners and fans, but health officials were able to cancel "Code Red" emergency measures declared on Monday as they forecast easing temperatures.

"We have good news ... from Thursday we will shift to 'Code Green'," Health Minister Eugen Nicolaescu told reporters.
More than 35 people died in Romania, Turkey and Greece in June when the mercury shot up to 46 Celsius.

Forests in Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia, Bulgaria and Greece have been ravaged by flames this week, blamed on record-high temperatures after the dry winter.
"I spoke with the Greeks and the Bulgarians to ask for help, but they have the same problem," said Predrag Maric, chief of Serbia's police rescue department.

"We hoped a Russian water-bomber would arrive in the morning, but they had to go help in Bulgaria where the situation is critical. And today will be the hottest day of the year."
In Macedonia temperatures were expected to hit an all-time record of 45 degrees Celsius during the day. One man died of smoke inhalation overnight in the southern town of Bitola and 200 were evacuated from a suburb.

In Bosnia, the southern towns of Citluk, the Adriatic port of Neum and the mountain town of Visegrad declared states of emergency. Towns and villages faced power cuts and water shortages due to the fires.

"The wind is our biggest enemy, it speeds up the burn enormously," said Stanko Sliskovic, Civil Defence Secretary of Bosnia's Muslim-Croat federation.
There were 18 fires burning in Serbia's breakaway Kosovo province, most near inhabited areas including the capital Pristina, and police, forestry officials and soldiers from the resident NATO-led peacekeeping force KFOR were battling flames.

"We have ordered all fire fighters to work," said Mahir Hasani of Kosovo's Emergencies Department. "There is no day off, no holiday for anybody. We are on high alert." (Additional reporting by Kole Casule in Skopje, Fatos Bytyci in Pristina and Daria Sito-Sucic in Sarajevo and Luiza Ilie in Bucharest)
Fair use from Reuters.

BalkanUpdate hacked by a Jihadi

2007-07-23T22:12:00.000-05:00

BalkanUpdate website is back online again. The website was hacked by an Islamic extremist ( Jihadi) because, according to the message, the website supported United States and Israel. I was really surprised to see this site come to the attention of a Jihadi as we don’t comment on issues that raise the ire of Jihadis. There is only one article: Kosovo Leader visits Israel that even mentions Israel, but that seems to have been enough to cause them to take the site down. An investigation reviled that the hacker was attracted to the site by the above link that was posted in another pro Russian/Slavic blog. I don’t know what to make out of this, but I am glad the site is back and running.

Above is the message left by the hacker. The audio piece was apparently a pro Jihad propaganda song.

The butcher of the Balkans rests in peace

2007-07-17T20:07:00.000-05:00

……while his victims continue to be found in mass graves in the fields of Serbia, Kosovo and Bosnia. Oh, the butcher I had in mind is Slobodan Milosevic. The grave is guarded by a 44 year old Serb whose only comment to the journalist from the daily Express, who visited the grave, was "I am glad I have this job". We are glad too, pal. Enjoy it!

Kosovo's future: A new battlefield

2007-07-12T20:06:00.000-05:00

Jul 12th 2007 MITROVICA AND PRISTINA

From The Economist print edition

The Russians have staved it off for now, but unilateral independence for Kosovo may still be coming

IN THE Serb-controlled northern part of Mitrovica, in Kosovo, a banner calls on the Russians for help. “In the name of God and justice,” reads another, in English, “do not make our Holy Land a present to Albanians.” Yet a few hundred metres south, across the River Ibar, Albanians stroll around in the sunshine. Kosovo feels calm and peaceful. It could, however, be the calm before the storm.

This week diplomats at the United Nations were working on the fifth draft of a Security Council resolution on the future of Kosovo. Russia has all but promised to veto any text that foresees independence for the territory. It seems that, although the war is far from over, they have won this round in the new battle of Kosovo.

Technically Kosovo is part of Serbia. But since the end of the fighting in 1999 it has been under UN jurisdiction. Some 90% of its 2m people are ethnic Albanians (Kosovars) who want independence. In 2005 the UN invited Martti Ahtisaari, a former Finnish president, to chair talks between Serbia and the Kosovars on the province's future. Serbia says the Kosovars can have anything they want but formal independence. The Kosovars say they will compromise on anything but that.

In March, after the two sides duly failed to agree, Mr Ahtisaari sent the Security Council his own plan for “supervised independence”. This foresaw an independent Kosovo, with highly autonomous zones for the Serb minority and the replacement of the UN mission by an EU mission, with a form of international governor. Serbia rejected this, as did Russia.

The Russians assert that Kosovo's independence against Serbia's wishes would set a precedent for other separatists. Not so, say Western supporters of the plan, who argue that Kosovo is a unique case. Many Western diplomats thought that Russia would eventually make a deal, trading Kosovo's independence for something else. Their mantra has been that “there is no Plan B.” But now, says Veton Surroi, a senior Kosovar politician who is de facto foreign minister, “Plan A is dead.”

Diplomats in New York are trying to tempt the Russians with a resolution which, though not endorsing the Ahtisaari plan, would allow the EU to replace the UN mission in Kosovo. The odds are against them, because the draft calls on Serbs and Kosovars to talk again for 120 days while the EU mission takes over. Once that is done, it would be easier to recognise an independent Kosovo.

Meanwhile, Mr Surroi observes, nobody is saying “what we should talk about.” Diplomats say the talks are meant to “go the extra mile” but, as Mr Surroi asks, once you have already done a marathon, what is the point of running an extra mile? The answer is that, for now, neither America nor the EU has the stomach to face down Russia. But when the EU mission is running, a unilateral declaration of independence would be easier.

On June 28th Serbs commemorated the 618th anniversary of their defeat in the battle of Kosovo at the hands of the Ottoman Turks. Vojislav Kostunica, Serbia's prime minister, declared that a new battle was being waged for Kosovo. It is a battle of “might or right”, he said, “and only right can win in Kosovo.” Yet Vuk Jeremic, Serbia's foreign minister, seems discomfited by the recent assertion of Russia's Vladimir Putin that the Balkans had always been a sphere of Russian special interest and that it was “natural that a resurgent Russia is returning there.” Russia is a good friend, says Mr Jeremic, but Serbia's strategic priority is still to join the EU.

Serbian and EU officials are at pains to insist that there is no link between Kosovo's future and Serbia's EU aspirations, but in the long run there must be. If Kosovo remains unresolved and restive, the EU will not admit Serbia as a member. Mr Jeremic claims that, in the coalition government, “we are all on the same page”. This is not widely believed. Partisans of President Boris Tadic argue (privately) that joining the EU is more important than keeping Kosovo, whereas supporters of Mr Kostunica say (publicly) that keeping Kosovo is more important than joining Europe.

Privately some Serbs and Kosovars say they could have serious talks on partition, but only, say the Kosovars, if the Serbs are prepared to trade the north of Kosovo for Albanian-inhabited areas of Serbia outside Kosovo. Diplomats hate such talk. For them it risks discussion of similar divisions in Macedonia, Bosnia and beyond.

In the next few weeks Serbs and Kosovars seem likely to be asked to talk again. They will doubtless glare at each other for a few more months, and the issues that confront the diplomats now will then return. At that point, if Russia continues to insist that Kosovo must stay part of Serbia, the Americans and the EU may be forced to do what they balk at now: unilaterally recognise Kosovo's independence.

At least, despite menacing words from some former guerrillas, Kosovars are not reaching for their Kalashnikovs. They understand, says a well-connected source in Pristina, that “any violence would be a bad investment now, because it would give ammunition to Russian diplomats who would argue that we were troublemakers.” For now, says Enver Hoxhaj, a Kosovar deputy, “we are just the first victims of the new Russian imperialism.”

Fair use from The Economist